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This dissertation addresses the relationship between mobilized coalitions of 
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democracy. It offers a critique of major works in political theory that see in civil 
society the potential to transform democratic politics, primarily through the protection 
of civil society from the state in order to allow for the development of new identities 
and forms of sociability. The three main theoretical objections to these works involve 
their focus on state-civil society relations at the expense of economic factors, the 
presupposition that consensus is present in civil society, and the assumption that 
mobilized civil societies are fueled from the grassroots. Four recent cases of civil 
society mobilizations from Latin America, in Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia, are presented to illustrate the deficiencies of current theoretical approaches to 
civil society. The case studies show the importance of material conditions and the 
framing of specific grievances in the formation of popular movements grounded in 
civil society.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The view that mass popular movements rooted in civil society play an 
important role in the promotion of democracy has become entrenched among 
academics and policymakers across the globe in the past three decades. Citizen 
mobilizations, encompassing a wide range of social actors and held together not by 
class or ethnic affiliations but by a common political project, have been instrumental 
in many countries in forcing the reform of political institutions, increased legitimacy 
and responsiveness on the part of governments, and the protection of rights and 
privileges inherent in democratic life. Yet, the ideal of a mobilized civil society has 
been developed by political theorists both too narrowly – paying attention to events in 
which civil societies pursue very specific goals – and too optimistically – overstating 
the impact that civil society can have, by itself, on national politics.     
The term ‘civil society,’ as is well known, attracted scholarly attention in the 
1980’s and 1990’s as a result of its use by dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America in the 70’s and 80’s to make sense of the growing discontent with 
authoritarian political regimes intent on decimating social ties that could threaten 
their hold on power. Labor unions, students, and scholars fought the intrusion of 
overbearing states on social relations and private affairs through non-violent, public 
actions of resistance, articulating their efforts as those of “civil society against the 
state” (Arato 1981). Students of transitions to democracy during the “third wave of 
democratization” (Huntington 1993) similarly recognized the presence and 
importance of popular movements that exerted pressure on state governments to 




collective protest. In their influential analysis of Latin American transitions to 
democracy in the 1970’s and 1980’s, Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter 
(1986) see the locus of popular power thus:  
In some cases and at particular moments of the transition, many of these diverse 
layers of society may come together to form what we choose to call the ‘popular 
upsurge.’ Trade unions, grass-roots movements, religious groups, intellectuals, 
artists, clergymen, defenders of human rights, and professional associations all 
support each other’s efforts towards democratization and coalesce into a greater 
whole which identifies itself as ‘the people’ (pp. 53-54).  
 
Such mass movements have become archetypes through which later protest 
waves in several parts of the world have been compared. From the “people power 
revolution” in the Philippines in 1986, which led to the ouster of dictator Ferdinand 
Marcos (Thompson 1995), through popular protests fueled by the corruption of 
elected officials in several Latin American countries in the 1990’s (Abente-Brun 
1999; García 2001; Espinal 2002; Valença 2002) and Eastern Europe (Spasic 2004; 
McFaul 2005), to the recent mobilizations against the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, 
following the assassination of former Lebanese President Rafik Hariri in February 
2005 (Safa 2006), protest movements intent on restoring democracy and sovereignty 
in their countries have been applauded as reflecting the strengthening of civil society 
and its positive effect on national politics.1  
                                                 
1 Sparked by alleged fraudulent election results on November 21, 2004, the “Orange Revolution” in 
Ukraine in particular captured global attention. “The most significant aspect of this thing is the 
mobilization of the population,” according to Lubomyr Hajda, associate director of Harvard's 
Ukrainian Research Institute in Cambridge, Mass., “it led to the birth of a civic nation, not an ethnic 
nation” (“Wireless World: the Orange Revolution” in The Washington Times, 17 December 2004). The 
Kyiv Post called the Ukrainian Parliament’s decision to void the results of that election and call for a 
new one on December 16 a “massive victory for the Ukrainian people and civil society” (quoted in 
“Election Pain Yields New Ukraine” in Slate, 9 December 2004 - http://slate.msn.com/id/2110850) 
and a New York Times article drew comparisons between the events in Kiev and many other instances 
in which “the people” helped advance democracy (“Heeding the Roar of the Street” in The New York 
Times, 5 December 2004). The scenes from Kiev, as well as similar uprisings in other former Soviet 




These events point to the capacity of collective social actors to not only 
mobilize against states, but to do so in a united front; coalescing, as O’Donnell and 
Schmitter put it, “into a greater whole.” Almost invariably (if sometimes implicitly) 
these actors, as well as the greater whole of which they are temporarily a part, are 
identified as “civil society.” They suggest that movements and organizations 
voluntarily formed by citizens through horizontal communication can have a 
significant impact in the promotion of democracy. In the actions of dissident groups 
in Eastern Europe, in the popular upsurges in Latin America, and in the more recent 
waves of mass demonstrations and protests, civil society has made its presence felt 
through the active articulation of the goals and beliefs of its members.2  
Among students of democratic transitions it is accepted that a healthy 
democracy requires the free and autonomous interaction of citizens and voluntary 
organizations in order for these to act as a foil to unchecked state action (Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999). Generally speaking, civil society is seen as constituting 
the space for the aggregation of the wishes of citizens and through which they can 
organize to pursue them in opposition to the goals of the governing state (Foley and 
Edwards 1996). Given its origins and subsequent use on the part of scholars and 
policymakers, the term civil society has become intertwined with a specific form of 
political regime – liberal democracy, – an idea that has received its share of criticism. 
                                                                                                                                           
fall of Communist regimes in the potential of civil society to be a force of democracy promotion 
around the world. 
2 In this sense, civil society is not a constant in political life but only a potential participant. This 
should be distinguished from the role ascribed to civil society by scholars such as Ernest Gellner 
(1983, 1994, and 1995), Adam Seligman (1992), and Robert Putnam (1993, 1995, 2001, and 2003), for 
whom social interactions strengthen democracy in a more indirect, passive way – civil society’s 
contribution rests much more on the fact of its being there than on the purposeful actions of its 
components. Hereafter, my use of the term should be understood to refer mainly to social actors who 





Empirical work has shown that civil society does not necessarily support democracy 
(Berman 1997; Encarnación 2003) and several scholars warn against believing 
wholesale in the “myth” of a virtuous civil society that is always on the right (Loaeza 
1994, Lechner 1995, Plattner 1995; Hengstenberg et al 1999, Salazar 1999, Rucht 
2003). On the other hand, some political theorists have decried the “taming” of the 
idea of civil society and instead explore its democratizing potential beyond the 
opposition to openly authoritarian regimes or the establishment of electoral 
democratic institutions. 
The avowedly “self-limiting utopian” visions developed by Jean Cohen and 
Andrew Arato (1992), John Keane (1988a and 1988b), and Gideon Baker (2002), 
along with theorists of “new social movements” (NSM’s) such as Alain Touraine 
(1981, 1982, 1987, and 1989) and Alberto Melucci (1989 and 1992) understand the 
major conflict between society and the state to be a struggle for hegemony – what Kai 
Nielsen (1995) calls “cultural leadership” (p. 46) – between the overbearing state and 
alternative understandings of politics resulting from the free interaction of individuals 
coming together in collective entities founded in ties of solidarity. This struggle takes 
place in what Jürgen Habermas (1991) calls the “public sphere,” which implies that 
counter-hegemonic worldviews be made known through political action. For these 
authors, civil society is only truly present when it is active, leading them to identify it 
with social movements. In order to come into being, however, civil society requires 
that the dominant political powers allow for the opportunity of individuals to act and 
interact with a certain degree of freedom, such that the fundamental goal of civil 




Far from viewing social movements as antithetical to either the democratic political 
system or to a properly organized social sphere (the pluralists’ view), we consider 
them to be a key feature of a vital, modern, civil society and an important form of 
citizen participation in public life. Yet we do not see social movements as prefiguring 
a form of citizen participation that will or even ought to substitute for the institutional 
arrangements of representative democracy (the radical democratic position). In our 
view, social movements for the expansion of rights, for the defense of the autonomy 
of civil society, and for its further democratization are what keep a democratic 
political culture alive (Cohen and Arato 1992, pp. 19-20).   
  
The radical view of democracy that emerges from these works is one in which 
individuals within civil society are constantly engaged in a struggle for freedom from 
the machinations and manipulations of elites. “Civil society,” as John Keane puts it 
(1988a), “should become a thorn in the side of power” (p. 15). Civil society and 
social movements, then, play a similar role in democratic societies as they do in cases 
of citizen struggles against authoritarianism or foreign domination. But rather than 
demand the establishment of or respect for democratic institutions, they provide a 
critical counterpart to the state and the economy and thus contribute to the further 
entrenchment of the ideal of democracy as a system of government of, for, and by the 
people.  
 The legacy of the original civil society uprisings in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America has encouraged the belief that civil society is unified by a desire for freedom 
and democracy latent in society, translated into action by organized social 
movements. The result is the almost automatic assumption that popular movements 
rooted in civil society are driven by this sentiment – the drive to keep society free 
from state interference and thus expand democracy – which falls nicely in line with 
the requirements of liberal democratic institutions (at the same time as it “deepens” 
democracy) as well as free-market economies (though it replaces in social 




collective actors in democratic polities, however, this position becomes problematic, 
both in terms of the theoretical understanding of the concept of civil society and of its 
aptness as a tool to understand the behavior of contemporary mass popular 
movements. Putting aside the obvious fact that some collective actors pursue goals 
incompatible with democracy (see Tilly 2003),3 the contention that a mobilized civil 
society pursuing democratic goals will necessarily engage in the development of 
alternative identities separate from (and critical of) the state requires further 
inspection. 
 This dissertation addresses this question, first, by outlining some major 
theoretical difficulties inherent in the works of “utopian” theorists of civil society and 
NSMs and, second, by tracing the process through which the complex and 
heterogeneous sets of social organizations, groups, and movements that constitute 
civil society coalesce into temporarily unified actors in cases that do not fit that 
conception. By focusing either on the conflict between society and authoritarian 
regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cohen and Arato, Keane, Baker and 
others) or on the overwhelming penetration of the state in civil society in the 
industrialized world (Habermas and the NSM theorists), these thinkers neglect the 
fact that, in many cases, these are neither the most urgent nor the most important 
problems faced by citizens. In order to make this clear, I examine a number of recent 
mass mobilizations rooted in civil society in Latin America. In contrast to past 
struggles against authoritarianism in the region, and even of recent mobilizations 
decrying corrupt leadership and illegitimate political practices, citizen mobilizations 
                                                 
3 See also Eder (2003) for a discussion of the problematic relationship between identity mobilization 




in countries as different as Costa Rica (the region’s oldest and most stable 
democracy) to ‘fragile’ or ‘unconsolidated’ democracies such as Argentina, Bolivia, 
Paraguay, and Ecuador have been driven as much by a rejection of economic policies 
embraced by elites as by political demands for responsiveness and accountability. The 
overwhelming force of these mobilizations, and their self-defined democratic 
character raises questions on the applicability of the civil society model offered 
above.  
The main focus of the case-studies is on the historical development of the 
relationship between civil society and the state in four Latin American countries – 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Bolivia – leading up to the mass mobilizations in 
the recent past, in order to identify how they differ from the cases commonly 
addressed in this literature. The major problem I see in ascribing particular 
characteristics to civil society is the fact that it is, by definition, composed of a 
multiplicity of different groups, associations, and movements, which are most often 
separate, different, and unequal. The existence of unified popular movements from 
civil society, given this fact, is puzzling, but instead is treated as a natural state of 
affairs by advocates of participatory visions of democracy. In this work, I take the 
position that the appearance of such movements is in need of study, in order to 
consider whether the process of unification affects the goals and values that they hold 
as most important. Theoretical works in North America and Europe have tended to 
concentrate on political and cultural conflicts between society and the state, and as a 
result cannot account for the type of mobilizations that combine concerns over socio-




dissertation is to explore whether popular movements rooted in civil society can 
promote ideals of democracy that substantially differ from their accounts.   
In chapter 2, I provide a more extensive discussion of the theoretical works in 
question and present three objections inherent in their portrayal of civil society and 
social movements. The first addresses the claim that the goal of civil society and 
social movements should be essentially to protect the public sphere from 
“colonization” on the part of the state. This is only acceptable if cultural conflicts are 
seen as preeminent. If, on the other hand, it is not taken as given that the material 
needs of individuals are of secondary importance, one must consider that in 
democratic polities the state is not only the entity on which power is concentrated but 
also the source of social goods that it is its role to supply. While the authors discussed 
above recognize a distinction between civil society and the economic market as well 
as the state, the relationship between civil and economic societies is often glossed 
over in favor of sophisticated arguments regarding the role of the state as a political 
entity in society. Yet, the state may be needed to protect society from the sometimes 
unrestrained processes at work in market economies (Rucht 2003). In other words, the 
question of whether the goal of civil society is necessarily its freedom from state 
interference is empirical, and it is a function of the primary concerns of individuals 
and groups in particular societies.  
The conceptual distinction between the ‘civil,’ ‘political,’ and ‘economic’ 
realms developed by Antonio Gramsci and adopted by the theorists of civil society 
and NSMs allows for the crucial role played by these actors in contemporary politics. 




present in actual events. It is beyond the scope of this work to enter into a thorough 
debate on this issue, but it seems to me that the contention that there is such a thing as 
society independent of political and economic factors and circumstances should not 
be taken as given. Philosophers like Hannah Arendt (1998) and Habermas have 
decried the intermingling of “public” and “private” spheres, and researchers such as 
Ronald Inglehart (1997) have posited a set of “post-materialist” values that dominate 
Western societies. It is difficult, however, to conceive of social and political matters 
that are completely divorced from the material conditions present in specific times 
and places.4 
The second critique refers to the tendency in this literature to assume a 
commonality of purpose among collectives within civil society. This ignores the fact 
that the public sphere, like the political and economic spheres, may be the stage for 
competition and conflict between different groups rather than a constant idyllic state 
of solidarity. If civil society is composed of a wide variety of groups formed freely by 
individuals for different reasons, then the likelihood is that the goals of the different 
groups will sometimes be at odds. Even when one can safely assume that most 
individuals and groups in a particular society support democracy, there is no 
assurance that the relationships between them will be amicable. This, as Michael 
Walzer (1992) has pointed out, is another reason for questioning the optimality of a 
civil society constantly trying to separate itself from the state. The importance of such 
                                                 
4 The transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe and Latin America were prompted as much (or 
perhaps even more) by the economic calculations of elites than by demands for democracy from 
below. Likewise, the current “democratic” revolutions in Eastern Europe are intimately related to those 
countries trying to gain entry to the European Union, for economic reasons as well as political ones. In 
the industrialized West, debates over immigration and religious or cultural freedom are often affected 
by economic considerations (such as the low birthrate in many of these countries, which encourages 




concensus is further enhanced by the need to account for the mobilization of different 
groups within civil society. An active civil society does in fact involve ties of 
solidarity among its members, as the theorists discussed above posit. Yet, the sources 
of such solidarity are scarcely examined in their works, and are instead also assumed 
to exist; “a gift from god,” as Ernesto Laclau (2004) derisively puts it. I maintain that 
the content of the bonds holding individuals together is contingent and should 
likewise be studied empirically. An analysis of the common worldviews which form 
the bases of solidarity in particular cases is extremely important, as it contributes to 
an understanding of the ways in which groups of citizens in democratic polities 
engage in collective action as well as help explain why the rare instances of massive 
collective mobilizations of civil society are so rare and short-lived.  
Finally, the implication of the aforementioned cursory look at the sources of 
consensus is that they are taken to stem from actors within civil society (i.e., from the 
‘grassroots’). Yet, this is also belied by real-world cases. Studies of the growth of 
Solidarity in Poland find that its leadership made symbolic use of past events, 
nationalistic rhetoric, and religious imagery in order to attract support (Garton Ash 
1984; Laba 1990). The choice of a national flag or such other emblem of the popular 
struggle contains elements of national ideologies inherited from the past, often 
imposed by elites. Cultural hegemony in this sense means more than the values of 
elites sitting in power and “spinning” facts to serve their purposes; it entails what 
Stephanie Golob (2003) calls a “core narrative of identity” through which elites 
“justify their own authority by equating the survival of the nation and its distinct 




internalized by the populace and serve to unify civil society (see, for a similar 
argument, Gellner 1994). They may even outlive the elites that put them in place, 
creating problems for their successors.  At the same time, as Tarrow (1994) notes, 
social movements serve not only as conduits of past traditions, but as creators of new 
and original forms of public contestation. It is in the synthesis of the old and the new 
that the most successful social movements acquire significance. 
The “people’s revolutions” that have taken place around the globe in recent 
years all have in common the rapid escalation of social unrest and the appearance of 
popular movements of protest, usually sparked by a dramatic event such as a 
fraudulent election, a political assassination, or the discovery of a particularly 
egregious act by a political figure. These mobilizations usually last only as long as the 
resolution of an immediate crisis is at stake, with demobilization occurring as rapidly 
as escalation. They are pushed forward by social organizations and movements, 
which attract mass support by framing immediate political events in particular ways 
and appeal to commonly held and understood symbols across the nation. In Lebanon, 
as Safa points out, it was the national flag; in Ukraine, the color orange and the well-
known lyrics “razom nas bahato! nas ne podolaty!” (“together, we are many! we 
cannot be defeated!” – see Karatnycky 2005).   
Popular movements of this type do not appear out of nowhere. They are 
ignited by specific events, but they usually arise out of long-existing crises that have 
caused rifts between society and the state. They also usually are supported by political 
or economic elite actors with a vested interest against a particular status quo. “Popular 




instances of “society against the state.” The literature on democratic transitions, while 
recognizing the presence of “popular upsurges” sees political change as driven mostly 
by elite actors: popular movements are the result of rifts within the status quo, which 
is under the control of competing elites (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999). The upsurges in Eastern Europe and Latin America in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s were backed by emerging elite actors, which in many cases 
abandoned their alliances with popular sectors after the most critical points of the 
struggle were past.5 Despite this, the behavior of so many citizens in pursuit of a 
common goal is important, not only for its consequences (long and short-term) but 
also because it reflects on the values that citizens hold in common. Individuals 
communicate their cares and wants to each other and transform them into shared 
visions, the scholarly literature tells us, by joining in collective action through civil 
society and social movements.    
Most people, most of the time, do not engage in this type of behavior, 
however. As Walzer (1995b) notes, to believe otherwise neglects the complexity of 
human social activity: “politics rarely engages the full attention of the citizens who 
are supposed to be its chief protagonists. They have too many other things to worry 
about. After all, they have to make a living” (p. 8). Social movements arise in order to 
respond to challenges posed by material conditions or the behavior of elites; they 
require opportunities and resources (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), but also a 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Garretón (2001) for a discussion of this phenomenon in post-transition Chile, Moreira 
(2001) on Brazil, and Baker (2002) on divisions between Solidarity and its allies in Poland. Seligman 
(1992) notes the “cynicism” that has characterized the use of civil society by elites in post-Communist 
Hungary (p. 7) and  Smolar (1996) argues that “the myth of civil society as united, antipolitical, and 
supportive of radical reform was one of the first casualties of the postcommunist era” (p. 34). The 
same is true of more recent examples. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution rallied behind presidential 
candidate Victor Yushenko, who has since fallen out of favor in the eyes of many former supporters, 




common purpose and solidarity with other members (Klandermans 1988). The 
articulation of common interests is a function of “framing processes” through which 
individuals come to understand a particular situation collectively (Tarrow 1994; 
Benford and Snow 2000). Social movements must further overcome obstacles to 
collective action in order to come into being and be effective: from the problem of 
“free-riding” (Olson 2000) to the tendency of movements to fall victim to defection, 
exhaustion, and co-optation (Piven and Cloward 1979; Tarrow 1994). These 
difficulties are intensified in cases where not one but many movements organize and 
act collectively with each other – when they “coalesce into something more.” 
In democratic polities, moreover, there are more opportunities for, and fewer 
threats against, collective action. But there is also less of a common need for social 
actors to stand together. Movements and organizations can communicate their 
demands to the government through institutional means, and governments can in turn 
address those demands and grievances separately. This creates competition and 
animosity between social actors (Walzer 1992 and 1995b; Hall 1995). Democracy, in 
other words, can be said to support the development of civil society but undermine its 
unity. The potential unity of separate movements, as Arturo Escobar (1992) notes, 
“cannot be taken for granted but must be constructed through articulation” (p. 79). In 
order for a confrontation between civil society and the state to take place, there must 
be, in Jan Kubik’s (1994) terms, a “symbolic/discursive polarization between the 
Party-state and the populace” (p. 5), which is the result of a framing process that 
utilizes available symbols – national, religious, ethnic – from what Tarrow (1994) 




various grievances and goals in that society into a singular set of demands articulated 
by civil society towards the state.6 The sources of these symbols and values are 
various: religion, established national and ethnic identities, a common culture, and 
common past experiences. In contemporary democracies, as in their authoritarian 
analogues, social movements may assume the role of framers and consensus-builders. 
This requires not only the ability to present existing conditions in broadly acceptable 
terms, but also for individual movements to adapt their own worldviews in ways that 
will make them more palatable to society at large. Political and economic crises may 
turn normally moderate individuals into activists, but they also force the more radical 
elements of civil society to moderate their views so as to find common ground in a 
broader movement.7 
For these reasons, theories that advocate the democratizing capabilities of 
civil society must address a variety of ways in which democracy is understood by its 
participants. Otherwise, they become an exercise in reification of little use to an 
analysis of the very real ways in which civil societies and social movements attempt 
to effect social change around the world. Through a comparative analysis of recent 
popular mobilizations in Latin America, this dissertation aims to shed light on the 
                                                 
6 During instances of brutal domination on the part of authoritarian states, as was the case in 
Communist Europe and military-dominated Latin America, there was a clear division between the state 
and its enemies (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Escobar 1992). Yet, even in such cases, collective action 
overcame lack of opportunities, the overwhelming danger of acting against the state, and also the 
dominant cultural discourse established by the ruling elites and accepted by most members of society. 
The role of the social movements was precisely to create a competing discourse that also had universal 
appeal: unifying values and symbols that hold individuals together, as well as common grievances and 
demands that spur them into action (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Klandermans 1988; Tarrow 1994; 
Laclau 2004 and 2005). 
7 In the 1970’s and 1980’s, for example, Latin American communist and socialist organizations found 
common grounds with more mainstream movements in order to strengthen the fight for goals that they 
deemed attractive, though insufficient (Mainwaring and Viola 1984; Cardoso 1989; Keck 1992). 
Oxhorn (1995b) similarly identifies the “moderation” of the ideologies of poor urban social 





issue of the formation of collective consensus within civil society; particularly in 
ways that conflict with those envisioned by North American and European theorists.  
Civil Society Uprisings in Latin America 
While the mass protest movements in such countries as Ukraine and Lebanon 
have been almost universally applauded as signals of the continuing role civil society 
can play in the promotion of democracy, a recent wave of popular mobilizations in 
Latin America, directed mainly against democratically-elected governments and 
focusing on economic as much as political factors has not received similar praise. In 
several countries, nationwide massive mobilizations and protests have paralyzed 
countries for weeks or even months, frequently resulting in drastic changes of state 
policies or the resignation of government officials, including heads of state. They 
have been striking in their magnitude and intensity, often representing the largest 
instances of collective mobilization these countries have ever experienced. Like the 
cases discussed above, they are characterized by the rapid, usually unexpected, 
simultaneous mobilization of collective actors arising from these countries’ civil 
societies – labor unions, neighborhood associations, university and high school 
student federations, middle class groups, “new social movements,” and many others – 
which seem to overcome economic, ethnic, social, and political differences and find 
common grievances against their political representatives and collectively stand up to 
the power of the state. Lasting from a week to several months, these intense periods 
of collective action are usually followed by equally swift demobilization.  
Such was the case in Costa Rica in 2000, when unprecedented nationwide 




hundreds of social organizations and “unaffiliated” citizens in order to protest against 
a government initiative to open the electricity and telecommunications industry to 
market competition. The rapid collapse of the Argentine economy in late 2001 
brought about angry crowds of protesters, leading to the resignation of President 
Fernando de la Rúa and, in rapid succession over the course of a few weeks, three 
temporary replacements. Two Ecuadorian presidents, in 2000 and 2005, were kept 
from completing their constitutionally-mandated terms in office by protests headed by 
indigenous confederations along with other movements and opposition political 
parties that decried the manipulation of political institutions and rejected successive 
attempts to impose austerity measures on an already impoverished population.  In 
2000, the protests culminated in a short-lived coup d’etat led by the major indigenous 
group and some dissident factions of the armed forces. In Paraguay, President Luis 
González Macchi barely escaped a similar fate in 2002, when a series of large 
mobilizations against his alleged corrupt practices and neoliberal economic policies 
brought about an attempted coup in 2002. Bolivia too, saw two presidents forced to 
resign by protesters, in 2003 and 2005, also in response to unpopular economic 
measures and allegations of corrupt behavior on the part of important political 
figures. Mass mobilizations of civil society occurred in Venezuela in 2002, except 
that in that nation President Hugo Chávez was the one rejecting neoliberal 
compromises and supported by many among the poor while protesters rejected his 
economic policies and his populist, semi-authoritarian governing style.  
 Instability and conflict between the state and society are, of course, not new in 




this pattern. In many countries, democratic transitions were completed in the midst of 
deep economic crises, creating social instability and violence. The steps taken to 
resolve these crises – in virtually every case, the adoption of a structural adjustment 
programs with international financing and support – were not always received with 
open arms. In some countries, political and economic change paralleled each other 
and the one came to be identified with the other. Social protest against neoliberal 
reforms in Latin America was common in the 1980’s and 1990’s, led by labor unions, 
left-wing political parties, and other activist groups (Walton 2001). It has grown 
progressively with the appearance of important new collective actors, which oppose 
both the limited reach of electoral democracy and market solutions to social 
problems, such as indigenous organizations in Ecuador and Bolivia in the early 
1990’s, the “Zapatista revolution” in Mexico in 1994, the Landless Peasant 
Movement in Brazil, and unemployed piqueteros in Argentina.  
It has been repeatedly suggested that civil society and social movements may 
contribute to further democratization in Latin America. Research on NSMs (Escobar 
and Alvarez 1992a; Zamosc 1994; Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998a; Dagnino 
2002; Yashar 2005) pays special attention to their pursuit of political aims like 
recognition of excluded social groups, multiculturalism, human rights, the protection 
of women and the environment, and so on. Alain Touraine, one of the initial theorists 
of NSMs has repeatedly asserted his belief that cultural conflicts trump socio-
economic ones in Latin America (e.g., Touraine 2003). Studies of civil society in the 
region are clearly informed by the work of Keane and Cohen and Arato (e.g., 




Bobes 2003). Several theoretical works combine analyses of social movements and 
the idea of the autonomy of the public sphere to consider the possible “deepening” of 
Latin American democracy into a more participatory form (Lievesley 1997; Ellner 
2001; Oxhorn 2001; Avritzer 2002). Referring to social organization among 
shantytown dwellers in Chile under military rule, Oxhorn (1995b) identifies the need 
for the popular sectors to form a “collective identity,” which he terms “lo popular,” 
that contributes to pro-democratic collective action.  
The popular insurrections in Latin America in recent years do not seem to be 
driven by these goals, however. While clearly the work of civil society and social 
movements, 8 they have been fueled by a combination of political crises of 
representation, cultural conflicts (regarding indigenous populations in countries like 
Bolivia and Ecuador), and by issues relating to economy policy and social welfare. 
How these relate to each other is a central concern of this study. It does not seem, 
however, that autonomy from the state, presumably in order to encourage the 
development of multiple forms of life and identities, is at the forefront of ordinary 
people’s priorities. As Pablo Andrade (2000) points out: 
In conditions of social, economic, and political inequality […], it is easy to imagine 
social movements that at the same time as they develop new collective identities and 
new forms of life, push for politics that revolve around the state and that tends, even, 
to diminish civil society (p. 44).9  
 
                                                 
8 See Schuster et al (2002) and Armony and Armony (2005) on Argentina; Postero (2004 and 2005) on 
Bolivia; Garita (2001) on Costa Rica; Zamosc (2004) on Ecuador; López (2004) on Venezuela.  
9 It is well known that competition for political and economic primacy in Latin America revolves 
around control over state institutions (e.g., Véliz 1980; Diamond and Plattner 2001), and that 
traditionally elites have been able to co-opt important social actors such as organized labor into 
particular political programs. More recently, as Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler (1998) note, the 
move towards neoliberalism characteristic across the region has led to the marginalization of social 





Despite the undeniable presence in contemporary Latin America of civil 
society organizations and social movements that espouse radical democratic or anti-
capitalist ideologies, it is my contention that these ideals are not what hold the mass 
popular uprisings together. Many of these collective actors have been at the forefront 
of the protests, but like their predecessors they have modified their immediate 
demands in order to fit them into the broader concerns of their respective societies. 
Their ability to mobilize large numbers of people has contributed to highlight social, 
political, and economic issues, and the ties between their members have provided an 
example for commonly apathetic or powerless citizens. Social protest against states in 
Latin America begins with these movements and organizations; it expands through 
them, and is in many ways shaped by them. A detailed analysis of these social actors 
is crucial for understanding the expressions of “people power” in the region.  
Some scholars see them mainly as threats to the precarious stability that took 
the region so much time and effort to find (Schamis 2002; Levitsky and Murillo 2003; 
Ollier 2003; Valenzuela 2004). Referring to the Andean cases (Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Peru) John Peeler (2004) warns of the danger of too much mobilization in these 
unconsolidated democracies. Omar Encarnación (2002) argues that the events in 
Venezuela put into question whether “a strong and invigorated civil society is an 
unmitigated blessing for democracy” (p. 38). In some cases authors use even stronger 
language, as when Philip Oxhorn (2002) refers to the Argentine protests of 2001 as 
“mob rule” or Moisés Naím (2004) argues that many social movements involved in 
protests across the region “feed off the politics of rage, race, and revenge” (p. 104). 




seen its share of political violence and economic disaster. At the same time, they 
strongly imply that the expressions of discontent coming from civil society are either 
unimportant or dangerous for democracy. They fail to consider the possibility that 
increased citizen involvement in politics, even if it is in the form of street protests and 
demonstrations, may have a positive impact on state-society relations in Latin 
America.10 
A growing literature, on the other hand, has applauded the rise in social 
protest over the last decade, and particularly the popular uprisings of recent years, 
precisely for their potential to right economic and social, as well as political, injustice. 
Scholarly accounts of the events in Argentina on December 2001 depict them as a 
watershed moment for national politics (Altamira 2002; Auyero 2002a and 2004; 
Cafassi 2002; Schuster et al 2002; Filippini 2002; Dinerstein 2003a and 2003b; 
Zibechi 2003; Sueiras 2004). Many proclaim the beginning of a new revolutionary 
period through a radical democratic transformation led by “civil society from below” 
(Mattini 2000 and 2003; Houtart 2001; Negri and Cocco 2002; Ferrara 2003; Barbetta 
and Bidaseca 2004; Hardt and Negri 2004) and by citizen-centered “counterpower” 
                                                 
10 Concerns for the survival of democracy seem overstated, however, as some of these authors admit 
(Schamis 2002; Hunter 2003; Levitsky and Murillo 2003). No Latin American nation has reverted to 
authoritarianism in over a quarter of a century, and public opinion strongly supports democracy as a 
form of government across the region (Encarnación 2004). There have been few military coup attempts 
by conservative factions since 1990 (e.g., Venezuela in 2002), and some by “radical” military groups 
(Venezuela in 1992, Ecuador in 2000, and Paraguay in 2002), but only a handful have succeeded in 
removing a government and those who have invariably have surrendered power to civilian authorities 
in a matter of days or even hours. There are also no longer significant groups from the left calling for 
the overthrow of ‘bourgeois democracy’ through violent means (Hayden, 2002, Castañeda 2003). 
Furthermore, advances in the availability and access to information, a global trend towards advocating 
democracy and the protection of individual liberties, and increased economic integration across 
borders reduce the opportunities of national elites to resort to non-democratic means, but at the same 
time solidify the existing status quo (Wiarda 1999, Weyland 2001 and 2004). As Peter Hakim puts it, 
“[t]he main concern is not whether democracy will survive in Latin America. It will. Rather what is at 





(Colectivo Situaciones 2001 and 2002). Rather than involving a violent appropriation 
of the means of production, the “civil society” revolution involves the creation of new 
normative identities based on communal relations and “shared life experiences,” 
which require the communal administration of material resources as well. Neoliberal 
economics, intended to leave economic outcomes to the workings of markets, are 
singled out as the primary enemy of the Latin American people. Similar conclusions 
appear in studies of Bolivia (Assies 2003; Mamani 2003; Tapia 2005), Costa Rica 
(Vargas 2000), Ecuador (Miranda 2003; Zibechi 2004; Unda 2005), and Latin 
America in general (Houtart 2001; Sader 2001; Seoane and Taddei 2003). Some 
authors see national protest waves as a prelude to transnational opposition to U.S.-led 
neoliberal globalization in a cosmopolitan “movement of movements” (Cox 1999; 
Robinson 1999; Cockburn and St. Claire 2001; Mertes 2004).  
At issue for these authors is the defeat of the hegemonic order historically 
imposed by political and economic elites. Like the theorists of civil society discussed 
above, they see in social protests a rejection of the established order, to be replaced 
by a new politics based on solidarity and horizontal decision-making. In contrast to 
American and European works, on the other hand, this perspective does not limit its 
conception of civil society and social movements to their role in promoting 
democracy. It understands that immediate material needs may trump political ideals. 
It openly rejects both liberal democracy and free market capitalism as commensurable 
with “real” democracy, and finds no difference between popular struggles against 
neoliberal reform and those against military dictatorships in years past. Such views 




works tend to ascribe to the nationwide protests precisely these ideals. The problem is 
that this assumes that the only real challenge to the status quo may come “from the 
bottom up.” The importance of popular protest in this view is limited to its ability to 
mount a counter-hegemonic alternative from the grassroots.  
As has been pointed out, theoretical accounts of the democratizing potential of 
civil society generally take such consensus (on the desirability and primary 
importance of democracy and autonomy from the state) for granted. So do the 
interpretations by Latin American scholars of the Latin American cases, which 
envision the popular movements as the beginning of an all-out campaign against 
liberal democracy, neoliberal capitalism, and, often, American imperialism. They do 
not address how different, often incompatible identities or demands are transformed 
in order to support another group’s struggle or to pursue new joint goals. Alliances 
between social actors, like those between political actors, may be purely strategic. 
Civil society usually represents not a collection of collective associations in equal 
standing but a complex series of interactions between social organizations with 
varying degrees of power and influence, in addition to political and economic elite 
actors looking for social support. The difficulty of finding common ground for action 
is well-known in Latin America, where there is a long history of political elites co-
opting or forming long-term clientelistic relationships with social actors – what 
Oxhorn calls “controlled inclusion” (Oxhorn 1995a and 2002). Despite all of this, the 
most recent outbreaks of social protest in Latin America do indeed see social actors 
coming together and forming, for a time, a united front that sees itself as representing 




In Chapters 3 and 4, I offer detailed accounts of what seem to be the “purest” 
instances of civil society opposition to the state among the available cases: Argentina 
and Costa Rica. In both nations, the actions of a core of opposing social actors was 
joined by a much larger set of organizations, movements, and individuals so that for a 
time collective action took on the form of “the people versus the state.” Unlike other 
countries, in which the actions of civil society were bolstered by their interaction with 
opposition political parties, economic actors, or the armed forces, in Argentina and 
Costa Rica there appears to have been a clear sense of division between ordinary 
citizens and the political class – government officials from all branches of 
government, political parties, influential figures, and so on – in general. This, I 
believe, makes it more likely to identify the role played by civil society organizations 
and social movements. Conflicts based on ethnic or regional differences – which 
introduce complicating factors in the state-society divide – are not significant in their 
impact in either Argentina or Costa Rica. In both cases, moreover, the presence of 
relatively large middle classes facilitates an analysis of values and demands that cross 
class boundaries and truly represent the “voice of the people,” as opposed to only the 
marginalized sectors of society.  
The discussions of the events in Argentina in 2001 and 2002 and Costa Rica 
in 2000 are taken from the following data sources: 1) media accounts of relevant 
events, provided by mainstream and “alternative” sources; 2) my own direct 
observations of these events, through personal involvement (in the Costa Rican case) 
and conversations with other individuals involved in collective actions; 3) pictorial 




public statements on the parts of figures involved in the events, including political 
leaders as well as heads of social organizations; 5) press releases and other original 
sources of communication from organizations and movements involved in the 
protests; 6) previous scholarly discussions of these events; and 7) a limited number of 
interviews, conducted by myself or made public in media outlets or book form. The 
focus of the discussion is on the civil society organizations and social movements that 
engage in long-term active opposition to the state, taken to be the initiators of 
collective action, mainly responsible for the framing and articulation of social 
demands that is expressed in these mass mobilizations.  
The conclusions reached through the two in-depth case studies are 
subsequently compared to two other cases of nationwide mobilizations in Latin 
America. Chapter 5 presents popular uprisings similar as those seen in Argentina and 
Costa Rica, which have taken place in Ecuador and Bolivia in recent years. Each case 
presents the formation of a core of social organizations actively mobilized against 
their governments, fueled by a combination of disillusionment in the political 
leadership and rejection of particular neoliberal economic policies. In both countries 
these social actors are joined, not once but repeatedly, by a broader coalition of actors 
that comes to constitute popular insurrections. That such events occurred more than 
once provides an opportunity to compare the characteristics of one popular upsurge to 
another in very similar circumstances.  
Ecuador and Bolivia do present problematic factors such as ethnic divides, 
regional animosities, military and elite interventions, and even foreign war. Unlike 




social well-being in the past, these two Andean nations are among the poorest in 
Latin America. In addition, these cases see a much larger level of cooperation 
between civil society and expressly political actors. This seems to violate a primary 
requirement for the constitution of civil society as discussed in the theoretical 
literature – that civil society be independent from political society. But such a 
restriction would exclude as civil society action many of the movements that inspired 
the concept in the first place, as well as more recent ones such as the Orange 
revolution in Ukraine. For the purpose of this discussion I prefer to grant that 
completely autonomous action on the part of civil society is rare, while considering 
the important effects that the mobilization of social actors may have on political 
affairs. 
An analysis of the actions of social movements and other civil society actors 
is fundamental, since it is through them that the broad popular coalition is formed and 
its demands and goals articulated. An account of the formation of such coalitions is 
not offered by analyses of civil society in the extant literature, however. The cases 
examined in this dissertation provide an opportunity to observe in what ways social 
movements contribute to this process. I suggest that a “core” of social movements 
exists in each country that engages in continued opposition to state policies and 
institutions. In most of Latin America, and certainly in the cases discussed here, the 
1990’s were years of reconfiguration of older movements, the appearance of new 
ones, and the consolidation of many of these into coherent blocks of opposition to 
national states. The goals of these movements pertain to political rights or to material 




terms of a broader goal of changing the political and economic systems at a 
fundamental level, be it in the form of revolutionary or reformist action. Were the 
popular uprisings in recent years simply the natural evolution of these movements, 
the values and goals behind them would be clear, but I believe that they are not.  
The binding force tying the various participants of the popular uprisings in 
Latin America, I contend, is grounded on a critique of contemporary political 
practices and economic policies that is explicitly democratic, but based not on radical 
democratic or socialist principles but on a particular understanding of the role of the 
state in society. This is an outcome of the particular experiences of citizens in each 
country. The popular movements in the region are indeed fueled by democratic 
sentiments, but these are inextricably linked to notions of social and economic justice 
that are perceived as being neglected by national governments in the region today. 
Concerns over economic welfare often conflict with the idea that civil society is 
necessarily better off when it is left alone by the state. In fact, I believe, the rejection 
of neoliberal economic policies is based on strongly-held attitudes within Latin 
America regarding the role of the state not merely as watchman but as responsible for 
providing for its citizens, and that these are partly the result of changes in national 
narratives following “critical junctures” in the various countries’ histories.11 The 
                                                 
11 There is an important current of thought that believes Latin American politics to be the function of a 
particular cultural heritage (Stepan 1978; Veliz 1980; Wiarda 1999). Howard Wiarda (2003), an 
important representative, argues that “even if Latin America changes sociologically and economically, 
its political and civil society situation will look quite different from that of the United States” (p. 92). 
Even if accepted as true (which I am reticent to do), a view that ascribes such a deterministic role to 
culture cannot account for differences among countries in the region. Constructivist approaches, on the 
other hand, underline the importance of specific historical processes. In certain momentous occasions, 
according to this line of thought, the “core narrative” of a nation can be reshaped by elites through 
processes of education and the establishment of political and cultural institutions (Golob 2003). Core 
narratives are particularly vulnerable during periods of national crisis, what this literature terms 




combination of political corruption and an economic agenda that benefits the rich and 
powerful are seen as a breach of the “social contract” that is central to Latin 
American nations’ understanding of politics. This is a far more powerful call to action 
than the ideals of radical or participatory democracy.  
 The interpretations of the protest movements offered by Latin American 
scholars recognize the importance of economic factors, but have a tendency to 
misrepresent the mobilizations as all-out attacks on market-driven globalization. 
Electoral support for pro-reform candidates throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s seems 
to belie this view, as does that fact that many economic reforms have in fact received 
widespread support. It should be kept in mind that the levels of social protest seen in 
these cases appear in response to very specific issues – a specific piece of legislation, 
a political scandal, a presidential declaration. As intense and powerful as the popular 
movements are, they last for relatively short periods of time, afflicted by the obstacles 
of exhaustion, defection, and cooptation, which have been well documented in the 
literature. In addition, the aftermaths of these periods of protest have not brought 
about increased support for anti-systemic ideologies or political candidates, though it 
has for political figures perceived as alternatives to established elites. This distinction 
is crucial, and is expanded on throughout this work.  
 Nevertheless, the renewed mobilization of civil society may still affect, 
perhaps even positively, the future of political, social, and economic relations in Latin 
America. Even if political change is primarily driven by elites – a notion that I 
                                                                                                                                           
important not to fall into the trap of believing that such core narratives – from which shared values 
stem – are arbitrary or that they can be interpreted as purely conventional. They are affected by 
national and regional cultures, by past dominant narratives, and certainly by existing material 





generally accept – the expression of popular dissatisfaction with current conditions 
should elicit a response from elites. Latin American popular protest is not driven by a 
coherent ideological alternative to free-market capitalism or electoral democracy, but 
by a strong conviction that it is the state’s role to take care of its people. Such beliefs 
do not originate in the social movements. They are tacit but accepted elements of the 
dominant national narratives, which social movements make use of and elites have 
ignored at their peril.    
In the conclusions presented in Chapter 6, I return to the theoretical questions 
and summarize how the empirical findings inform the debate on civil society and 
social movements. It is not at all my intention to argue that the commonalities I 
identify in the various mass mobilizations constitute the most important or prevalent 
political conflicts in Latin America. As Susan Eckstein (2001a) has noted, and as is 
clearly seen in the following chapters, confrontations between social movements and 
states usually revolve around specific socio-economic issues. Most of the time, 
political mobilization is the work of social organizations and movements acting 
separately, or in conjunction with a well-established core of opposition. The 
phenomena I examine here represent special cases, but ones that may teach scholars 
something about the general attitude that Latin Americans have towards their 




Chapter 2: Civil Society in Political Theory 
 
The insistence to only consider civil society in relation to the state 
overshadows the relationship between civil society and economic forces. Some 
theorists borrow the term from the classical liberal tradition of John Locke and the 
Scottish Enlightenment (Seligman 1993; Gellner 1994), and understand the freedom 
of civil society to consist to a large extent of economic activity. To them, it is 
incorrect to speak of civil society in places like Latin America or Eastern Europe at 
all, since civil society is the result of a specific historical process. Even if one granted 
that civil societies do exist in those regions, an antagonism between civil society and 
market forces does not have a place in their theories. Those who appropriate the 
concept from Antonio Gramsci (1999), on the other hand, take pains to distinguish 
civil society from both the state and the economy, but dedicate the bulk of their 
analyses to its relationship with the former. When, as in the cases examined below, 
the boundary between political and economic power is unclear at best, idealized 
versions of civil society as protecting the integrity of an abstract societal “lifeworld” 
are not very useful.  
The Gramscian branch of the literature tends, frequently implicitly, to assume 
some sort of unifying set of values that make civil society the “realm of solidarity,” 
though never abandoning the fundamentally plural and heterogeneous nature of its 
component associations. Not only, as I will argue below, does this contradict 
Gramsci’s understanding of the term, but it ignores some major questions. Under 




banner of democracy? What makes a particular issue become the center around which 
the plurality of associations in civil society become, for a while, a single movement? 
And, beneath the catch-all banner of democracy, what are the real goals that drive 
these movements? Studies on social movements provide some insight into these 
questions, though without looking at civil society specifically. This is, to an extent, 
understandable; a concept as vague as civil society is not useful in the crafting of 
rigorous, empirically-derived theories. Nevertheless, I contend that focusing on civil 
society, with all its ambiguities, provides certain insight into the politics of the 
countries in question.  
It is true that some definitions of “social movements” would exclude the type 
of massive, spontaneous, and short-lived mobilizations that occupy most of the 
attention of the case studies that follow (Escobar and Alvarez 1992b, p. 1; Olzak 
2004). Studies of social movements (Piven and Cloward 1979; Jenkins and Eckert 
1986; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1998, 1999) as well as the literature on democratic 
transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Diamond 1999) predict the difficulty in 
maintaining such energetic activity across civil society over extended periods of time. 
For others, by contrast, spontaneous mobilizations should be considered social 
movements as long as they show the deliberate pursuit of change, internal solidarity, 
and symbolic coalescence (Laraña 1999, pp. 175-176). Does a relatively short life-
span automatically make a political movement unimportant? That has not seemed to 
be the verdict of the international community regarding popular movements in 
Tiananmen Square in China in 1989 or those in the Ukraine in 2004.  Even if none of 




countries, the issue of the temporary coming together of different groups into an 
active and mobilized civil society should concern those who wish to underscore its 
importance to democratic theory.   
 
Transitions to Democracy and the Revival of Civil Society 
Much scholarly work has been produced in Europe and the United States since 
the late 1970’s regarding the links between social movements, civil society, and 
democracy. In fact, what Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992) term the 
“contemporary revival” of the idea of civil society began with the appearance of 
social movements striving for democracy in Eastern Europe and in Latin America. 
Though the concept had appeared in the writings of dissident intellectuals in the 
1970’s, the world began to pay attention to its potential following the birth of the 
Solidarity labor union in Poland in 1980 (Arato 1981; Nowak 1991, Baker 2002), 
which, in the words of Jacek Kuron (1981), was part of “a tremendous social 
democratization movement in all possible strata [of society] and at the same time its 
symbol” (p. 94).  
Similarly, while the Latin American left was in the process of replacing 
classic Marxist categories with terms such as ‘hegemony,’ ‘civil society,’ and 
‘democracy’ (Baker 1998, Dagnino 1998), the adoption of these ideas for political 
struggle arose out of the experiences of mobilizations by, among others, urban 
movements in Brazil (Mainwaring and Viola 1984 and 1994; Baker 2002, pp. 78-79) 




2001). Thereafter, civil society became “the political celebrity” of the struggle against 
authoritarianism in Latin America (Stepan 1988, p. 5).  
Since in both cases the primary antagonism took place between repressive, 
anti-democratic forces and groups demanding more liberties and openness, there has 
been a tendency among many scholars to only extol the contributions of a mobilized 
civil society when it is involved in trying to bring about or reinforce liberal or 
electoral democracy. This “taming of the idea of civil society” (Baker 2002), is 
reinforced by theoretical work that links the rise of civil society to specific historical 
developments in the West (Seligman 1992, Gellner 1994). It is evident in studies on 
transitions to democracy during the “third wave of democratization” (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999) as well as 
in the tendency of international and transnational organizations to equate civil society 
with the non-profit (NGO) sector (see Carothers 1999).12  
The literature on democratic transitions adopts, if not a minimal 
Schumpeterian definition of democracy, then certainly one that emphasizes elite pacts 
and political institutions as the keys to democratic governance (Lievesley 1997; 
Baker 2002). An important influence is that of Robert Dahl, for whom even 
“pluralistic” democracies are essentially run not by majorities but by a variety of 
                                                 
12 To those one could add a “neo-Tocquevillian” current of work on civil society, of which Robert 
Putnam is undoubtedly the most important figure, which conceives the primary role of voluntary 
organizations to be the creation and reproduction of “social capital.” Life is better in a society with 
copious amounts of social capital because it fosters trust, norms of reciprocity, and civic engagement. 
Social capital allows social problems to be resolved through collaboration rather than conflict. These 
cultural patterns further educate citizens as to how to behave towards each other under a democratic 
regime (Putnam 1993, 2001). Putnam borrows the idea of civil society organizations acting as “little 
schools of citizenship” directly from Tocqueville, but does not follow on Tocqueville’s analysis of the 
possibility of these same organizations standing up to the state when necessary. Instead, social capital 
appears to place citizens in the service of government, leaving no alternative behavior for when 
government does not fulfill its democratic role. For critiques of the Putnam argument, see Portes and 




competing minorities (Dahl 1972, 1991). These authors acknowledge the important 
contribution civil society can make in transitions from authoritarianism and 
democratic consolidation, but they also point out that large-scale mobilizations of 
civil society are short-lived. For advocates of a “realist” conception of democracy, 
moreover, a mobilized public is often seen as more dangerous than beneficial. 
Particularly in young and “fragile” democracies, continued stability often takes 
precedence over responsiveness to popular demands (Peeler 2004; Valenzuela 
2004).13  
It is important to point out that the notion of an antagonistic relationship 
between civil society and the state is present in the liberal tradition. Alexis de 
Tocqueville sees civic associations as compatible with democracy, but also as 
protecting individuals from the excesses of democratic rule. For Tocqueville, the 
problem to be feared from democracy is that it will work too well rather than not well 
enough. In other words, Tocqueville fears the tyranny of the majority as represented 
by democratic government. Associations between individuals allow them to join their 
resources in protecting each other from the rule of the many. Though Tocqueville is 
not specific on what mechanisms these associations use to resist the state apparatus, it 
seems that he has economic resources in mind above anything else. For contemporary 
theorists in this tradition, such as Ernest Gellner (1994 and 1995) and Lawrence 
Cahoone (2002), the main antagonist of voluntary associations is not the majority of 
fellow citizens but the state itself. It is through their ability to join in associations and 
pool their economic resources together that citizens can resist unacceptable intrusions 
                                                 
13 Held (1997) outlines many of the different theorists that have taken part in the debate. For an 
extended discussion of elitist vs. participatory theories of democracy in a Latin American context see 




on the part of the state. For this reason, not only is the democratic state a precondition 
of the existence of civil society from this perspective, but so is the market economy. 
For advocates of a more “radical” conception of civil society, however, these ideas 
should be taken further. 
The more direct inspiration for these works, and the pro-democracy 
movements with which they became associated, was the work of Italian Marxist 
philosopher Antonio Gramsci. His ideas, in fact, have been incorporated into most 
theories of civil society since (Edwards and Foley 2001, p. 2). For Gramsci,  
the fundamental political contest is unlikely to be a confrontation between capital and 
labor for control of the state and, thus, the means of production […]. Rather, the 
contest is likely to be a ‘positional’ one for civil society conceived essentially as a 
cultural-political domain, indeed the sole public domain where mass consent is at 
issue (Adamson 1988, p. 325, c.f. Nielsen 1995).14  
 
Gramscian civil society involves groups and relationships, independent of the 
state and the economy, that create cultural modes of behavior. The ruling classes are 
not secure in their position of power purely by means of their monopoly over the use 
of “legitimate” force, but by the consent of the rest of society, which is precisely what 
lends the former its legitimacy. Gramsci rejects orthodox Marxism’s dismissal of civil 
society as purely the superstructural incarnation of what is fundamentally an 
economic relationship between classes (Gramsci 1999, p. 407). Even were the state to 
be removed in capitalist societies, he argues, civil society in its usual form would 
resist any fundamental change to the status quo. The “positional” dispute is the 
attempt by groups within civil society to create new ways of viewing the world and, 
therefore, is less a contest between groups within civil society and the state than 
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between civil society groups against each other. If anything, the balance of opinion 
should benefit the “conservative” element of civil society, which has not only the 
approval of ruling institutions behind it but also history and the powerful inertia of 
cultural norms. The struggle for cultural supremacy, for hegemony, is fought within 
civil society. Civil society cannot confront the state until the war of position has been 
fought and won.15 
Civil society can only be in place if the state and economic organizations 
cannot incorporate or completely control the various practices, organizations, and 
institutions of the society that are not economic and not governmental. In the 
Gramscian model, a nation in which the state has virtually complete control over all 
aspects of society is more vulnerable to collapse if state institutions are conquered by 
revolutionary forces (his famous statement that in Russia civil society was amorphous 
and “gelatinous” (Gramsci 1999, p. 238), while at the same time impervious to 
“cultural” dissent. This explains the different relationships between Eastern European 
and Latin American dissidents to Gramsci. For the first, in light of their conviction 
that Soviet-style states could not be overthrown by force and were unlikely to be 
amenable to political reform, the creation of civil society in order for cultural 
challenges to be mounted was fundamental (Cardoso 1989). For the latter, the fact 
that opposition groups and parties were already in existence made the challenges 
                                                 
15 Most current work that borrows Gramsci’s insights rejects his determinism and emphasis on the role 
of the party. But to ignore that the strength of civil society in his model stems from the creation of 
alliances between groups misses the point entirely. Gramsci leans toward civil society at the expense of 
the privileged historical role of the proletariat because he sees inter-class movements covering a whole 
range of interests and goals (not only the workers’ drive to escape economic oppression) as the key to 
cultural change. This makes uncertain the content of the new hegemonic discourse as well as the 
composition of the hegemonic alliance (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). In addition the embracing of non-
proletarian groups into the hegemonic alliance opens the possibility of other interests becoming 
prioritized. “Collective action there would be,” as Sidney Tarrow puts it, “but it might well be on 




coming from civil society possible. This awareness for the need of any civil society as 
a precondition for a particular kind of civil society – one that has democracy as its 
ambition as well as its inspiration – prompts theorists such as Cohen and Arato 
(Cohen and Arato 1992, Cohen 1995, p. 37) to posit civil society as “the goal of” as 
well as “the medium for” radical democratic change.     
Rather than facing the complexity of the state/civil society relationship in 
Gramsci’s thought, however, his terminology has been used in accounts of civil 
society that are driven by specific political realities. Dissident intellectuals in Eastern 
Europe in the 1970’s and 80’s transformed it into a conception of “civil society 
against the state” and “self-limiting revolution” (Arato 1981; Keane 1988a).16 They 
saw civil society as fundamentally opposed to totalitarianism. Czechoslovak thinker 
Vaclav Havel, for instance, emphasized the central role of “the lie” in totalitarianism 
and the fundamental opposition to “the lie” in civil society (Keane 1985; Baker 2002, 
p. 21).  
In Poland, Adam Michnik adapted ideas by Leszek Kolakowski into his vision 
of “new evolutionism,” in the hope that change was possible in Soviet-style systems 
but with a clear understanding of its limited scope. “In my opinion,” says Michnik, 
“an unceasing struggle for reform and evolution that seeks an expansion of civil 
liberties and human rights is the only course Eastern European dissidents can take” 
(in Baker 2002, p. 16). Jacek Kuron, on his part, rather than viewing it simply as a 
means for attaining more civil liberties, sees civil society as an end in itself, a “system 
in which the social structure can be established from below” and that “demands more 
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pluralism, more democracy” (Kuron 1981, p. 95). The writings of Michnik and Kuron 
establish a juxtaposition between the state and civil society, albeit one that is unclear 
on the possibility of society accruing power through self-organization (Cohen and 
Arato 1992, p. 32). They described themselves as democratic socialists, and were 
concerned with forms of council democracy for the working class and not with 
parliamentary or procedural democracy (Arato 1981, p. 46; Baker 2002, p. 23). 
Though the different conceptions surrounding civil society varied 
considerably among the Polish intellectuals of KOR (Workers Defense Committee) 
like Michnik and Kuron, the Czechoslovakian members of Charter 77, among them 
Havel, Benda, Hejdánek, and Battek, and Hungarians such as János Kis and György 
Bence, scholars in the West agree that the Eastern European vision revolved around 
several common assumptions (Keane 1988a and 1988b; Cohen and Arato 1992; 
Smolar 1996; Baker 2002). First, that civil society is analytically, and should be in 
actuality, separate from the state. Understandably, they did not give much thought to 
the possibility of also separating the concepts of “civil” and “bourgeois” society, 
something that later thinkers would see as crucial in distinguishing “liberal” from 
“radical” versions of the concept. Second, the Eastern European movements’ main 
activities were publishing, lecturing, discussing and teaching. The hope seems to have been 
the building of the moral bases of democratic structures and practices, i.e., a democratic 
political culture (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 35). The power of the state was such that open 
defiance of the system was unthinkable. Third, despite the participation of labor and workers’ 
organizations, they never identified oppressed society with the working class, or any one 
societal group for that matter. The emphasis was from the start on pluralism and diversity of 




KOR (KSS-KOR) to indicate its support for all initiatives of self-representation (Arato 
1981, p. 23). 
 However, it was Solidarity, the Polish workers’ movement, which came to 
embody Eastern European resistance to Communism. Following the strike at the 
Lenin shipyard in Gdansk, in July 1980, workers across the country organized strikes 
in support of the Gdansk workers:  
As ever-increasing numbers of factories joined the subsequent Inter-Factory Strike 
Committee (MKS), the list of demands to be met if work were to be resumed also 
grew. The first and most significant of these, by now highly political, demands was 
that the communist government must accept ‘free trade unions independent of the 
Communist Party’ (Baker 2002, p. 13).  
 
Solidarity was created after the government acceded to the demands and the 
Gdansk agreement was signed. Though crushed in December 1981, it became a 
symbol of a nascent civil society in Eastern Europe. Because it was a movement that 
had triumphed, even for a brief period, many saw in it the potential to rally the masses 
behind it; in Gramscian terms, to form a new “historic bloc” to challenge the existing 
conditions (Peleczynski 1988, p. 368). 
 From the start, Western observers understood the fate of Solidarity to be 
intimately linked to the success of civil society in Poland to achieve reform. Arato 
(1981), in particular, is adamant on the fundamental role that social movements must 
play if civil society is to be strengthened from “below.” The leadership of Solidarity 
itself understood its role as not only striving for the meeting of particular demands but 
as the standard-bearer for an emerging civil society (Arato 1981, p. 25). Kuron 
recognized clearly this dual nature: “What we are dealing with is a tremendous social 
democratization movement in all possible strata. The independent self-managed union 




1981, p. 94) But how did it acquire this mantle? After all, Solidarity in actuality 
represented the demands and interests of a specific segment of Polish society. What 
led it to be identified with the entire struggle of liberty versus tyranny? If the nature 
and the goal of civil society is to further pluralism, diversity, the freedom to associate 
with like-minded individuals, then how could one group come to represent all the 
others? As Arato himself points out, “universality never emerges spontaneously from 
plurality” (Arato 1981, p. 47).  
Ernesto Laclau (2004) argues that “the symbols of Solidarnosc (Solidarity) became 
in Poland the symbols of the absent fullness of society” (Laclau 2004, p. 25). The case of 
Solidarity allows a glimpse into the important processes through which civil society 
becomes focalized into one particular group and set of demands. Solidarity shared 
with other groups a profound desire to extirpate itself from the direct control of the 
state. The dichotomization of society into the state and its subjects facilitated the 
drawing of battle lines and the formation of sides in the battle. Solidarity took 
advantage of the symbols available to it to present itself in a more universal light to 
the Polish people. An example is Lech Walesa’s insistence on the construction of a 
monument to commemorate those who died as a result of a strike in Gdansk in 1970, 
which sparked protests that contributed to the eventual establishment of Solidarity 
(Garton Ash 1984). Roman Laba (1990) and Jan Kubik (1994) convincingly show 
how Solidarity made use of Catholic and nationalistic symbols to mobilize support – 
“Never did the practice of revolt appear to draw so heavily on the inherited symbols 
of consensus!” (Laba, quoted in Tarrow 1994, p. 132). Laba emphasizes “the 




invented during the strikes, and the degree to which dominant symbols and rituals 
were lifted from nationalist and socialist traditions and transformed” (Laba 1990. p. 
128).  
 The paradox of a single group embodying a notion that implies heterogeneity 
and pluralism was bound to create problems, both theoretical and political. In 1981, 
Walesa terminated KOR’s advisory role to the movement, in part because Michnik 
and Kuron were critical of Solidarity’s demagoguery, cult of leadership, and 
“naiveté” (Michnik 1985, p. 130, Baker 2002, p.28). Solidarity, in its newly-acquired 
leadership role, increasingly related to Polish society as a unified whole (Baker 2002, 
p. 29). The thinkers of KOR, on the other hand, continued to emphasize societal 
pluralism. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that the identification of the democratic 
resistance with the one particular entity benefited the movement in the long run. The 
presence of a concrete symbol inspired the Polish public and the international media 
in ways that the discrete actions of many small groups would not have. In order for 
civil society to mobilize as a relatively coherent whole, a symbol to rally behind, or to 
oppose, is necessary. The various groups within civil society cannot be assumed to be 
capable of acting in unison simply because they all value the existence of civil society 
itself. This has, unfortunately, been ignored by many prominent supporters of civil 
society. 
As in Eastern Europe, the Latin American revival of civil society was 
intertwined with resistance against authoritarian regimes. As a result, the different 
approaches to the concept in the region shared two aspects: that civil society was to 




state as such) and that the goal of civil society was to contribute to the struggle for 
democracy (Dagnino 1998, p. 41). Since the “bureaucratic-authoritarian” regimes in 
the region received support from conservative elites and often from the United States, 
resistance appeared mainly from the left. Traditionally, the Latin American left had 
ignored civil society as a bourgeois component of capitalist domination. This 
perception was reinforced by the very real deficiencies of incomplete or exclusionary 
democracies (Castañeda 2003, p. 353), the same regimes that presumed to represent 
the potential for breaking the cycles of poverty and violence in the region, and which 
extolled the virtues of liberty and civility.  
Left-wing intellectuals began to turn away from orthodox Marxism as they 
became exposed to European post-Marxist ideas and when the threat of violence 
inherent in the rule of military dictatorships acquired an unavoidable immediacy. By 
the late 1970’s, “[t]he antagonism between authoritarianism and democracy [had] 
largely superseded that posited between capitalism and socialism” (Munck 1990, p. 
113). The rediscovery of Gramsci by Latin American Marxists played a crucial role in 
the divorce of the Left from revolutionary and deterministic ideologies and its 
adoption of radical democracy as the primary goal of popular struggle (Barros 1986, 
Chilcote 1990, Munck 1990, Pearce 1996, Dagnino 1998, Baker 1998 and 2002).  
Thinkers rejected Marx’s determinism and the surety of an inevitable workers’ 
revolution. Adopting the concept of hegemony “implies a rejection of the notion of 




42).17 The possibility of the construction of an alternative hegemonic forces 
underlines the element of consent inherent in Gramsci’s idea of civil society: 
This conception of hegemony as articulation opens the door for a consideration of the 
autonomy of different subjects and the process of building their own collective 
identities. The collective elaboration of the basis for such an articulation embodies 
the core of and the greatest challenge to hegemonic construction (Dagnino 1998, p. 
42). 
 
 The traditionally state-centered mindset of the Latin American left also 
moved from a critique of the authoritarian state to a critique of state politics as such 
(Lechner 1988, p. 21), and thus moved away from the goal of taking over state power. 
Latin American theories of civil society, like Eastern European ones, emphasized 
self-restraint and self-organization (Baker 2002, p. 67). Pluralism within civil society 
replaced vanguardism and monism. That Gramsci’s ideas might serve to further non-
democratic goals was often ignored or pushed aside. “In my view,” states Brazilian 
Francisco Weffort, “if the notion of hegemony may have an anti-democratic meaning, 
we must look for a democratic meaning to it… What I am proposing is that we 
invent, if there is not one, a notion of hegemony which is democratic.” (quoted in 
Dagnino 1998, p. 40). Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1989) summarizes one such 
approach thus: 
Real democratization will arrive (and is arriving according to those who hold that 
perspective) as it is crystallized in the spontaneous solidarity of the disinherited. It 
lives as comunitas, experiences of common hardship which form a collective we 
based on the same life experience that is transformed only when, through molecular 
changes, the simultaneous isolation of the state and the exploiters – which will perish 
at the same time – comes about (p. 313).  
 
Cardoso’s critical description focuses on the assumption by many proponents 
of the new theories that solidarity will appear spontaneously within civil society 
                                                 
17 This point is central to the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). See also Barros (1986) and Nun 




among the oppressed by virtue of their shared experience of being oppressed. His 
objection that “civil society is ruled by domination – and that – taken by themselves 
alone – civil society and democracy have nothing to do with each other” (Cardoso 
1989, p. 312) has been taken by some to suggest an unwillingness to give up an 
orthodox Marxist understanding of politics (Baker 2002, p. 55). This, however, 
ignores Cardoso’s careful examination of the adequacy of the concept of hegemony 
for the situation in Brazil at that time. Cardoso was dubious at best of the possibility 
of a democracy “of civil society” that rejected the state and political parties. As was 
the case in many other South American countries in the period of transition, civil 
society and political parties were partners in the process of opening up of political 
spaces. In Cardoso’s words, there was a “pan-politization of the social and a 
socialization of the state” (Cardoso 1989, p. 319). Though it was successful in its 
contribution to the democratic transitions, this mixing of the social and the political is 
precisely what current theories of civil society, such as Cohen and Arato’s and 
Baker’s, oppose. 
  Pluralism in civil society, one of the characteristics that made it so attractive, 
flew in the face of the need to create a new hegemonic force to counter the state. As 
in Poland, the contradictory necessities of plurality and unity created rifts among 
Latin American movements and thinkers (see e.g., Mainwaring 1989, p. 198). 
Attempts to elaborate a notion of “unity within diversity” (Coutinho 1980, p. 31) only 
added more confusion to the issues: 
The importance of autonomy for Latin American social movements during the 1970’s 
and 1980’s was not simply a matter of catering for alternative political identities. For 
workers in particular, autonomy meant the opportunity to develop appropriate 
political organizations and strategies in alliance with other movements. The neo-




Latin American social movement leaders, asserting a plurality of identities was not an 
end in itself. These identities were important to collective autonomy from the state, 
which is why there were often heated debates (as in Poland over the umbrella role 
played by Solidarity) concerning the degree of autonomy that movements should 
have from each other (Baker 2002, p. 77).  
 
   Still, no resistance movement of the period in Latin America solidified behind 
a Solidarity-like symbol. Though alliances did exist among movements, there was 
never a sense that society was unified in its rejection of the authoritarian 
governments. More than in Eastern Europe, Latin American activists were forced to 
wait for change to come from above. Once again, the paradox becomes evident. A 
unified civil society has more resources at its disposal, more leverage in its struggle 
against the state, but this unity undermines one of the basic aspects of the social arena 
that civil society represents and, presumably, desires to preserve. There is no inherent 
common ground among groups and associations in civil society, particularly if one 
accepts Gramsci’s notion that it is within civil society that the battle for 
predominance across cultural norms is fought.  
 Ernesto Laclau and Chatal Mouffe (1985) have developed an account of the 
unity/diversity dichotomy inherent in civil society. Strongly influenced by Gramsci, 
they emphasize not the concept of civil society but that of hegemony, as the process 
through which politics and culture are articulated. They use Gramsci’s to criticize 
Marx’s reliance on a universal subject of history – the urban proletariat. Such a 
universal subject cannot be assumed to exist, it must be (and is) constructed by a 
combination of material conditions and the articulation of competing understanding 
of the world. Thus, “popular struggles where certain discourses tendentialy construct 
the division of a single political space into two opposing fields” (Laclau and Mouffe 




Third World,” they argue, “imperialist exploitation and the predominance of brutal 
and centralized forms of domination tend from the beginning to endow the popular 
struggle with a center, with a single and clearly defined element” (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985, p. 131).     
 Cohen and Arato (1992) agree: “In both Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
the juxtaposition of civil society and state was a conceptually dualistic outcome of a 
period of societal self-organization that led to polarization between democratic and 
authoritarian forces.” Civil society emerged as “an undifferentiated bloc 
counterpoised to the political system, and as the only agent of democratization 
processes” (Salazar 1999, p. 24). As a result, the impetus of civil society 
mobilizations subsided following the transitions to democracy. Once the repressive 
regimes were out of the picture, the unifying principle behind the multi-class alliances 
that formed the basis of the movements disappeared as well.18 This was the case in 
both regions. In Poland, Solidarity moved from civil to political society, many former 
dissidents across Eastern Europe entered the political arena, and a number of Latin 
American groups were absorbed by the resurging political parties.  
Though some movements retained their independence and continued their 
activities following the transitions,19 the dream of a unified civil society acting on 
behalf of the public dissolved in the processes of institutionalization, co-optation, and 
demobilization alluded to by the seminal work of Robert Michels (1949) and 
examined at length in the literature (Piven and Cloward 1979; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Tarrow 1994). Moreover, once democratization was taking place, 
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many organizations representing the interests of the poorest strata of society in Latin 
America saw their goals being pushed aside in favor of those of middle and upper-
class groups to which they had been previously allied (Moreira Alves 2001, Garretón 
2001). In spite of this, these civil society movements provided the inspiration for a 
new wave of scholarly work on the potential for civil society and social movements to 
continue to advance the cause of democracy beyond a rigid institutional framework of 
elite-dominated states and political parties.  
Civil Society and Social Movements: Fighting Democracy with Democracy 
It would be impossible to summarize here, however briefly, all the different 
ways in which the concepts of civil society and democracy have been examined even 
in the relatively recent past.20 Here, I limit myself to theories that examine the role of 
actively mobilized groups and collectives which explicitly strive to promote or 
expand democracy, with emphasis placed on those that come out of or refer to Latin 
America. The theories of civil society that emerge from the experiences of Eastern 
European and Latin American movements discussed above see this role of civil 
society as crucial. If peoples living under oppressive conditions and the constant 
threat of political violence could mount a front of resistance against their 
governments, why cannot citizens living in democracies do the same?  
 This raises the questions of whom civil society is fighting against in a 
democratic setting, and for what purpose. Given their focus on resistance to the state, 
many Latin American writers such as Weffort, Manuel Antonio Garretón, and 
Orlando Fals Borda (Edwards and Foley 2001) retained the idea that the principal 
                                                 




peril that society faced was domination from the state. After the transitions to 
democracy, this trend continued with the influx of ideas from a third influence on the 
current revival of the concept of civil society – the literature on the “new social 
movements” and the French “second left” in Western Europe.   
 The Western European approach arose out of a critique of the welfare state 
(see Offe 1984) and the perceived need to protect the public sphere from its 
encroachment. The “new social movement” theories are premised on a redefinition of 
the relationship between politics and society (Habermas 1991; Touraine 1981, 1982, 
1987, 1988; see also Fraser 1993, and Cohen and Arato 1992, Ch. 10). Advanced 
capitalist societies, it is argued, have undergone a transformation and have reached a 
“post-industrial” stage; that is, one in which the main goal of social organization is no 
longer the manufacturing of goods, but the provision of services. In general, the rise 
of the standards of living in those societies has made conflicts over the possession of 
goods secondary. Therefore, the most important social issues revolve around 
expressions of identity, freedom of speech, participation in decision-making 
processes, and the creation of a less “impersonal” society. Autonomous and 
independent institutions are juxtaposed to elite-controlled, bureaucratic and 
technocratic structure. The stakes involve the free expression of one (or one’s 
group’s) identity against the weight of external domination. The dynamics of social 
movements are no longer ruled by conflicts over “issues,” but by the mobilization of 
“identities” (Eder 2003, p. 62).21 
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 By far the most thorough and theoretically sophisticated attempt in the recent 
literature to combine the concept of civil society with the role of social movements is 
found in Cohen and Arato’s Civil Society and Political Theory (1992) and in their 
subsequent writings (Arato 1994; Cohen 1995). Cohen and Arato reject outright the 
anti-state visions of civil society that emerged from Eastern Europe and Latin 
America as overly simplistic and optimistic (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. viii, p. 30).22 
Their theory endeavors to combine the understanding of the social arena as a separate 
“lifeworld” of Western Europeans such as Habermas and Touraine, with Gramsci’s 
distinction of civil society from the state and the economy. Civil society represents 
the possibility of genuine democratic citizenship as long as it remains separate, for the 
actors in political and economic society “cannot afford to subordinate strategic and 
instrumental criteria to the patterns of normative integration and open-ended communication 
characteristic of civil society” (p. ix). An outright extrication of civil society from state and 
economy, on the other hand, is neither possible nor desirable. Civil society’s role is to 
influence the other two arenas in ways that tip the scales away from purely instrumental goals 
and towards those of “plurality, publicity, legality, equality, justice, voluntary association, 
and individual autonomy” (Cohen 1995, p. 37): 
[T]he political role of civil society is not directly related to the conquest of power, 
but to the generation of influence, through the life of democratic associations and 
unconstrained discussions in a variety of cultural and informal public spheres. Thus, 
the mediating role of political society between civil society and the state (political 
society sets up receptors for the influence of civil society) is indispensable, but so is 
the rootedness of political society in civil society. In principle, similar considerations 
pertain to the relationship of civil and economic society, even if historically, under 
capitalism, economic society has been more successfully insulated from the influence 
of civil society than political society, despite the claims of elite theories of 
democracy (Cohen 1995, p. 38).  
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As long as political and economic societies fulfill their function of acting as bridges 
between civil society, the state and the economy, the relationship between them need not be 
contentious. But Cohen and Arato acknowledge that this state of affairs has utopian 
underpinnings (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 452). As a rule, civil society must actively pursue 
both its independence from political and economic “rationalities” and its continued capacity 
to influence them for the sake of society (p. 472). The most valuable resource that it 
possesses, the reason for its importance and the necessity of its “defense and differentiation” 
they call “solidarity” – “which refers to the ability of individuals to respond to and identify 
with one another on the basis of mutuality and reciprocity, without exchanging equal 
quantities of support, without calculating individual advantages, and above all without 
compulsion” (p. 472). Social movements are the “dynamic elements” of their theory when 
they are characterized by “self-limiting radicalism” – “projects for the defense of civil society 
that accept structural differentiation and acknowledge the integrity of political and economic 
systems” (p. 493).  
Crucially, the importance of the new social movements for Cohen and Arato lays not 
in “what gains and losses they will produce for the actors, but whether they will produce 
solidarity or not” (p. 556). Accordingly, “the success of social movements on the level of 
civil society should be conceived not in terms of the achievement of certain substantive goals 
or the perpetuation of the movement, but rather in the perpetuation of values, norms, and 
institutions that are rooted ultimately in a political culture” (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 562).   
While much of the work on civil society and new social movements in principle is 
intended to analyze advanced capitalist societies,23 it has been enormously influential in Latin 
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America, whether through Cohen and Arato or otherwise.24 Arturo Escobar and Sonia 
Alvarez, for instance, state that 
[the new social movements] embody a transformative potential in at least two 
dimensions: first, the widening of ‘socio-political citizenship’, linked to people’s 
struggles for social recognition of their existence and for political spaces for 
expression, and second, the transformation or appropriation by the actors of the 
cultural field through their search for a collective identity and the affirmation of their 
difference and specificity” (Escobar and Alvarez 1992b, p. 4). 
 
 Even for some movements engaged in efforts to secure the most basic services, 
notions such as the opening up of political spaces, the recognition of a cultural or ethnic 
identity, and the curtailing of state interference on “local” decisions play an important 
rhetorical role (Scribano 1999; Nash 2001; Assies 2003).25 This sometimes leads to overly 
elaborate theoretical descriptions of collective actions, in order to make them fit with a pre-
conceived notion of the role of social movements. For example, referring to the Brazilian 
Landless Peasant Movement (Movimiento de los Trabajadores Sin Tierra – MST), 
Bernardo Mançano Fernández argues that land occupations 
are actions that initiate a spatial dimension of political socializations: the space of 
struggle and resistance. This space, constructed by the workers, is the place where the 
movement acquires experience and shape. Occupation is movement. In it, new 
subjects are created. In each land occupation, a new experience-generating source is 
created that will bring new actors that would not exist without it. Occupation is the 
condition of existence of these actors. In conceiving of the occupation as a fact, they 
are continuously recreating their own history. Not to conceive it is not to be 
conceived (Mançano Fernández 1999, p. 87).26  
 
 Similar views have been developed by certain Argentina unemployed 
organizations (Colectivo Situaciones and MTD Solano 2002; Dinerstein 2003a) and 
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some neighborhood assemblies that formed after the protests of December 2001 
(Dinerstein 2003b; Zibechi 2003). Many peasant and indigenous groups also place the 
goal of developing new identities based on traditional and communal ways of life at 
the forefront of their ideological programs. These include the Zapatistas in Mexico 
(Hayden 2002), and indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia (Yashar 2005).   
Behind the defense of cultural identities hides an apparent inability to deal 
with movements that do not have the expression of a particular identity or cultural 
tradition as their primary goal. In Latin America, this would exclude the majority of 
instances of collective political action (Eckstein 2001a). To be sure, the continued 
attention that civil society receives from scholars is due in large part to renewed 
struggles for recognition around the world and “the extraordinary energy and 
commitment expressed by the ‘new social movements’” (Walzer 1995a, p. 2). 
Feminist, environmental, cultural, ethnic, and so many other new social movements 
certainly do exist, and their study is indubitably important. The emphasis placed on 
the importance of shared symbols in the creation of collective identities is a necessary 
addition to the understanding of collective action. There is a tendency to nevertheless 
pay too much attention to these issues at the expense of others. 
Though Cohen and Arato ascribe to civil society the role of protecting the “realm of 
solidarity” from the intrusion of the state as well as the market economy – “economic 
rationality and societal solidarity represent competing claims” (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 
476) – most of their discussion concentrates on the former. It appears that they are not as 
ready to admit that the goal of democratizing civil society can be solved by separating it from 
the economy, as it is from the negative influence of state bureaucracy. This leads to a certain 




becomes necessary in part in light of Habermas and Offe’s critique of the welfare state, it is 
strange that, in regards to the economy, Cohen and Arato claim that “there is no reason why 
workers should not try to represent their interests through compromise [with it]” (Cohen and 
Arato 1992, p. 464). Certainly, if one accepts Touraine’s contention that the United States 
and Western Europe are in a “post-industrial” age where material conflicts are secondary, it is 
reasonable to spend less time on them. That is, however, most definitely not the case in Latin 
America.  
John Keane has criticized Cohen and Arato’s depiction of the economic arena as 
excessively negative (Keane 1988a, p. 86). A more pointed criticism, put forth by Hudson 
Meadwell, points out that their notion of civil society requires a thriving market economy. 
Cohen and Arato’s new social movements, he writes, 
[are] built, not on the ruins of capitalism, but on some of its successes, and [are] the 
carriers of criticism and change in this new world. New collective carriers of change 
have been identified, and the working class has been abandoned. The working class 
has become the enemy, the harbinger of industrialism in a post-industrial age. Thus 
this move also provides a solution to the Gramscian problem of ‘organic 
intellectuals.’ There is now no need to worry about relations between bourgeois 
leaders and working-class followers. The concerns of these new social movements 
are not the material questions of economic production and distribution, but the 
forging of new collective identities and political cultures that are not based on class 
(Meadwell 1995, p. 191). 
 
In terms of most Latin American social movements, it is more often than not a 
mistake to separate identity from material claims. For most movements the goal is not, it 
cannot be, the separation of civil society from the state. The structure of political institutions 
in most countries in the region encourages groups to seek institutional recognition and 
political exchanges to satisfy their goals. This, added to the fact that the constituencies of 
most of these groups come from the marginalized classes (as opposed to movements in the 
advanced capitalist countries, where they come from the middle classes) makes Latin 
American social movements fundamentally political in character (Mascott 1997; Baker 




politics – like the Andean countries, Guatemala, Mexico, and Brazil – as in those where such 
issues are secondary – as in Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The 
need for unity is more pressing for Latin American movements because freedom of 
movement and association often takes a back-seat to immediate demands of basic 
services. The transformation of the left-wing theorists’ understanding of the role of 
the state coincided with the new strategies of many movements and organizations, 
which focused on demanding economic and social concessions from the state instead 
of the capitalist employers. This “broader class struggle [was] located at the point of 
consumption (or reproduction) rather than production. Indeed, the capitalist state, and 
not the employer, came to represent the enemy in this scenario” (Baker 2002, pp. 78-
79; see also Assies 1994, p. 83). The literature that links the democratic potential of 
civil society to new social movements – like Cohen and Arato, Escobar (1992), and 
Dagnino – often neglects this crucial aspect of the experience of movements in Latin 
America; by turning their focus to issue-movements such as feminist, human rights, 
or environmental groups. 
But it is important not to dismiss the more recent mass mobilizations purely as 
relating to the goals of “old” social movements. Much like for the movements in the region in 
the 1970’s and 80’s, and like Solidarity in Poland, the line separating economic and political 
demands is not at all clear. The mass demonstrations in Argentina in 2001 or in Costa Rica in 
2000 were sparked by economic policies initiated by their governments, but popular unrest 
was fueled as much by these actions as by the general discontent simmering in these societies 
over corruption in the political elite, a perception of foul dealings between politicians and 
powerful economic interests, and the general inadequacy of democratic institutions to 




victory in 1998 revolves around a combination of political debates on the nature of 
democracy and economic issues like the future of the state-owned oil company (Ellner 2003a 
and 2003b). One should not forget that the elite pacts that initiated the transitions to 
democracy in the region – in “second wave” democracies like Costa Rica and Venezuela 
(Peeler 1985) as well as in “third wave” ones (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 
1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996) – were the result of economic as 
much as political calculations, and that current political alliances in most every country hinge 
primarily on a political actor’s view on the desirability of economic liberalization and 
privatization of state industries.  
Advocates of civil society like Keane (1988a), Held (1997), and Cohen and Arato, 
realize that for civil society to be truly democratic, the material conditions of citizens are to 
be taken into account. Yet they do not provide nearly as adequate an account of the role civil 
society should play in the economic aspect of democratization as they do in the political one. 
Nor do they pay much attention to the contradictory demands of the two. Mass mobilizations 
that demand the state to “own up to its responsibilities” (Laufer and Spiguel 1999; Scribano 
1999; López Maya 1999) do not wish for a reduction of state interventions in society but an 
increase (Rucht 2003). As Kurt Weyland (2004) has noted, Latin American political leaders 
that pushed for neoliberal reform did not gain power through reasonable explanations of the 
advantages of economic restructuring: 
Personalistic, populistic leadership, which claims an electoral mandate from the 
people but determines the content of this mandate at will, went hand in hand with 
neoliberal reform in a number of Latin American countries. The most outstanding 
cases were Menem in Argentina (1989-1999), Fujimori in Peru (1990-2000), Collor 
de Mello in Brazil (1990-1992), Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador (1996-1997), and, with 
less latitude, Carlos Andres Peres in Venezuela (1989-1993). […] Their connection 
to the people had the character of plesbicitarian acclamation than of liberal 
representation.” (pp. 149-150) 
 
For better or for worse, Latin American voters accepted such leaders, but with the 




each of the cases mentioned by Weyland, these presidents attracted public anger when they 
were shown to be dishonest and corrupt. They were ousted (with the exception of Menem, 
who successfully completed two terms in office) by congressional opposition and 
impeachments along with public protests. Presidents in the cases examined in the following 
chapters, enjoyed support from other political elites for the political programs, but were 
unable to quell the rising sentiments within civil societies that the neoliberal restructuring 
itself constitutes a betrayal of the government’s responsibility to care for its constituents.  
Civil society groups in Latin America are very much aware that a retreat of the state 
in managing social interactions often leads to economically privileged groups taking 
advantage of the rest (Walzer 1995b, p. 23; Rucht 2003, pp. 215-216). This brings to the fore 
a second major drawback of accounts such as Cohen and Arato’s: namely, the lack of 
attention they pay to the process through which civil societies unite for a particular purpose. 
As Meadwell (1995) and Keane (1988a) have pointed out, by completely divorcing economic 
activity from civil society, Cohen and Arato eliminate a powerful resource through which 
movements may oppose the state. Without it, the only way in which they can pose a serious 
challenge to the status quo is through collective mobilizations, the bigger and more durable 
the better. The problem is that, in conceiving of civil society as fundamentally concerned 
with the preservation of the purity of the “lifeworld,” they assume a level of commonality of 
purpose across groups that may or may not exist. Hudson Meadwell’s (1995) critique of 
Cohen and Arato addresses this issue:  
Consensus not over procedural or institutional arrangements that might address the 
political problems produced by diversity within a political community, but consensus 
over the content of the lifeworld, is assumed to be present. Civil society, then, is 
constituted by identity rather than difference, by unity rather than diversity (p. 193).  
 
In this evaluation, a “fetish of identity formation” makes Cohen and Arato’s 




1995, p. 191).27 Without accepting Meadwell’s wholesale rejection of the focus on 
identity formation, it seems clear that he identifies a serious drawback in Cohen and 
Arato’s work. The question at hand is, therefore, when can (and does) civil society 
take “the shape of a social movement” (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 75)?  
Civil Society in the Shape of a Social Movement 
As pointed out above, scholarly work on new social movements has developed 
important insights into the processes through which identity construction and the use of 
symbols affect the birth, shape, and lifespan of movements. The study of social 
movements in the United States, dominated in the 1970’s by theories of collective 
action and “resource mobilization” that assumed individuals to be purely self-
interested and stressed opportunity structures as the main driver of group behavior 
(Jenkins 1983; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1987), has also incorporated more 
complex accounts of group formation and motivations – “No serious student of 
movements any longer believes – if any ever did – that material interests translate 
straightforwardly into guides to action” (Tarrow 1994, p. 119).28 Bert Klandermans 
(1988) distinguishes “consensus formation,” which is a function of existing meanings 
in particular social networks, and “consensus mobilization,” which involves 
deliberate attempts to use those meanings for a specific purpose. Similarly, William 
Gamson (1990, 1992), and David Snow and Robert Benford (Snow and Benford 1988 
                                                 
27 This last charge would, one assumes, come as a complete shock to Cohen and Arato, who dedicate 
the last third of their 1992 book (well over two hundred pages) to establishing their theory’s rooting in 
modernity. 
28 A newer direction being taken by scholars appears to be a broadening of the scope of enquiry from 
social movements to “contentious politics.” The presumed gains from this development represent a 
loss for the interest of this work, however, as the goal of identifying similarities among vastly different 





and 1992; Benford and Snow 2000) underline the important of “framing” issues into 
grievances that will strike a cord with individuals:  
Social movements are deeply involved in the work of ‘naming grievances,’ 
connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that 
will resonate with a population’s cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform 
message to power holders and others (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 136).  
 
 The “classic research agenda” on social movements, according to an 
important recent work, “provid[ed] a reasonable, if overly structural and static, model 
for social movements. It worked best as a story about single unified actors in 
democratic polities; it worked much less well when it came to complex episodes of 
contention, both there and especially in nondemocratic states” (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly 2001, p. 18). The same can be said of studies of new social movements in Latin 
America. Though aware of Laclau and Mouffe’s work, writers such as Escobar 
(1992) and Dagnino (1998) prefer to concentrate on individual groups at the expense 
of issues that ranges of groups across civil society share:  
True, there are some demands that can be universalized, such as the demand to 
democratize the state, family, local community, and so on; these demands originate in 
large part in the capitalist mode of production and the unity of social labor. Yet, even 
these demands are understood and experienced in very different ways by the various 
social actors (Escobar 1992, p. 79).   
 
The goal of this work is to examine precisely those issues that Escobar and so many 
others choose to ignore: what are the demands that become universalized? How does this 
happen, and what role does civil society play in their “framing”? In a formally democratic 
Latin America, as in the rest of the democratic world, “the proliferation of points of 
antagonism permits the multiplication of democratic struggles” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 
131, see also Laclau 2004, p. 28). As societies become more open, the possibility of the 
coalescence of individuals into a “people” with common aspirations becomes more difficult. 




republicans like Sheldon Wolin (1996)29, and neo Marxists like Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri (2000 and 2004).30 For all their differences, they share a belief in the capacity of 
people, of citizens, to unite into a collective at the appropriate time. This sentiment is echoed 
by Latin American authors who, combining Marx, Gramsci, and postmodern thinkers such as 
Michel Foucault, hold on the hope that a “civil society from below” will rise to face the new 
challenges posed by capitalism, even if it has not done so thus far (Houtart 2001, Sader 
2001). 
Discussions of the massive protests in Argentina in 2001 highlight the 
importance of cultural rather than class struggle and, to repeat a well-worn phrase, the 
“creation of new identities” (see Svampa 2000). Though it is clear to all that the 
immediate causes of the outbreak of the protests were economic, many of these 
authors contend that, as the NSM theorists argue, the Argentine movement was born 
in a “post-liberal,” post-industrial,” or “post-modern” context. If capitalism in its 
current incarnation is to be resisted, it must be done in the realm of meaning. In this, 
they also recall the arguments of Habermas (1991) and Cohen and Arato (1992) in 
claiming that emancipation from “outside” cannot occur, since the “emancipators” 
(the Party) uses the same methods as the dominators. Ana Dinerstein (2003b), for 
instance, argues that “que se vayan todos! demands the impossible and, by so doing, 
generates an empty space for new meanings to be invented” (p. 194). Raul Zibechi 
(2003) puts it thus: 
                                                 
29 Wolin’s conception of “the political” entails “an expression of the idea that a free society composed 
of diversities can nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality when, through public deliberations, 
collective power is used to promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity.” By contrast, politics 
is “the legitimized and public contestation, primarily by organized and unequal social powers, over 
access to the resources available to the public authority of the collectivity. Politics is continuous, 
ceaseless, and endless. The political is episodic, rare” (Wolin 1996, p. 31).  
30 Referring to Hardt and Negri, Laclau comments that the spontaneous unity of the multitude appears 




The experience of the new Argentine movement indicates that it is possible to face 
social change in a different way, with different objectives and, above all, without 
creating apparatuses that end up becoming parasitic and destroying the popular 
movement. It shows that the main task of the movement is the recreation of social 
ties, which are the nuclei of the changes, that, at a certain moment, must be defended 
through the street actions of the multitude (p. 16).  
 
Luis Mattini adds that the results of the protests are not as important as the 
fact that they occurred at all. He sees the uprising of December 2001 as a “post-
modern insurrection,” and emphasizes the need for a new kind of resistance (Mattini 
2003; see also Mattini 2000). The left-wing intellectuals that form Situaciones, a 
collective that aims to produce “militant” scholarship in Argentina, use the term 
“counter-power” to encompass the different and diffuse forms of struggle. This notion 
has been adopted by internationally known neo-Marxist writers such as John 
Holloway and Hardt and Negri, as well as many Latin American academics.31  
They embrace Gramsci’s notion of hegemony in its recasting of Marxist class-
struggle from purely economic to economic/cultural. If hegemony is cultural 
domination, then the revolution must proceed first in the cultural realm and only later 
in the political one. Hence, they also accept Gramsci’s division of society into 
political, economic, and civil. Foucault, however, shows that society is awash with 
relations of domination. The independent intellectual left in Argentina today therefore 
rejects traditional forms of organization, including labor unions and political parties. 
All those form of organization have a totalizing effect and only impose a different set 
of relations of domination. The only social arrangement that escapes this trap is the 
one created by a community of equals in terms of their own shared “life experience.” 
                                                 
31 See Colectivo Situaciones (2002) and Colectivo Situaciones and MTD Solano (2002). For a 
collaboration with Negri, Holloway and others see Colectivo Situaciones (2001). Dinerstein (2003a), 




Otherwise, they argue, the logic of “complexity” undermines the capacity for new 
creation” 
Complexity thus acquires a singular status: not only does it point to the existence of 
very real structures of domination, creators of values that organize society, but they 
also act as obstacles to thought that rejects militant inquiry. It blocks, then, through 
this mechanism the potential of the re-appropriation by peoples of their own 
conditions of existence (Colectivo Situaciones and MTD-Solano 2002, p. 168).   
 
 All forms of political action that think in terms of unifying structures, such as 
the state, are “homogenizing” and therefore useless for truly critical thought. 
Naturally, these authors see it as positive that there was never a single organized 
resistance movement nut an agglomeration of separate groups acting together – 
“multiple action replaces a unifying concentration,” notes Zibechi approvingly 
(Zibechi 2003, p. 184).   
One issue that arises is the sudden blending of the economic with the socio-
cultural. It is very clear to all that the main concerns of the unemployed piqueteros in 
Argentina are not simply a cultural agenda but one of survival. Many of these groups 
are fighting primarily for work and food. These groups need continual assistance 
from national authorities – that, in fact, that is their main demand. This “pre-modern” 
(Meadwell 1995) approach of giving primacy to localized communal identities – for 
what is modernity if not an attempt to make sense of “complexity”? – to the 
understanding of collective identity has been criticized by neo-Marxists such as Atilio 
Borón (1995), and scholars of liberalism such as Michael Walzer (1992), John Hall 
(1995), and Meadwell (1995). Walzer’s contention, for instance, that a strong-enough 
state is required for a healthy civil society, specifically, to protect civil society from 




In [the Buenos Aires neighborhood of] of Quilmes people buy in the exchange 
markets sugar for three credits and sell it in Bernalesa at three thousand: it’s total 
speculation […] It’s therefore even more liberal; supply and demand at their most 
savage (Colectivo Situaciones and MTD-Solano 2002, p. 184).   
 
Unfortunately, the dangers of a purely locally-based social arrangement, in 
which state intervention is rejected in principle, seem to be too much for individuals 
to bear. The result is an eventual return to conventional politics at best, or to silent 
and impotent inaction at worst. 
Is it accurate to extrapolate the fact that some groups speak of new identities 
founded on shared life experiences and claim that the root of the national 
mobilization was this type of resistance? It is my contention that it is not. The united 
reaction against the state, the national movement that “synthesized and subsumed” the 
plurality of goals of a plurality of collective and individual actors, did exist for a short 
time, almost certainly less than one year. But the basis for the movement, its unifying 
aspect, did not stem from the abstract goal of “creating new identities.” On the 
contrary, it stemmed from people’s understanding of their identity as citizens of 
Argentina, their sense of national unity, and their feeling of being victimized by their 
elected officials. As shall be seen below, the economic program enacted by the 
Argentine state during the 1990’s had created animosity among the poor, the growing 
ranks of unemployed and on the millions of middle-class families that saw their 
standard of living decrease. The basis for the continued actions of social movements 
was a rejection of policies in which the state gave up some of its power. The 
unification of civil society in the Argentine case was brought about by two acts of 




state of siege to confront increasing social unrest. Both were interpreted as betrayals 
of the role the state should play in public life. 
Cohen and Arato seem to recognize this problem to an extent, when they state that 
the unity of civil society “is not on the level of institution, organization, or even a shared, 
fundamentally unquestioned normative order” (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 434) and that “[the] 
first task of the new movements is to form the very subject that must become the collective 
actor who will participate in political negotiations and exchanges and then the bearer of gains 
and losses” (p. 556). Yet, there is no assurance that this collective actor will follow the radical 
democratic project that Cohen and Arato set out. There is also no way to know where the 
discourse that will become “hegemonic” will come from. Cohen and Arato are optimistic of 
its arising from the bottom-up, from the grassroots (pp. 506-507). But it is a fact that social 
movements and mass mobilizations often rally behind political parties, charismatic 
personalities, or elites.32  
What, then, holds civil society together, when it acts together? Some advocates of the 
liberal conception of civil society recognize that something must. Ernest Gellner (1983, 
1994), Liah Greenfeld (1992) and Nicos Mouzelis (1995) have persuasively argued that 
nationalism is intimately connected with the rise of civil society in the West:  
Social order requires a shared culture; facts as such cannot, in the nature of the case, 
engender that shared system of ideas, interpretations and values which make a society 
viable. Facts are on the one hand recalcitrant, and on the other inadequate. So, any 
culture is a systematic prejudgment (Gellner 1994, p. 32).33  
 
This seems to solve the problem for liberals such as Gellner – since they do 
not expect the various groups within civil society to act in concert – but it certainly 
does not for advocates of an active, mobilized civil society.  It seems in fact that 
nationalist sentiment is habitually present as a cohesive element in mobilizations of civil 
                                                 
32 Torres-Rivas (1989), for instance, argues that popular pro-democracy movements in Central 
America in the 1980’s were elite-driven.  




society, as in the case of Solidarity mentioned above, and Latin America as well (López 
Maya 1999, Garita Bonilla 2001). If Cohen and Arato see nationalism as a unifying force in 
civil society, they do not acknowledge it explicitly, and neither do most of those who use 
their ideas and terminology.34  
As a conclusion to this chapter, I would like to suggest that Laclau and Mouffe’s 
ideas raise some issues relevant to this question.35 As already noted, Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) reject the existence of a given social actor that a priori represents “the people” as a 
whole. “The people” signifies an actual relation between social actors, but one that is 
contingent on the particular meaning which is given to it. Thus, the term may be used to mean 
the whole of the population of a country, the members of a national group, or, as it often does 
in Latin America, the plebs or lower classes. Mass movements habitually appropriate the 
concept of “the people” to attain legitimacy in the eyes of participants as well as antagonists. 
In effect, “[i]t does not designate a given group, but an act of institution that creates a new 
agency out of a plurality of heterogeneous elements” (Laclau 2004, p. 24). The construction 
of such a popular identity is what Laclau (2004), in a later work, terms “populist reason.” The 
whole of the people rarely wants the same thing at the same time. Particularly in democracies, 
different groups are engaged in the pursuit and articulation of various claims. There is no 
“society” beyond the sum of its components. For Laclau, the basic social actor is not the 
group, but the discursive claim or “demand.” But demands only make sense if there is an 
actor that is the target of those demands. This creates an internal “frontier” within society, 
which divides those groups that articulate demands, on the one hand, and the entity that is 
supposedly capable of satisfying those demands.   
                                                 
34 Jeffrey Alexander (1994) is a notable exception.  
35 My understanding of Laclau and Mouffe’s work benefited immensely from my participation in a 
seminar led by Ernesto Laclau at Northwestern University in the fall of 2004, and from his generous 




The result is a dichotomous social configuration with power distributed unequally, 
with the upper hand held by the target of the demands (presumably the ruler, state, or 
government) and a chain of equivalent though dissimilar demands competing for the former’s 
attention and acquiescence. This is not unlike the image of civil society we see in Cohen and 
Arato and in the new social movement theorists.36 The difference is that, in this view, social 
heterogeneity is “ultimately irreducible to a deeper homogeneity” (Laclau 2004, p. 23). 
Therefore, the question of how a temporary and incomplete homogeneity is achieved 
becomes central. This is the “logic of hegemony.” As in Gramsci, hegemony refers to the 
prevailing cultural discourse37 one in which one of many possible sets of norms and values 
becomes dominant. In contrast to Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe conceive of hegemonic 
discourses as constantly changing. Through a process of articulation and dissemination 
(which, admittedly, is not clearly outlined38), a demand comes to be taken as representing 
itself and all the others, it is simultaneously an individual demand and the symbol of the 
whole existing heterogeneous set.  
If there is no permanent common goal or principle among the widely 
divergent groups and associations of civil society, the formation of a mass 
mobilization that encompasses a great number of them would follow a process akin to 
that envisioned by Laclau and Mouffe. That is, a particular issue or demand would 
come to represent, if only for a short while, all the rest. I nonetheless share Tarrow’s 
                                                 
36 Though Laclau and Mouffe would likely not agree, particularly since much of their work combines a 
particular interpretation of Gramsci and the theories of thinkers such as Lacan and Derrida. I do not 
intend to discuss the usefulness of post-structuralism and Lacanian psychology in an analysis of real-
world political events, not do I wish to engage in the many complexities of their theories (for a good 
debate, see Butler, Laclau, and Zizek 2000).  
37 We may add, accepted freely by social actors (as opposed to being forced upon them by an external 
force). This is certainly what Gramsci has in mind, though Laclau and Mouffe neglect to dwell on it 
(Dagnino 1998, p. 37).  
38 Keane (1988a) notes that “Laclau and Mouffe do not specify the institutional mechanisms of 
hegemonic articulation […] They fail to see that their defense of stable openness or self-limiting 
democracy counterfactually implies – at a minimum – the same procedural framework to which they 





(1994) doubts about thinking of politics as a “text to be interpreted” (p. 119).39 Laclau 
and Mouffe, influenced by Lacanian psychology and post-structuralist theory tend to 
put little emphasis on existing material conditions, despite their Marxist roots. A close 
look at the symbols and language used by social actors is useful and important, but so 
are careful considerations of historical and material factors. In particular, I believe, 
one must pay attention to the dominant narratives within civil society. Political 
theorists – Tocqueville and Gramsci indubitably among them – have long understood 
that state power is legitimized through a combination of force coming from the rulers 
and the consent of the ruled. Recently, constructivist approaches, notably in the field 
of international relations, have focused on the values and norms that shape a nation’s 
identity and its importance to politics (Wendt 1996). Stephanie Golob puts it thus:  
Officials interpret the national interest in terms of what constructivists have called a 
nation’s ‘shared’ or ‘corporate’ identity; they justify their own authority by equating 
the survival of the nation and its distinct corporate identity with the survival of their 
state. Their ultimate goal is to shape the definition of national interest so as to 
reinforce the political and emotional connection between the citizens and the state 
through a core narrative of identity. In this way, they demonstrate the state’s 
identification with, and commitment to, the nation’s highest ideals and its most 
treasured self-schemas (Golob 2003, p. 366). 
 
Governments gain legitimacy not only through political institutions, but also from 
adhering to the national core narrative of identity. Historic institutionalism and 
studies of path dependency argue that, during certain “critical junctures” in a 
country’s history, this core narrative can be reshaped to serve the purposes of those 
wishing to retain power (Golob 2003, p. 367, see also Thelen 1999). The new core 
narrative is solidified and maintained by different mechanisms of reproduction, 
                                                 
39 Although Laclau has repeatedly stated that he believes the politics of hegemony encompass politics 
tout court, I pointedly limit myself here to suggesting that Laclau and Mouffe’s account of hegemonic 
formation may be of use in understanding the coalescence of civil society into a movement that 




enacted through institutions and education. The hegemonic struggle, or the attempt to 
replace a core narrative with a new one, not only takes place between civil society 
and the state, but also within civil society. Social movements and other actors’ are 
constrained by pressure to conform to the dominant culture attitudes, even as they try 
to change them through collective action. This is clearly recognized by Cardoso 
(1989): 
If, on the other hand, the basista (grass-roots) thrust and the constitution of a 
collective-popular subject so as to support a new historical subject of democracy 
breaks the confining bonds of past institutional forms, on the other hand the reform-
democratic thrust which accepts the contemporary reality of the pervasiveness of the 
State breaks the illusions about the possibility of a democracy ‘of civil society’ 
(Cardoso 1989, pp. 323-324). 
 
The conflict for hegemonic supremacy is long and difficult, as Gramsci was 
very much aware. While the dominant view among theorists of liberal democracy 
seems to be that this can only be accomplished by elites, the literature discussed here 
is faithful to its Marxist inspiration in believing that those “below” can ultimately 
prevail. The problem is that, by eliminating Marx’s belief in an objective “subject of 
history,” one is left with the multiplicity of actors that compose civil society. In Latin 
America at least, they do not seem strong enough in their few moments of unity to 
create the thorough upheaval that their champions anticipate.   




Chapter 3: Crisis and Protest in Argentina 
 
The economic crisis that rocked Argentina in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s 
was accompanied by an unprecedented wave of popular mobilization. In this chapter, 
I trace the development of the distinct elements of civil society that engaged in 
contestatory actions against the state, and the process through which they came to 
coalesce into the popular mobilizations that led to the resignations of four Presidents 
in a span of three weeks. As shall be seen below, despite the fact that the high-point 
of the protests, in December of 2001 and January of 2002, was preceded by a wave of 
lootings and food riots across the country, the majority of mass mobilizations 
expressed political values and goals and therefore should be considered the actions of 
organized civil society. The protests in Argentina illustrate the flaws in the theoretical 
literature on movilized civil societies since they were the result of socio-economic 
grievances combines with political ones, they demonstrate the difficulty in 
establishing and maintaining consensus across civil society, and in the articulation of 
grievances and goals predominated a sense of loss for past elite-driven politics in 
which state officials were responsible for the welfare of the citizenry.   
In late 2001, with the Argentine economy on the verge of collapse, nationwide 
protests denounced the government and President Fernando de la Rúa. The situation 
veered towards chaos with the outbreak of riots and lootings in the city of Rosario on 
December 12. Within a week they had spread across the country, as crowds of poor 
and unemployed people accosted supermarkets and other businesses demanding food 




state of siege in an attempt to stabilize the situation. But rather than abide by the 
presidential decree, middle and upper-class Argentines flooded into the streets. 
Banging pots and pans (cacerolas) and calling for the resignation of the president, 
economy minister Domingo Cavallo, and the rest of the cabinet, people in nightgowns 
and slippers, many with small children in tow,  showed the politicians “where they 
could stick their state of siege.”40 On the night of December 20, 2001, after a day of 
violent confrontations between police and demonstrators, de la Rúa resigned the 
presidency and evacuated the premises by helicopter, off the roof of the Casa Rosada 
(the presidential palace), for fear of being attacked by the crowds.41   
Over the next two weeks, four different men were appointed president of 
Argentina by the Congress: Ramón Puerta, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, Eduardo Oscar 
Camaño, and Eduardo Duhalde. The “provisional” presidents were pressured by new 
outbreaks of protests that led to their swift resignations. Political cartoonists poked 
fun at the country with the “three-day presidents” in the international media as the 
world awaited a resolution. Duhalde eventually was able to restore calm, benefiting 
from his predecessors’ efforts and from the initial outpouring of public anger 
gradually losing steam. Though he still faced months of continued popular 
mobilizations, he established enough legitimacy to finish de la Rúa’s tenure through 
2003.      
                                                 
40 A common impromptu song heard around the capital was “que boludos, que boludos, el estado de 
sitio se lo meten por el culo” (“those fools, those fools, they can stick the state of siege up their ass” – 
“Saqueos, Muertos y Cacerolazos y el Fin de Cavallo. El Día y la Noche del No Va Más” in Página 
12, 20 December 2001.  
41 Bereft of popular support, de la Rúa sought backing from his fellow political leaders but found he 
had been abandoned. It seems that he had been blind to the machinations of his political opponents, 
who were waiting in the wings for the right moment to relieve him of his position. See “El Gobierno 




Scholars in the United States have interpreted the events of December 19 and 
20, 2001 (hereafter December 19/2042) largely as an outburst of popular anger, 
basically a “food riot,” over the state of the country’s economy (Oxhorn 2002; 
Schamis 2002; Levitsky and Murillo 2003; Ollier 2003; Valenzuela 2004). These 
accounts do not examine the motivations of the participants or their varying types of 
organization that were present. They also pay little attention to the buildup of popular 
organization that had been taking place in Argentina for years prior. They focus 
instead on the deleterious effects that social instability can have on the adequate 
functioning of democratic institutions.43 Though it points to some very real problems, 
this perspective fails to recognize a major change in the relationship between civil 
society and the state in Argentina.   
During the late 1990’s there was a tremendous increase in organized political 
mobilizations across the country, involving organized labor and unemployed workers’ 
movements, left-wing political parties, human rights and ecclesiastical organizations. 
A “cycle of protest” (Tarrow 1989), a period of high levels of collective mobilizations 
against the state, strongly impacted national politics between 1996 and 2002 (Iñigo 
Carrera and Cotarelo 2000; Recalde 2003). Most protests were peaceful, organized by 
established groups, and had clear political as well as material goals. The lootings and 
vandalism of December 2001 were the exception rather than the rule. It is widely 
believed in Argentina that the lootings themselves were instigated by opposition 
                                                 
42 Although this paper addresses the periods before and after those two days in December, they create a 
good reference point for analysis, as they have been prominent in political, media, and academic 
discussions.   
43 They are influenced by recent studies of democratic transitions and consolidation, which argue that 
consolidation is more likely to happen in societies were popular mobilization from civil society is 
channeled through traditional political institutions (Schmitter and O’Donnell 1986; Aguero and Stark 




forces form within the political elites, and thus were not spontaneous outbursts of 
popular rage at all.44  
On the other hand, a number of works, mostly within Latin America, depict 
December 19/20 as a watershed moment for Argentine politics (Altamira 2002; 
Auyero 2002a and 2004; Cafassi 2002; Schuster et al 2002; Filippini 2002; Dinerstein 
2003a and 2003b; Zibechi 2003; Sueiras 2004). Some accounts proclaim the 
beginning of a new revolutionary period, either in the form of a socialist revolution 
(Sáenz and Cruz 2002) or through a radical democratic transformation led by “civil 
society from below” (Mattini 2000 and 2003; Houtart 2001; Negri and Cocco 2002; 
Barbetta and Bidaseca 2004; Hardt and Negri 2004). Many of these authors point to 
December 19/20 as the moment in which a plurality of collective protest movements 
acquired a common purpose. Yet, this picture of the conflict between civil society and 
the state is also misleading. Not only does it downplay the traumatic wave of violence 
that enveloped the country for one critical week, but it also presupposes too readily 
the existence of a cohesive popular movement.  
 The large public mobilizations in Argentina involved a revival of citizen 
participation in politics, which reflected a strengthening civil society. Despite 
unlawful actions by some, the cycle of protest referred to here was dominated by 
peaceful, organized demonstrations with clearly stated goals and demands. The 
urgency of the economic situation as well as specific political grievances prompted 
many Argentines to engage in collective action. Each of the many groups that 
                                                 
44 Essentially, it is argued that poor people were incited by political operatives sent by high ranking 
officials from the opposition Peronist party, including Duhalde. This charge was discussed in the 
national media as early as December 21, and has made its way into scholarly discussions (e.g., 
Schuster et al 2002). A good account of the circumstantial evidence and various allegations can be 




protested against the state in this period organized around a shared identity and 
articulated common demands. The discussion below focuses on the most important 
ones. During the climactic days of the crisis – between December 12, 2001 and late 
January, 2002 – the intensity of citizen protest was at its highest, and there were signs 
that the various social groups could indeed unite into a single national movement 
representing “the people.” Ultimately, a long-lasting political actor would not emerge.  
Virtually all the mobilized groups coalesced behind the call for the resignation 
of de la Rúa and his government, as well as more generally directed anger at the 
traditional political class, expressed in the cry “que se vayan todos, que no quede ni 
uno solo” (“they should all go, not one should be left”). The specific targets of 
popular anger, other than the politicians, were the high rate of unemployment, the 
devastating economic crisis, government corruption, and the perceived leniency 
towards alleged criminals such as former President Carlos Menem (Auyero 2002a; 
Armony and Armony 2005). Concerted action was facilitated by open communication 
among groups and very real common grievances (which grew as the crisis 
exacerbated), but also common ideas and values – nationalist symbols, appeals to 
historically significant events, a unifying national “myth,”45 an “us versus them” 
attitude among protesters (Auyero 2002a). Yet, after only a few months, the 
movement dissipated as the economic situation began to gradually improve, groups 
and movements squabbled internally and with each other, and the government 
                                                 
45 Armony and Armony (2005) suggest that the dream of a “Great Argentina” is integral to the way 
Argentines see their relationship to their country. In an analysis of presidential speeches, they argue 
that Menem employed the idea of Great Argentina to “sell” his neoliberal program, and that this added 
to the sense of betrayal felt by the citizenry. They also find that de la Rua’s successors tried to re-
establish the hope in a return to the national destiny. As Eduardo Duhalde put it, “Argentina is doomed 




successfully co-opted some of the major actors. The discussion below examines the 
instances of concerted action on the part of civil society groups, the ways in which 
political, social, and economic issues were blended together in the process of the 
creation of temporary alliances, as well as the difficulties for the endurance of a 
popular movement in contemporary Argentina.  
 
Social Protest in Argentina before 1996  
Peronists and Militaries (1940-1983) 
The primary source of social mobilization in Argentina before 1976 was 
organized labor. The umbrella General Confederation of Workers (Confederación 
General de Trabajadores – CGT) emerged as a political force by joining forces with 
populist Colonel Juan Domingo Perón and his Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista 
– PJ) in the early 1940’s. As minister of labor during a period of military rule (1943-
1945), Perón had risen rapidly in popularity due to a number of pro-labor reforms 
enacted under his direction. This prompted his removal and incarceration, but on 
October 17, 1945 massive demonstrations led by the CGT forced his release and not 
long after the elections that would win him the Presidency. During its heyday (1946-
1950), the PJ institutionalized a clientelistic regime based on direct ties between the 
government and specific social sectors. Argentina’s advanced industrial economy 
made the labor unions key conduits through which the government could mobilize, 
and also reward, support. The economic corporatism that characterized this period of 
the country’s history was fundamentally tied with these ties between the government 




Organized labor remained loyal to Perón, as Marcelo Cavarozzi (1986) 
argues, “as the main symbol of a return to a better past [that] constituted Peronism’s 
greatest attraction for the masses, and in particular for the working class” (p. 28). It is 
already evident in this period that what would become the country’s most influential 
political ideology relied on the idea that the rapid industrialization of the early part of 
the twentieth century was the key to welfare for the entire population. The accusation 
that traditional land-owning elites and the new capitalists, in collusion with the 
military, were trying to exclude the majority of Argentines from these benefits would 
be a fundamental driving force in political conflicts for decades to come.  
The unions acted both as advocates for the working class (and expressed 
material demands) and as a source of civil support for a political movement and party. 
Yet, if organized labor played some of the roles that would later be ascribed to civil 
society – allowing citizen involvement in politics outside of elections, articulating 
demands, and facilitating the collective pursuit of shared goals – it did so by 
remaining closely tied to the Peronist political machine and to a fundamentally class-
centered ideology. The PJ, on its part, developed neighborhood, local, and provincial 
units that penetrated communities and became permanent fixtures in the lives of poor 
and working-class Argentines. This network of agents, which continue to exist today, 
greatly affected the shape of social mobilization in Argentina (although it lost part of 
its luster in the 1990’s).46 The alliance between Peronism and the labor movement 
                                                 
46 Auyero (2001) provides an excellent in-depth discussion of present-day Peronist “survival networks” 
and the different ways in which the PJ retains a prominent space in neighborhood social life. This well-
known presence of the PJ in poor neighborhoods and shantytowns gave credence to the claim that the 
lootings of December 2001 were instigated by “punteros,” as the “embedded” (to borrow an in vogue 




would endure through military coups, guerrilla violence, and a brief return of Perón to 
power in the early 1970’s (Horowitz 1990; Collier and Collier 2001; Di Tella 2003). 
Perón’s two presidencies strongly polarized Argentine society, initially 
between the poor who benefited from his welfare policies and were attracted by his 
populist eloquence, and the traditional elites he had pushed aside. Particularly during 
his second tenure (1951-1955), however, his personalist rhetoric, anti-communism, 
and support of former Nazi immigrants gained him the enmity of many on the left. He 
was criticized for his treatment of political opponents and his disrespect for free 
speech, and by 1954 had alienated the Catholic Church as well. An alliance of 
conservative groups, centrist and leftist political parties, and several sectors of the 
Armed Forces organized a coup that termed itself the Liberating Revolution 
(Revolución Libertadora) and took over the government on September 16, 1955. 
Organized labor, the only significant social actor still loyal to Perón, launched 
demonstrations demanding his return, but soon conceded defeat and retreated. For the 
next decade, the military allowed for limited electoral experiments (the PJ was 
excluded form participation) but the ambivalent support for democracy among the 
country’s citizens did not suffice to mount much resistance to yet another coup in 
1966.47     
The CGT, though it experienced internal splits regarding questions of strategy 
in dealing with anti-Peronist governments, remained unified in its loyalty to Perón. 
(Godio 2000). The most significant cases of large-scale labor protests took place in 
1969 and 1970 – in a number of worker “takeovers” of various provincial cities, most 
notably in Córdoba (Lobato and Suriano 2003, Ch. 3). They were instrumental in the 
                                                 




fall of the 1966-1973 military government since they reflected a lack of support 
among the citizenry for the regime (Bermeo 2003, p. 180). These historical instances 
of political action initiated “from below,” along with the worker demonstrations of 
1945, would be used in the 1990’s to inspire popular mobilization.   
The last military regime in Argentina (1976-1983) targeted labor unions as a 
possible source of organized opposition, gutting their leadership, infiltrating 
government agents into labor organizations, and imprisoning, torturing, and executing 
politically-active individuals (Godio 2000; Lobato and Suriano 2003; Recalde 
2003).48 A primary goal of the ruling junta was to weaken civil society; along with 
the unions, left-wing political parties, student federations, and other activist groups 
were forcibly demobilized (Cavarozzi 1986, p. 21). Though the effort was not 
completely successful, as shown by the appearance of a variety of new citizens’ 
movements, the legacy of repression on social activism would cripple most social 
organizations for years thereafter.  
As in other Latin American countries dominated by repressive military 
regimes, human rights organizations became significant political actors in Argentina. 
Relatives of Detained and Disappeared Individuals for Political Reasons (Parientes 
de Detenidos y Desparecidos por Razones Políticas - PDDRP), Mother of Plaza de 
Mayo (Madres de Plaza de Mayo - Madres), and Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo 
(Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo - Abuelas) were born between 1976 and 1977, the earliest 
days of the last military period. These groups confronted the state on issues of civil 
liberties, human rights, and the abuse of government power, and originally stayed 
away from economic debates. Their achievements in undermining the government’s 
                                                 




legitimacy and attracting international condemnation has been seen as a contribution 
to the eventual return to democracy in 1983 (Oxhorn 2001). 
 Madres was (and continues to be) the most prominent of these groups.49 It was 
formed on April 30, 1977, by fourteen women whose children had “disappeared,” 
who convened to meet at Plaza de Mayo to make their grievances public.50 Though 
“initially dismissed, often ridiculed, and later on brutally persecuted” (Navarro 2001, 
p. 241), Madres slowly carved its place in the national consciousness. Their calls for 
the “live return” (“aparición con vida”) of their loved ones evolved over time into 
“marches for life” (“marchas por la vida”), which sometimes attracted several 
thousand participants (Recalde 2003, p. 130). Developing from chance encounters 
and conversations, Madres perfectly embodied the paradigm of the “new social 
movement,” centered on a collective identity shaped out of shared personal 
experiences and pursuing similarly shared goals of government openness, respect for 
individual rights, and accountability for perpetrators – making “the personal” political 
(Navarro 2001, Zibechi 2003). The quiet manner of their usual processions belied 
their commitment, and when members began to be harassed and arrested the group 
found various ways to fight for its own rights as well. Like the worker battles of 1945 
and 1969, Madres’ defiance would serve as inspiration for the protests against 
governments in future confrontations.   
                                                 
49 Though it shares many characteristics with Abuelas – see Arditti (1999) – Madres’ symbolic 
significance in Argentine culture is indisputable. 
50 As the movement’s official story has it, on one of their first excursions a guard in uniform 
approached them and order them to “move along, move along” (“circulen, circulen”). So the women 
did just that, and began a slow circular march around the square, which became their distinctive modus 




 The period examined in this section provides examples of three different types 
of social mobilization. First, there is organized labor, which was unified by an 
ideology of class struggle, a sympathetic government that provided direct benefits for 
a decade, and later by a strong allegiance to Perón and his movement. As 
representative of many sectors of society, the CGT was a typical instance of a Latin 
American social movement intimately linked to a political entity, and therefore a poor 
example of independent civil society action. Though important in the fall of previous 
military regimes, the presence of the unions was much less felt during the last 
military period (1976-1983). The CGT would emerge into the newly democratic 
Argentina weakened by a long period of inactivity, political persecution, and a 
decimated leadership.  
Second, there is the broad coalition of anti-Perón groups that formed towards 
the end of his second presidency. This instance of opposition to the state shows that 
politics in Argentina were not dominated by class conflicts, but rather by alliances 
against particular political leaders (usually presidents) and government policies.51 The 
anti-Peronist opposition illustrates the potentially divisive nature of society when 
politics are dominated by personalistic figures. These alliances also show that many 
Argentines were willing to sacrifice democratic principles during periods of political 
conflict, a pattern that would change later on, as Nancy Bermeo (2003) has pointed 
out. Finally, there are the emerging new social movements, which concentrated on 
issues of human rights, citizen protections, and institutionalized democracy, and 
which would lead the fight against the military dictatorship. Bermeo notes that by the 
                                                 
51 See Bermeo (2003, pp. 195-199) for a discussion of the low level of polarization in Argentina 




mid-1970’s the Argentine population was showing a stronger commitment towards 
democracy, and was much less supportive both of the military takeover of 1976 and 
of the regime that followed in general (see esp. Ch. 6). In each case, there were 
central issues separating the ruling political actors from the rest of society, and the 
opposing coalitions identified with them. It would take almost two decades into the 
democratic period for a similar wave of collective action to appear.  
Dual Transition (1983-1995) 
Democracy was nevertheless welcomed in 1983 by a timid citizenry. Raul 
Alfonsín of the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical – UCR) was elected 
President amid much hope, but soon faced some complicated realities. Factions of the 
armed forces, which had given up power grudgingly, attempted to seize power by 
force repeatedly in the early years following the transition. The national economy, as 
in the rest of the region, was in the midst of the debt crisis that would lead to the 
1980’s being remembered as the “lost decade” in Latin America. Alfonsín was also 
openly challenged by organized labor and human rights groups. In addition to 
protesting the government’s handling of the economy, the unions pushed for the 
return to power of the PJ, though labor protests were much less severe than in other 
Latin American countries during the same period (a result of the highly effective 
repressive tactics of the military regime).52 Unlike their counterparts in other 
countries, Argentina’s human rights groups did not disappear following the transition 
to democracy but relentlessly continued to seek legal prosecution against human 
                                                 
52 See Walton (2001). The CGT would eventually call for thirteen general strikes during the Alfonsín 




rights’ abusers (with meager results, given the urgent need of the civilian authorities 
to placate the military brass).53  
In the late 1980’s, organized labor reformed its ranks behind the new face of 
the PJ, Carlos Saúl Menem (Murillo 2001), who decisively won the 1988 presidential 
election on a populist platform. Once in power, however, Menem initiated a radical 
“neoliberal” program of economic reform designed to control inflation rates and 
modernize the economy, with Domingo Cavallo as the head of his economic team. 
They successfully halted inflation behind Cavallo’s “convertibility strategy” of 
pegging the Argentine peso to the American dollar, brought large quantities of 
foreign investment to the country, privatized most state holdings, and produced 
impressive rates of GNP growth for most of the decade. The strong currency and the 
virtual elimination of trade barriers encouraged the acquisition of imported goods; as 
a result, the levels of consumption of the upper and upper-middle classes began to 
resemble those in Europe and the United States. Though criticized for corrupt 
dealings and a penchant for semi-authoritarian practices, Menem was widely praised 
for his foresight on economic matters, and Argentina was lauded as a model for 
economic reform in the age of globalization (see, e.g., Corrales 2002).   
As became increasingly evident through the 1990’s, there were negative 
outcomes to the reforms as well. Economic and social inequalities became more 
marked, unemployment grew rapidly, and the welfare state became less effective due 
                                                 
53 For examples of the dissolution of such groups in Chile and Brazil see Garretón (2001) and Moreira 
Alves (2001) respectively; see also Foweraker and Landman (1997). These authors contend that 
following the transitions to democracy in their countries the goals of these groups were cast aside. 
Madres and Abuelas refused to retreat, and were able to gather support for their activities, including a 
national demonstration on March 21, 1985, which attracted hundreds of organizations and 50.000 
participants in. Yet, it seemed for a long time that they would be much less effective in a democratic 




to sharp cuts in public expenditures. Many from the traditionally large middle class 
fell into poverty, while more and more workers lost their livelihood as privatized 
industries looked to increase efficiency and profits. Despite all of this, Menem was 
reelected in 1995. Continued support from the CGT, the approval of the upper classes 
for his policies, and the failure of the previous government in keeping inflation under 
control contributed to the persistence of his economic model into the 21st century 
(Murillo 2003).54 Unrepresented by the major political parties or the labor unions, the 
“losers” of the Menem period – the impoverished middle and working classes, the 
unemployed – did not have the organizational capability to mount a coherent 
opposition movement.  
Middle class protests were especially rare, though some neighborhood-based 
groups had decried government economic policies through “apagones” (“blackouts”) 
– in which all participants would turn off their electricity, or disconnect their 
telephones, at a particular time for two or three hours, – “bocinazos” – honking of 
car-horns in unison, – and cacerolazos. These last had emerged as a result of 
Menem’s policies in opposition parties’ rallies and in marches organized by white-
collar workers, especially teachers, in 1990 and 1993 for example (Schuster et al 
2002, pp. 24-25).55 As a rule, the Argentine middle classes during the Menem period 
were seen (and saw themselves) as eschewing direct political participation, other than 
at the electoral ballot, electing to wait and enjoy the fruits of the newly modernized 
                                                 
54 See Stokes (2001) for a discussion of Menem’s shift from populist rhetoric to neoliberal policies.  
55 Many in the media commented, following December 19/20, that the middle class protests that 
contributed to the electoral defeat of Peronism in 1999 essentially brought it back to power in 2001 (a 
number of news articles and editorials discuss this issue in Página 12, December 21, 2001, though 
there are many other instances). Conversely, it did not escape the most observant commentators that 
the middle classes in Chile had employed cacerolazos to protest left-wing president Salvador 




economy. The legacy of state repression constituted a further deterrent against 
collective action.  
Early signs of popular discontent were nonetheless evident in the poorest 
areas of the country. The State unions’ Front (Frente de Gremios Estatales – FGE), in 
the province of Jujuy, joined left-wing parties to demand higher tariffs for large 
corporations in 1990. Dismissed oil workers in the towns of Tartagal and Mosconi 
staged demonstrations against the privatization of the state oil company in 1991. In 
the city of Santiago del Estero, on December 16, 1993,56 state workers and private 
citizens forcibly invaded the state legislature, the executive House, and the courts 
buildings and set them on fire. Protesters also attacked the homes of PJ and UCR 
officials perceived to be especially corrupt. Initially dismissed as a disorganized riot, 
Javier Auyero (2002b) has shown the santiagueñazo to be a purposive (if to an extent 
spontaneous) action that had clearly framed objectives and targets of protest: 
“protesters though of themselves as the ‘honest pueblo’ that fought against a corrupt 
political class” (Auyero 2004, p. 322).57 In 1994 and 1995, similar uprisings took 
place in La Rioja, Jujuy, Salta, El Chaco, Tucumán, Entre Ríos, Catamarca and Tierra 
del Fuego. These so-called “puebladas,” in which masses of protesters took over 
entire towns for a day or two, were not centrally organized, but launched by 
multisectoriales, heterogeneous ad hoc alliances that counted on the presence of 
                                                 
56 The historical account of the birth of the unemployed movement, beginning with the santiagueñazo 
of 1993 is provided by Laufer and Spiguel (1999), Oviedo (2001), Kohan (2002), Recalde (2003), 
Lobato and Suriano (2003), Svampa and Pereyra (2003), Zibechi (2003).  
57 Auyero’s analysis of the Santiago del Estero riots has influenced my discussion of the Argentine 
cycle of protest leading to December 19/20: he examines “how, as collective action escalated, 
brokerage efforts multiplied, networks were formed, lines of culpability were collectively drawn (i.e. 
the targets of popular anger were defined and concretised in specific places), and violence (and fire) 
was learned and normalized” - http://www.sunysb.edu/sociology/faculty/Auyero/Auyero-
Relational%20Riot.htm. The picture that emerges from my analysis is necessarily less detailed than 




union leaders, recently unemployed workers, pensioners, non-employed women and 
children, groups protesting abuses by private-service companies, and human rights 
organizations (Laufer and Spiguel 1999, p. 30; Iñigo Carrera and Cotarelo 2000). 
They would inspire the unemployed movement that would emerge soon after.   
 For the first time since the 1940’s, organized labor faced an ideological 
conundrum. Its relationship with the PJ had been long and profitable (at least to the 
highest-ranked leaders), but Menem’s policies threatened to harm the working class. 
Amid growing concerns over the outcomes of neoliberal reform, and of heated 
internal debates, the CGT leadership chose not to withdraw its support for Menem.58 
As a result, an opposing camp (notably state workers’ unions) broke ranks with the 
CGT to form the Argentine Workers’ Central (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos – 
CTA) in 1993. Truck and bus drivers’ organizations formed a second dissident group, 
the Argentine Workers’ Movement (Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos – 
MTA), in 1994. They began to convene their own strikes - the first one on August 2, 
1994 (Iñigo Carrera and Cotarelo 2003), signaling the first ever major division within 
the labor movement under a Peronist government (Godio 2000, p. 1228). The CTA 
and the MTA channeled their electoral support to opposition parties UCR and 
emerging third party FREPASO, which would unite in the late 1990’s to form the 
Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el Progreso – Alianza), though Menem’s 
reelection showed that the PJ still had the upper in terms of influence at the local level 
in many provinces. 
                                                 
58 Individual unions mobilized and declared strikes over privatization programs - telephone workers in 
1990, miners in Sierra Grande in 1991, railway workers in 1991, steel workers in Somisa in 1992 – but 
the CGT called for only one general strike during the first Menem administration, a twenty-four hour 




Human rights’ organizations were active during the first half of the 1990’s. 
Menem decisively dealt with the issue of human rights’ abuses by supporting 
“amnesty laws” for members of the armed forces. In fact, the military brass had never 
publicly acknowledged that any human rights abuses had taken place. Nevertheless, 
Madres took a leading role in the fight against menemismo, using language that would 
come to become prevalent among opposition movements:  
This puppet leadership does not privatize, it gives away; it does not pay attention to 
the needs of the people, it smashes it; it pays no attention to the constitutional system, 
it turns it into a viceroyalty. Menemism or any other type of personalist leadership 
must realize that this people, like the kids say, no longer “eats glass”; and, naturally, 
it unites slowly but surely, because we know that the alternative we face is solidarity 
and struggle or hunger and repression.59  
 
 Though Madres, Abuelas, and other groups continued their weekly 
pilgrimages to the public squares as well as periodic “Resistance Marches” (Marchas 
de Resistencia), Menem’s reelection was seen as a serious setback. Their fortunes 
changed in 1995, with the publication of a series of interviews between journalist 
Horacio Verbitsky and former military officer Adolfo Scilingo, in which Scilingo 
described the handling of political prisoners during the military period (see Verbitsky 
1996). For the first time, a relatively high-ranking member of the armed forces openly 
discussed torture, disappearances, and political assassinations, the “dirtiest” details of 
the dirty war. After the Scilingo affair, demands for official accountability acquired 
renewed strength, as several other former military officials came forward to confess 
crimes in the following months.  
HIJOS (“children”)60 was created in 1995 by sons and daughters of the 
disappeared. Young adults who had been orphaned by the military, and who had 
                                                 
59 From a pamphlet convening for the 12th March of Resistance, 9 and 10 December 1992. 
60 The name of the group is also an acronym: Children for Identity and Justice against Forgetting and 




shared their experiences in group-therapy sessions and other projects established to 
help the thousands of affected children, took to developing workshops and 
discussions in order to deal turn their personal experiences into political demands. 
Madres and HIJOS shared more than their goals. The latter group deliberately 
adopted the formers’ emphasis on the “affective” relationships between their 
members, based on their shared history. HIJOS gained prominence not only for the 
legitimacy of its demands but also for the novelty of its tactics. Its members first 
popularized a type of public demonstration called escrache, in which people gathered 
outside the home or business of a person deemed guilty of crimes and organized a 
“celebration of denunciation” next to it. The escrache was not simply an act of 
“finger pointing,” but a new way of combining social, cultural, and artistic activities 
with political ones. Escraches were soon launched not only against alleged human 
rights’ violators but also against corrupt politicians and unpopular public figures. In 
several cases, especially in the charged period of 2000-2002, spontaneous escraches 
took place in front of public officials’ homes or offices, and even when particularly 
reviled individuals were spotted eating at a restaurant or walking down the street.  
The first Menem presidency, in sum, encountered some opposition among the 
citizenry: from disgruntled factions within the labor movement, human rights 
organizations, left-wing political groups, and the occasional appearance of town-level 
multisectoriales.61 With the exception of the human rights’ groups, which were 
among the first to equate political concerns over repression with unemployment and 
                                                 
61 Scribano (1999) notes that it is a mistake to think of the 1989-1996 period as one completely 
dominated by social apathy. He points out that there were 1734 protests in Argentina in those years – 
877 union, 345 economic but not union, and 512 “citizen-led.” Still, he acknowledges that 




hunger, the mobilizations in this period revolved around specific socio-economic 
grievances, though the formation of collective identities revolving around a sense of 
disenfranchisement is evident in the provincial uprisings. As Auyero shows in the 
case of the santiagueñazo, poor Argentines had the tools, the opportunity, and 
increasingly the communal feelings of solidarity to join in collective action in 
situations perceived to be extreme. The federal and provincial governments 
negotiated settlements, such as payment plans for dismissed workers, and were thus 
able to temporarily secure order. Protests were mostly isolated geographically and 
socially (i.e., participants belonged to the same socio/economic class), and the 
Menem presidency dealt with individual groups separately. It could afford to since 
neither most of the poor nor the middle class were perceived as capable of large-scale 
organized mobilization.  
The Protest Cycle (1996-2002) 
New Actors, New Alliances (1996-1999) 
Beginning in late 1995, the relationship between the state and the citizenry as 
a whole changed drastically. The quantity and size of protests markedly increased, but 
there was also much more cooperation among groups, even between seemingly 
unrelated organizations. Additionally, the rhetoric of labor and unemployed protesters 
incorporated more general issues of politics and citizenship. Rather than fight for 
specific benefits from the government, protesters decried corruption, poverty, 
unemployment, and crime. It became common to hear complaints against a political 
class that had “stolen Argentina,” sold it to foreigners and pocketed the profits. These 




in labor mobilizations, demonstrations by Madres and other human rights groups, as 
well as in reports by the mainstream media increased dramatically.  
  On September 6, 1995, the CGT, CTA, and MTA jointly called for a general 
strike for the first time, though the CGT remained as a whole a supporter of the 
administration. They would do so again five times between 1996 and 1999, with each 
strike including large demonstrations and marches, and attracting more and more non-
union members as the issue of unemployment became preeminent (Iñigo Carrera 
1999; Iñigo Carrera and Cotarelo 2003). The roadblock was incorporated to most 
large labor strikes as a form of protest in 1996, influenced by the success of nascent 
unemployed organizations around the country.62 The content of workers’ demands 
changed as well. Lacking a coherent economic alternative to Menemism, the CTA and 
MTA decried the model as throwing the country into disarray.  
The gradual merging of complaints relating to democratic principles and 
economic grievances in public demonstrations was evident on March 24, 1996, the 
twentieth anniversary of the last military coup. As Madres, Abuelas, and H.I.J.O.S. 
commemorated the dead and continued their campaign to punish those culpable, a 
Federal March, organized by representatives from all three labor organizations in 
conjunction with left-wing groups, student federations, pensioners’ organizations,63 
parts of the Church, and several others attracted tens of thousands of demonstrators 
under the slogan “Work for All.” Menem’s attempts to change the national 
Constitution in order to seek a third term in office also provoked widespread 
                                                 
62 For a detailed discussion of the adoption of the roadblock by organized labor see Svampa and 
Pereyra (2003), pp. 29-36.  
63 Such as the National Coordinating Organization of Retired Workers and Pensioners (Mesa 
Coordinadora Nacional de Jubilados y Pensionados) and the Independent Movement of Unemployed 




indignation.64 Though still acting separately, traditional (i.e., concerned with material 
issues) and “new” social movements began the process of creating a common 
language that allowed for mutual cooperation. The core of “anti status quo” protesters 
had grown significantly, and would rapidly continue to do so with the incorporation 
of the emergent unemployed movement.  
It was during the puebladas that the road block, or piquete, was adopted as a 
regular instrument of protest. The first massive piquete took place during a pueblada 
in the oil towns of Cutral-Co and Plaza Huincul (in Neuquen province) on June 21, 
1996.65 It lasted about a week, and it comprised the complete stoppage of traffic of 
the major highway leading to the area, thus damaging the operations of the large YPF 
Corporation (see Sánchez 1997). By some accounts, about 20,000 people took part in 
the protests at some point, in an area with 50,000 inhabitants (Kohan 2002). About a 
month after the cutralcazo, Menem asked for Cavallo’s resignation as minister of the 
economy. 66 In 1996 and 1997, massive piquetes took place in Cutral-Co once more, 
Tartagal and General Mosconi (in the province of Salta), and Libertador General San 
Martín (in Jujuy). The central demand of these demonstrations was work for the 
unemployed, fueled by a sense of disenfranchisement due to the closing of the oil 
plant. Unionized workers also participated, as did pensioners, housewives, children 
and the elderly, joined by the sense of abandonment of the community: “The people 
                                                 
64 Even with the growing presence of vocal opposition, the possibility of Menem’s second reelection 
was all too real for supporters and opponents alike. The UCR publicly opposed such a move, and 
former president Alfonsín declared Menem a “usurper of power” – “Para Alfonsín Menem es un 
Usurpador” in La Nación, 10 February 1997.   
65 There are different opinions as to when the “very first” piquete took place among different piquetero 
groups and scholars (Kohan 2002; Svampa and Pereyra 2003), but the cutralcazo is universally seen as 
the turning point.  
66 Laufer and Spiguel (1999, p. 32) contend that the two events were linked, though that is to a large 




in this town need to be aware of the things we are losing,” said one protester, “of the 
things the government is taking away from us” (quoted in Auyero 2004, p. 320).67 
From the very first, the puebladas were understood to signify the unification of social 
groups in the face of catastrophe.68 
The piquete fully entered the national consciousness as the signature weapon 
of an organized unemployed movement when it made its appearance in Gran Buenos 
Aires, initially in areas such as Florencio Varela and La Matanza in 1997. The action 
itself proved to be very effective in attracting an official response. With a minimum 
amount of effort and a relatively small number of people traffic could be stopped 
completely, keeping workers and executives from arriving at their job stations and 
slowing ground commercial traffic. The authorities had a difficult time breaking up 
the protests since the participants were not easily identifiable (many groups took to 
wearing masks), they had community infrastructures behind them, and were willing 
to engage in physical confrontations, having “nothing to lose” (Svampa and Pereyra 
2003, p. 30). The piquetes also provided new opportunities for the public expression 
of grievances, spawning larger public gatherings that often involved the distribution 
of food and other goods, as well as public debates on issues of import. Once the 
authorities were forced to negotiate, protesters organized into assemblies to ascertain 
                                                 
67 A municipal worker in Cutral-Co expresses his grievances thus: “The plant that they finally built in 
Bahía Blanca was producing 10,000 jobs. It was ours and they took it. […] When YPF was here, it was 
a boom, a joy; every two steps you had a restaurant, a candy store, that was life. Now there’s nothing, 
it’s dead” (quoted in Svampa and Pereyra 2003, p. 108). 
68 The most important legacy of the cutralcazo, according to a CTA figure, was “union, union in 
conflict, and a bitter taste about all this because they stole our hope, and it deepened because we were 
left with nothing, no job sources, and people are getting poorer” (quoted in Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 




the will of the majority. Negotiators were elected, often with provisions that called for 
new representatives to take their place every day.69  
Soon after their appearance on the scene, piquetero organizations began to be 
courted by unions and by party representatives from all corners of the political 
spectrum. While initially demarcated by their geographical location, many piquetero 
groups later sorted themselves out according to their political affiliation. Two 
umbrella organizations, by far the largest, became preeminent: the Combative Class 
Movement (Corriente Clasista Combativa – CCC), allied to the Revolutionary 
Communist Party (Partido Comunista Revolucionario – PCR), and the Land and 
Home Federation (Federación Tierra y Vivienda – FTV), which joined the CTA. 
Several groups adhered themselves to smaller parties such as the Workers’ Party 
(Partido Obrero – PO). The most important independent organizations came from the 
unemployed workers’ movements (movimientos de trabajadores desocupados – 
MTD) of the south side of Gran Buenos Aires: the Piquetero Block (Bloque 
Piquetero), the Teresa Rodríguez Movement (Movimiento Teresa Rodríguez – MTR), 
and the Unemployed Workers Central Aníbal Verón (Coordinadora de Trabajadores 
Desocupados Aníbal Verón – CTD-Verón).70  
As the unemployed rallied around the piquetes, the number of actions grew 
exponentially – from 140 in 1997 to over 2000 in 2002. The second Menem 
                                                 
69 It is tempting to paint these public actions as a spontaneous democratic utopia, but the assemblies 
rarely lasted more than a week or two – though a notable exception is the Unemployed Workers’ 
Union of Mosconi (Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados de Mosconi), which supplanted the local 
CGT as the main engine of popular mobilization in the area (Svampa and Pereyra 2003, pp. 132-146) – 
after a deal had been reached with political authorities. If anything, more organization and the 
unavoidable development of clear leadership positions proved to be the path that most unemployed 
groups ended up taking.   
70 It is not possible to do justice here to the complexity and variance of the piquetero phenomenon. For 




administration reacted initially through limited shows of force, but rapidly turned to 
cooptation and the development of social aid programs, particularly the stipend-based 
“planes trabajar.” Almost from the start, provincial and local governments 
(dominated by PJ officials) attempted to establish paths of negotiation with the 
piqueteros. These were strongest in 1997, when the economy was showing signs of 
recovery.71 The first massive governmental response of over 200.000 work plans, and 
the promise of future work as the economy continued to improve, placated the 
protests for a time. This state of affairs benefited the large agglomerations of 
unemployed, the CCC and FTV, at the expense of smaller ones such as CTD-Verón, 
which had to compete with well-established Peronist networks (see Svampa and 
Pereyra 2003, pp. 88-94).  
Despite these government responses, the first joint mobilization between 
organized labor and the unemployed, which included the CGT, CTA, MTA, CCC, 
independent unions (like the metal workers’ Unión Obrera Metalúrgica), Peronist 
associations, left-wing parties, and student federations, took place on August 14, 
1997. It involved a general strike, large marches, and dozens of roadblocks across the 
country. Though small, relative to the largest mobilizations of 2000-2002, it signaled 
an increasingly united front of social protest.72 This wave of mobilizations also 
encouraged the formation of non-union social movements like the fogoneros, new 
political parties such as FREPASO, and lobbying groups such as the National Front 
                                                 
71 Lobato and Suriano (2003) note a decline in the number of roadblocks in 1998, only 51. After that, 
the number of piquetes shot to 252 in 1999, 514 in 2000, 1,282 in 2001, and 2,334 in 2002. 
72 The number of joint actions increased after 1999. Iñigo Carrera and Cotarelo document 685 road 
blocks in Argentina between 1993 and 1999. The unemployed are responsible for almost half (47.6%) 
and the unions for 36.8%. Notably, the two acted jointly only 26 times (or 3.8%) of the total. This, 
however, does not mean that both groups were not protesting simultaneously, but that individual 




against Poverty (Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza – FRENAPO). The most 
important organization of its kind in this period, FRENAPO’s “board” includes the 
CTA, Madres, and dozens of other middle class organizations, as well as congress 
members from left-wing parties.73  
From 1999 on, the piqueteros became the most important engine of protest in 
Argentina. The independents, like the CTD-Verón and the Unemployed Workers 
Movement of Solano (Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados de Solano – MTD-
Solano), have been particularly innovative in their adoption of the language of 
“radical” or “participatory” democracy.74 “We do not look to replace the proletariat 
with the unemployed,” states a member of the MTD-Solano, but “the MTD is a 
proposal, a project, that takes as its axis the issue of work – in this case 
unemployment – but that is much broader” (Colectivo Situaciones 2002, p. 40). For 
these organizations the roadblock is a part of a project to create new forms of 
sociability through community action, workshops, education, round-table discussions, 
and so forth. In their intellectual development, the CTD-Verón and MTD-Solano 
acknowledge the influence of the Landless Peasant Movement of Brazil (Movemento 
dos Sem Terra – MST) and the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (Ejército 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) in Chiapas, Mexico. The hooded spokesman of the 
Zapatistas, “Subcomandante Marcos,” was a major influence with his interpretation 
of the concept of “civil society” as the basis for a new, localized type of democracy 
independent from the state (see Hayden 2002).  
                                                 
73 For a complete list, see Schuster et al (2003), p. 16.  
74 See Colectivo Situaciones (2002); Colectivo Situaciones and MTD-Solano (2002); Ferrara (2003); 




Their attractiveness to democratic theorists notwithstanding, the segment of 
the piquetero movement that argue for horizontal and autonomous decision-making 
has always been a small subsection of the mobilized unemployed.75 For better or 
worse, their rejection of institutionalized incorporation into the political system (or 
non-institutionalized co-optation) have made the CTD-Verón and MTD-Solano a 
divisive elements in the overall resistance movement. Their critique of union leaders, 
even of the CTA and MTA, has often been as harsh as that of Peronist politicians. In 
contrast, the larger CCC and FTV have been more pragmatic in their goals and 
affiliations, often subordinating ideological consistency for results on the ground. 
Their leadership is openly recognized and firmly established (the CCC is headed by 
well-known activist Carlos Santillán, for example). Both embrace the language of 
class struggle commonly used by their closest allies (the CTA for the FTV and the 
communist PCR for the CCC).76 Their political rhetoric is non-revolutionary but 
clearly Marxist in inspiration; they refer, for instance, to the “three pillars of the 
working class:” workers, the unemployed, and pensioners, and trace their origins to 
the labor struggles of the 1960’s and 70’s (Kohan 2002, pp. 35-37).77  
During the late 1990’s, Madres, Abuelas, and HIJOS bolstered the growing 
number of organizations that opposed the government’s economic policies as a matter 
of “human rights and human dignity.” They participated in protests, signed public 
petitions, and belonged to larger organizations that opposed the process of economic 
                                                 
75 Perhaps a few thousand at their highest point, compared to over 120.000 for the FTV and 70.000 for 
the CCC. 
76 An illuminating discussion of the CTA-FTV relationship in terms of the self-interested of their 
leaders appeared in the daily Página 12, June 22, 2002. 
77 See “La Corriente Clasista y Combativa desde Sus Inicios” at http://www.cccargentina.org.ar. 
Svampa and Pereyra (2003) make a helpful distinction among piquetero groups depending on their 
primary orientation: syndicalist (the CCC and FTV), territorial (provincial and neighborhood-based 




liberalization. They understood their mission as naturally pertaining to the fight 
against poverty and misery, which they saw as no less criminal than the behavior of 
the military in years past. For their annual December March of Resistance in 1998, 
they called to action all those “harmed by this system that claims to be democratic but 
obstructs justice. All those who wish to see the [military] criminals in jail and those 
who demand work and a dignified life.”78 The yearly Marches occurring every 
December came to adopt a format in which representatives from the CTA, piquetero 
organizations, FRENAPO, and other groups would give speeches to ever-growing 
crowds, with Hebé de Bonaffi, Madres’ leader, giving the final address.  
The intensity of mobilizations in the provinces and the capital from late 1995 
to early 1997 waned somewhat in the immediate aftermath. The official CGT, still the 
largest labor organization, did not (or could not) adopt an openly hostile position 
towards the Menem government, and labor strikes in 1997-1999 did not reach the 
numbers of those in the previous two years. The CTA, MTA, and the piqueteros took 
on the mantle of representatives of the working classes. They would act together often 
throughout the protest cycle, but much more so after 1999. Most piquetero groups 
were still in the embryonic stage, after all, but after a decrease in 1998 the number of 
roadblocks rapidly rose. These groups’ protest actions were mainly fueled by 
economic issues such as the availability of employment and the decline in the 
standard of living of the working poor, though it was not the call for class warfare 
that won them allies among the middle classes, environmentalist and human rights 
                                                 




groups, but their positioning themselves as defenders of the country and its interests 
against those of the “políticos choros” (“thieving politicians”).79  
As can be seen, by the end of Menem’s second term in power there was a 
fairly solid coalition of civil society organizations that opposed the neoliberal 
economic adjustment program. This coalition encompassed the CTA, MTA, the 
piqueteros, human rights’ organizations, and several smaller groups, in addition to 
left-wing political parties. Economic issues (especially poverty and unemployment) 
were the principal contributors for the expansion of the “anti-status quo” opposition, 
which created a consistent interpretation of politics in Argentina. In their eyes, the 
difference between the democratic governments of Alfonsín and Menem and those of 
the military turned to be mostly cosmetic, as human rights abused remained 
unpunished, and the poor were the victims of “state violence” (in the form of 
impersonal “markets” rather than direct repression).80 Yet, as long as discontent was 
seen as stemming from the lower classes the Menem and de la Rúa governments 
adhered to the neoliberal economic project, concentrating primarily on placating the 
IMF and reducing fiscal spending. The political elite successfully established in the 
public consciousness a distinction between “legitimate” demands and the “chaos” 
created by the working poor and the piqueteros. After all, Menem had been reelected 
and de la Rúa had not promised a change in economic policy during the campaign to 
succeed him. Those in the opposition were the unfortunate victims of a necessary, and 
                                                 
79 “We do not accept it when they tell us there is no alternative. While the government affirms that 
there is no money to solve the issue of unemployment and to reactivate the economy, between March 
and August there was an ‘escape’ of twelve billion dollars in public reserves,” said Víctor de Gennaro, 
head of the CTA, during a march in August 2001 - “La Movilización a la Plaza Fue Más 
Multitudinaria de lo Esperado” in Página 12, 9 August 2001. 
80 Many journalists opposed to the government adopted this view through editorials and news stories. 
Horacio Verbitsky, for example, found that the commander in charge of controlling protests in early 




ultimately beneficial, process of reform.81 It was only when the middle classes joined 
in on the protests that, in Ernesto Laclau’s (2005) terms, the struggles of “the plebs” 
became those of “the people.”  
 
Argentina “On Fire” (2000-2002) 
With de la Rúa’s electoral victory, the CGT leadership lost its privileged 
position close to the ruling party, and joined the labor protests with renewed 
enthusiasm. Despite a strong dispute over leadership within the CGT – between 
Rodolfo Daer and Hugo Moyano (originally of the MTA), which led to the eventual 
formation of an “official” CGT (or CGT-Daer) and a “dissident” faction (or CGT-
Moyano) – the year 2000 saw organized labor unified again behind a common 
opposition to de la Rúa (Iñigo Carrera and Cotarelo 2000). Disputes over proposed 
drastic changes to the national labor code and reductions of the national deficit (the 
“Zero Deficit” law) saw particularly strong responses from the unions. De la Rua and 
his cabinet, still insistent on the need for and the widespread support of the proposed 
labor legislation, claimed that “the CGT is practically alone” in opposing it.82 
Moyano, whose faction had supported de la Rua during the electoral campaign, 
declared that 
Alianza has violently changed sides. Before, they used to turn up at our rallies, have 
their pictures taken with us, and encouraged us to strike. Now it seems that the IMF 
has persuaded them that the workers are to blame for all the ills in Argentina.83 
 
A similar sentiment was expressed by Madres, though with their usual 
emphasis on human rights and denunciation of officially sanctioned violence: 
                                                 
81 “The future will prove me right,” stated de la Rua in response to protests and general strikes – “De la 
Rua No Habló de Concertación y Cargó contra el Sindicalismo” in Página 12, 10 June 2000.  
82 “El Gobierno Utiliza la Consulta para Presionar a la CGT” in Página 12, 1 February 2000.   




Despite the usual promises of reactivating the economy and creating jobs, the first act 
of Fernando de la Rúa’s government was repressive: facing the sustained protest of 
the population of Corrientes demanding bread and dignified work, he ordered police 
intervention, [which resulted in] the murder of five people and the injuries of dozens 
more.84   
 
Between May of 2000 and December of 2001, there were eight general strikes 
called by all three labor organizations (Iñigo Carrera and Cotarelo 2003)85 and dozens 
of mobilizations that counted with their approval and their ability to add volume to 
the crowds. Workers were indubitably more active when particular policies affected 
their employment or benefit status, but the large marches and protests of 2000 and 
2001 adopted the view that equated the plight of the working class and the rest of the 
poor, particularly unemployment, to the undemocratic practices and human rights’ 
abuses of the military era.86 The formerly pro-status quo CGT quickly turned against 
de la Rua and joined the ranks of anti-status quo radicals, mainly due to the severity 
of the economic crisis. The form of the general strikes changed accordingly. 
Traditionally, labor strikes, when including an organized demonstration, revolved 
around a central act led by the heads of the unions and the CGT high-command. Even 
following the breakups in the 1990’s, joint strikes of the CGT and CTA followed the 
same structure. After 2000, there appeared to be a lot less centralization, given the 
simultaneous raising of dozens of road-blocks and of several marches. The umbrella 
labor groups still retained a degree of importance in that they determined the dates of 
                                                 
84 “Vivir Combatiendo la Injusticia” by Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo, available at 
http://www.madres.org/marchas/marchas11_20/marchas19.asp  
85 With the independent MTA having been replaced by the “dissident” CGT-Moyano. 
86 During the June 9, 2000 general strike, the first with the wholehearted support of Daer’s “official” 
CGT, Moyano stated that the overwhelming support to the strike was “a cry from the insides of the 
people, that says to the government that we cannot continue with an economic model that increasingly 
starves and kills people” – “Los Gremios, Conformes, Imaginan el Día Después” in Página 12, 10 
June 2000. Bonasso (2002), Kohan (2002), and Zibechi (2003) among others portray the experiences 
of protesters as facing security forces that had no qualms in using violence, as did the human rights’ 




the protests, but the social struggle could no longer be seen as class-based (Zibechi 
2003).87     
  In an attempt to diminish Peronist influence on the CCC and FTV, de la Rúa 
reduced the amount of resources that went through local officials. The result was 
precisely the opposite, in that the large groups protested the reduction of social 
programs (from over 200.000 in 1997 to less than 40.000 in 2000), and the smaller, 
localized ones were free from the pressure of the Peronist machine (Svampa and 
Pereyra 2003, p. 99). As the economy deteriorated, the response of the security forces 
became more repressive. The rise to power of Alianza, therefore, combined with 
continued economic deterioration, provided both the incentives and (for the smaller 
organizations) the opportunities to increase their level of mobilization. Their ability to 
pressure the government increased as their alliance with labor strengthened. Between 
October 31 and November 4, 2000, for example, a joint action of most of the major 
piquetero groups prompted de la Rúa to order the security forces to respond 
forcefully, but the CTA and CGT-Moyano successfully negotiated official 
concessions by threatening to call a general strike.  
 A distinct, and smaller, form of collective action also appeared among the 
unemployed during de la Rúa’s presidency. Dismissed workers from individual 
factories, usually those that were going out of business altogether, would organize 
                                                 
87 On August 8, 2001, a general strike of the CGT and CTA was accompanied by several dozen 
roadblocks and a march of tens of thousands of people to Plaza de Mayo. A “high ranking government 
official” admitted that there was a clear consolidation of the opposition movement and “coordination 
among groups that had previously protested separately.” The government official added that he did not 
see a rise in the level of protest, only in the unification of separate groups, but that assessment would 
prove to be wholly incorrect. – “No Hubo Gran Crecimiento de la Protesta, Creció la Coordinación” in 
Página 12, 10 August 2001. The national press identified the presence of “unemployed, state workers, 
teachers, students, and ‘loose’ individuals form the middle classes” – “La Movilización a la Plaza Fue 




and “retake” their workplace as impromptu communes. The first, on August 18, 2000, 
involved metalworkers in the neighborhood of Avellaneda, “occupied” the factory in 
which they had been employed and began production on their own.88 Over the next 
two years, and inspired by December 19/20, the number of occupied factories reached 
one hundred, attracting national and international attention. In some cases, workers 
have maintained productive activity for years, sometimes even with governmental 
help, making the “recovered” factories less a revolutionary cadre than a curious type 
of community-based development project.    
What the various groups of the unemployed share is a primary demand: the 
availability of “dignified” work. Finding themselves in new circumstances, the newly 
unemployed and underemployed developed their organizations around the common 
(undeserved) status of unemployed worker. They ascribe responsibility for their 
situation to the state and directed their energy towards confronting it. While 
politicians extol the generosity of welfare assistance plans, the unemployed make a 
point of pointing out that the plans were “torn from the government through 
collective struggle” (Svampa and Pereyra 2003, p. 97).89 It is often missed by 
scholarly accounts that an important element of piquetero identity stresses a past era 
in which the people of Argentina, even blue-collar workers, could live a dignified 
life.90 The calls for change emanating from the unemployed movement (as also 
                                                 
88 Factory takeovers had taken place in isolated occasions before. In Argentina, the first such action 
occurred in 1985, when laborers at a Ford factory took possession of the machinery and continued to 
turn out products for eighteen days. 
89 The distribution of the food, money, and tools received by communities of the government plans was 
almost form the start an issue divisive issue. In some cases, local governments took it upon themselves 
to distribute the goods, while in others the unemployed organizations were allowed autonomous 
decisions. Chargers of favoritism and corruption, not to mention physical intimidation by “bosses” in 
charge of distribution, are common.  




became the case with the impoverished middle classes) entail a conception of current 
politics as a fall from grace, and a political class which could have done better for the 
public at large. During a large “March for Dignity” on August 9, 2001, a young 
piquetero expressed his response to the alliance between unemployed and pensioners: 
“My eyes feel with tears when I see the grandpas joining in the fight. They lived in a 
different society, where there was education and health care for all.”91 This sentiment 
was more prevalent in the de la Rúa period because it was echoed by the traditional 
labor movement, which equated the glorious past to the heyday of Perón, and 
eventually by the middle classes as well. 
Nobody expected or predicted the explosion of middle-class anger that would 
take place on the night of December 19, 2001, but they indubitably marked a turning 
point. Menem and de la Rua had assumed the lack of vocal opposition form the 
middle classes to represent support for their policies – as “pro-status quo moderates” 
– despite sporadic instances of discontent.92 Governments are usually more hesitant to 
use violence against middle class protesters, and this was understood by organizations 
in the opposition (particularly the poor and unemployed), who were often the target of 
police brutality. As the members of the MTD-Solano note “the state of siege was 
designed to repress the organized sectors.[…] Had it not been for the middle classes 
we would have had it much worse” (Colectivo Situaciones and MTD-Solano 2002, p. 
142). The presence of mass middle-class protests in a country that thought of itself for 
                                                 
91 “Los Piqueteros Marcharon desde la Matanza a la Plaza de Mayo” in Página 12, 9 August 2001.  
92 Some scholars believed the Argentine middle classes could not be trusted to support democratic 
institutions, and therefore saw a lack of political mobilization as a good thing. Surveys, such as the 
Latinobarometro democracy database, showed the population of Argentina to be very unsupportive of 
democracy in the 1990’s (Lagos 1996; Blake 1998). Hector Schamis (2002) has commented that the 
continuation of democratic institutions in Argentina following the crisis of 2001 is an unexpected, if 




half a century as predominantly middle class meant the difference between a strong 
minority opposition and widespread rejection of the government. Many among the 
impoverished middle classes took it one step further, and explicitly joined the protests 
of workers and the piqueteros.   
 In hindsight, though, it is possible to identify some early signs that pointed to 
a potential awakening of the middle classes. Menem’s popularity had waned towards 
the last years of his presidency, as a result not only of the economic problems but of a 
series of political scandals that reduced his overall support. Perhaps the most 
important were accusations against Menem, Cavallo, and other high government 
officials of illegal arms sales to Ecuador and Croatia. Human rights groups, both 
national and international, had also denounced Menem on his handling of the 
investigation of a terrorist attack on the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, 
while his purposeful dawdling on the issue of military confessions (several officers 
came forward after Scilingo) continued. Rumors of appropriation of state funds for 
“secret” bank accounts in Switzerland or some such foreign destination, on the part of 
the president and most every national public official were common in opposition 
circles. The increased visibility of the piqueteros as disturbers of the peace reflected 
poorly on the government as well.93 
Many in the lower middle classes had suffered (fell into poverty, lost their 
jobs) during the Menem years and the situation exacerbated under de la Rúa with the 
                                                 
93 As late as July 2001, according to a Gallup poll, 73% of Argentines disapproved of the roadblocks. 
Many saw them as a new form of political violence or, at the very least, a nuisance for productive 
economic activity. In many circles they were simply referred to as “negros” – dark-skinned, poor 
criminals, always at the beckon of the Peronist bureaucrats and “punteros.”  This began to change in 
mid-2001, when news of the deaths of some young piqueteros made national headlines. Acts of 
remembrance for the dead were joined by labor and human rights’ groups under the slogan “today we 




growing budget and debt crises; but this by itself was not enough to spur the great 
majority of their numbers to action. The arm-sales scandal again irrupted into the 
public scene when indictments were filed against Menem, who was placed under 
temporary house arrest in 2001. To make matters worse, after the resignation of 
economic minister Ricardo López Murphy, de la Rúa appointed Cavallo – Menem’s 
alleged accomplice in the arms deal, and his partner in instituting the new economic 
model – as his successor on March 20. Not too surprisingly, the move proved to be 
widely unpopular. Upon his reappointment, Cavallo’s drafted a plan to reduce 
economic expenditures by over $3 billion in 2001 and 2002. Three of de la Rúa’s 
ministers resigned in protest almost immediately, and small demonstrations around 
the country decried the move. Despite growing popular discontent, Cavallo was 
granted “superpowers” by congress to increase the efficiency of his remaking of the 
Argentine economy. Some opposition congress-members argued the move was 
unconstitutional (and therefore, reminiscent of Menem’s strategies). The protests of 
the pilots and flight attendants of Aerolíneas Argentinas, which reached its highest 
point in 2001, also angered the middle classes, who identified with the white collar 
workers and called them the “middle-class piqueteros” (Zibechi 2003).  
Legislative elections in October of 2001 proved to be a turning point. The 
voting public of Argentina, which historically turned up in very high numbers, 
expressed its displeasure by either abstaining from participating (26% of the 
electorate, a remarkably high number) or voting null (an unprecedented 21%, 40% in 
certain provinces).94 It was the null ballots that made the strongest impression, as 
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angry voters imaginatively cast their support for Clemente (a popular comics 
character), Osama Bin Laden, or, in many instances, a sliced salami or a block of 
cheese. The tragicomic aspect of the “voto bronca” (“angry vote”) reflected a sense 
of defeatism, of seeing no alternative to the current leadership, which would reappear 
in the later cry of “que se vayan todos.”  A public opinion survey conducted in that 
period found Argentines to be concerned predominantly with “dishonesty” and “lack 
of equal opportunities.” While respondents were fairly satisfied with democracy, they 
found their country to be “unjust,” and showed a marked distrust of their compatriots. 
Graciela Rommer, the head investigator, assessed that distrust was most marked 
regarding “the government, the political class, and the unions” and that “the decline 
of Argentine values translates into the end of the myth of Argentine solidarity, which 
cannot be seen in reality.”95 
But the de la Rúa administration was too preoccupied with pressure from the 
IMF and the international community to pay much attention to voter apathy and 
plummeting approval ratings. De la Rúa and Cavallo concluded that the most 
immediate fiscal danger was the flight of foreign capital from the national banks (as 
the situation worsened, more and more investors removed their money, which 
naturally contributed to further deterioration). On December 1, 2001, the government 
announced a series of measures that prohibited the withdrawal of currency from the 
banks by private citizens, which came to be known as the “corralito bancario” 
(“banking playpen”). The owners of the largest savings accounts, the middle and 
upper classes were furious. Years of promises of economic development had 
                                                 
95 Data quoted in “No Te Metás, Que Ya No Hay Valores” in Página 12, 1 December 2001. The 
survey found that respondents gave a 6 out of 10 score to democracy, and a 3.3 score to the degree of 




suddenly turned to a blatant breaking of the most basic trust between citizens and 
government: respect for individual property.  
 On December 12, the Chamber of Market and Enterprise Activities (Cámara 
de Actividades Mercantiles y Empresariales – CAME), an association of small and 
medium-sized business owners, called for an apagón/cacerolazo to protest the 
corralito. The press reported that “no characteristic slogan was heard, because it was 
evident that any connection to traditional party politics would have been rejected by 
the anti-political humor of the protesters.”96 Organized labor joined in with a general 
strike in support of those affected by the corralito. “The last measures undertaken by 
Domingo Cavallo,” reported the daily Página 12, “have achieved what the workers’ 
could not by themselves: the unity of the entire syndicalist sector.”97 Since the strike 
did not present any labor-related demand, de la Rua called it a “senseless measure, 
with no justification and with a purely political rationale.”98 Almost immediately, 
several left-wing parties, unemployed and neighborhood organizations announced 
demonstrations in support of the strike. At a demonstration led by the CTA and 
affiliated piquetero groups, Juan González stated that “the crisis is a structural 
problem that has been implemented since the dictatorship.” Piquetero leader Luis 
D’Elia called for “the middle class that fumes and curses at home to go out to the 
streets.”99  
                                                 
96 “Los Cacerolazos Pusieron en Máximo el Fuego del Enojo y el Fastidio” in Página 12, 13 December 
2001. 
97 “Cavallo Consiguió la Unidad Gremial” in Página 12, 13 December 2001.  
98 “Cavallo Consiguió la Unidad Gremial” in Página 12, 13 December 2001. 





 The decision of the labor confederations to strike in protest against economic 
measures that (directly at least) affected primarily the middle class represents yet 
another turning point in the unification of civil society. The exhortations on the part 
of the piqueteros for the middle class to come out and join them reflected a growing 
sense that their plight was the same. Many labor and unemployed protests in the 
following months explicitly expressed solidarity with the middle classes. Although 
many among the poor and unemployed did not have much bank savings to speak of, 
they joined in the protests both because they saw their interests threatened and 
because they immediately connected the new financial restrictions to their economic 
distress.100 The middle classes, on their part, became more attentive to the overall 
economic climate and its social consequences. On December 13, a highly publicized 
government report showed the unemployment rate to be 18.3%. That same day the 
lootings started, many with the participation of piqueteros and in some occasions of 
unionized workers as well. This complicated manners for the government, which was 
in the middle of negotiations with the IMF regarding debt payments. Incredibly, 
policymakers did not see the coming storm, as is evident by support in the upper 
house of congress regarding benefits for senators of up to $10,000 a month.101   
Despite warnings in the media, the de la Rúa administration did little to 
counteract the expanding wave of lootings. Spokespersons for Alianza were claiming 
that the lootings were prompted by PJ punteros as early as December 16, but they 
seemed unable to recognize the degree of anger felt by the poor. The first lootings in 
                                                 
100 In response to the question “why did you come?,” a woman from a poor shantytown responded “to 
support the people” (Fernández et al 2002).  
101 See “Las Cifras de la Cámara Alta. El Nuevo Senado Mantiene las Viejas Mañas”, Diario La 




Gran Buenos Aires took place on the following day. Many looters told journalists that 
they had been forced to act by the government’s neglect of their plight.102 
Simultaneously, business owners in the area organized marches and vehicle caravans 
to protest the corralito. The national union of railway employees paralyzed much 
commercial activity by striking in support of workers in La Pampa, threatened with 
dismissal due to the privatization of the local railway company. The lootings were 
therefore not the only instances of collective action, and de la Rúa’s inability to see 
the other expressions of discontent seems to have led to the colossal political 
miscalculation behind the declaration of the state of siege.   
The federal government only responded in earnest to the growing chaos on 
December 18, when it announced a plan to distribute food to the poorest areas around 
the country at the same time as it launched a strong police response to the lootings. 
Violent confrontations were reported in dozens of localities around the country.103 
This did not stop peaceful middle-class and piquetero demonstrations elsewhere, 
some attracting large numbers of participants. That same day, FRENAPO announced 
the results of a “popular survey” (“consulta popular”) that collected three million 
signatures in support for a subsidy plan to radically reduce poverty – a plan that could 
not have been further from the immediate concerns of policymakers or IMF officials.  
                                                 
102 Cameras captured images of looters crying and apologizing to “the people.” While no one denies 
that some participants took advantage of the opportunity to acquire other goods, there seemed to be a 
significant degree of sympathy for the most destitute in media reports. On the other hand, a young man 
of east-Asian decent was likewise filmed crying over the rubble of the convenience where he worked, 
and became the image of the tragic cost of the lootings (see the reports in Página 12, Clarín, and La 
Nación on 20 December 2001).    
103 See “El Reclamo de Comida Llega a Buenos Aires,” Diario Página 12, December 18, 2001 and “La 





On the morning of December 19, President Fernando de la Rúa met with his 
cabinet along with synidicalist, church, and industry leaders to assess the situation, at 
the headquarters of Cáritas, an ecclesiastical organization. As he left the premises, de 
la Rúa’s car was pelted with rocks and eggs. Dozens of crowds had positioned 
themselves in front of businesses and food providers across the country, while 
business and unemployed protests continued. Public employees in the capital and 
various provinces took to the streets as well, attempting to forcibly enter government 
buildings and assaulting some high-ranking politicians in the process. The use of 
rubber bullets, tear gas, and other riot-control measures left hundreds of injured. With 
the situation clearly out of the government’s control, de la Rúa appeared on national 
television and announced the state of siege, which sparked the first spontaneous 
middle-class cacerolazo. The middle-class demonstrations of December 20, 
emboldened by the announced resignation of Cavallo early that morning, marched to 
the centers of public life: busy intersections, squares, churches, and government 
buildings.  
It would become common in later days to simply attribute the cacerolazos to 
the corralito, but this obscures parts of the content of the middle class protests. 
Though lacking central leadership, the cacerolazos represented quite rational and 
civil collective behavior.104 Yet, it seems unlikely that such an effective mass 
demonstration could have been the work of an apolitical and apathetic citizenry. In 
hindsight, once more, it is possible to identify signs of more meaningful political 
involvement among young middle-class adults (many of whom had little prospects of 
                                                 




employment) in university forums, music performances, and even soccer matches.105 
Amazingly, many participants in the first cacerolazos later recalled the public 
discussions that developed among people waiting in line in front of the banks. The 
irony of the corralito facilitating the venue for the rebirth of the public sphere is 
striking.106 Though the massive cacerolazo late in the evening of December 19 was 
by all accounts a spontaneous event, some neighborhood meetings and small middle-
class marches had taken place earlier that day.107  
There were some notable aspects to this powerful outburst. The crowds 
formed within the various neighborhoods of the large urban areas, and subsequently 
marched towards significant street-corners, public monuments, or government 
buildings.108 The most common sentiment was a rejection of the political class as a 
whole: “que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno solo.” There was no concrete 
demand to be met (after all, nobody really expected all politicians to pack their bags 
and leave the country), but a repudiation of “politics as usual.” In many debates in the 
media and among activists, the primary issue was the alleged unconstitutionality of de 
la Rúa’s imposition of the state of siege. There were no calls for revolutionary action 
                                                 
105 See Kohan (2002) and Zibechi (2003) for discussions on the role of artistic and sports venues as 
meeting points for apolitical youths, and their functions as “little schools of protest,” in which crowds 
learned how to confront riot police. Iván Heyn, president of the student Federation of the University of 
Buenos Aires at the time, states that these events were much more likely to end in some sort of 
political action than the meetings of student-activist associations (in Caparrós 2002, pp. 47, 53).  
106 Though there is no systematic data that I know of to confirm whether this took place in more than a 
few isolated occasions, it is a narrative that has become accepted as true in Argentina (and that many 
scholars accept as true).    
107 Federico Schuster and his collaborators (Schuster et al, 2003) offer the most detailed account of the 
highest point of the protest cycle (December 12-January 20). This study identifies the neighborhoods 
of Belgrano, Villa Crespo, and Liniers in Buenos Aires as holding some of the first neighborhood-level 
actions.     
108 Nobody seems to know when or where the first such march appeared, but the word spread quickly 
through telephone conversations, the internet, and television. Immediately after de la Rúa’s short 
nationally-broadcast speech at around ten in the evening, news commentators remarked on the 
presence of mobilizations in middle-class and upper middle-class neighborhoods. The term asambleas 




beyond small isolated activists nor an explicit repudiation of existing political and 
economic institutions. International observers, particularly from left-leaning media 
outlets, assigned an “anti-neoliberal” message to the cacerolazos that was not really 
there.109  
 If the countless visits to bureaucrats seeking information provided the 
opportunity for the grieving women who would form Madres to meet each other and 
share their stories, hours-long waits at the banks did the same for the middle sectors. 
No organization or plan of action emerged from this improvised public forums but the 
seeds of solidarity that would grow into the marches and later the neighborhood 
asambleas were planted.110 With the declaration of the state of siege late on 
December 19, the middle-classes staged their “spontaneous insurrection” on the basis 
of this newfound “we.” The implication is that the difficult economic circumstances 
not only encouraged, but facilitated the development of the unified civil movement of 
the middle classes, as they did for the piqueteros. In this sense, it is difficult to fault 
the enthusiasm of some authors (e.g., Kohan 2002; Zibechi 2003; Hardt and Negri 
2004) who were led to overstate the significance of these extraordinary events.  
If anything, the marching columns vocally rejected the presence of left-wing 
groups that advocated class-struggle. There are many accounts of jeers and boos 
                                                 
109 Examples abound. See, e.g., Klein (2003) 
110 It seems appropriate to speak of the first two weeks of December 2001 as witnessing the creation of 
“social capital” among the Argentine middle classes. Robert Putnam (1995) defines social capital as 
“features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives” (quoted in Edwards and Foley 2001, p. 8). Bob Edwards and 
Michael Foley point out that social capital, the foundations of collective action in civil society, can be 
seen as promoting “public spiritedness” (as in Putnam or other “neo-Tocquevillians”) or, alternatively, 
“social autonomy” from the state (as in Choen and Arato and others) (Edwards and Foley 2001, p. 7). 
Putnam’s seminal works point to the need of social capital for civil society to fulfill its role. In the case 
discussed here, though, collective social action stems precisely from mistrust in the “democratic” 




towards the raising of banners of unions, parties, or other such organizations; only 
national flags were permitted (and, in later days, those of the asambleas themselves). 
The crowds yelled against the state of siege, the politicians, and the corralito, but also 
sang popular tunes and, in several occasions, the national anthem. Several of the 
protests turned into batucadas (“musical protests”). The battles between crowds of 
protesters and the security forces on December 20 added an element of “brotherhood 
of arms,” which contributed to the creation of the neighborhood asambleas in the 
following days. Many later accounts refer to the “campaigns,” with its militaristic 
connotations, of December 19/20. The campaign ended in victory: the resignation of 
de la Rúa and his embarrassing departure off the roof of the Casa Rosada.  
On December 20 the situation was chaotic and violence was prevalent, so 
much so that residents of lower-middle class neighborhoods were advised by police to 
arm themselves against the coming mobs of looters coming to burn their homes (these 
never materialized). Government buildings, businesses, and the private residences of 
prominent political and economic figures (including de la Rúa’s daughter) were 
vandalized. Of note was the arrival of Madres to Plaza de Mayo (December 20 was, 
as it happens, a Thursday) and the fierce reception they encountered from police.111 
Along with Judge María Romilda Servini de Cubría, Madres would subsequently lead 
the calls for an investigation of government-sanctioned violence during December 
19/20. For the participants in the protests, December 20 constituted a battle against 
                                                 
111 In a public statement, Hebé de Bonaffi condemned the repression unleashed under de la Rúa’s 
orders: “Not even during the dictatorship was the charge against Madres so strong. While we were 
being run over by horses from the back, we had the infantry with tear gas in front” (Página 12, 




the armed government forces abusing their position. The two-day confrontations 
would yield thirty-four dead, hundreds of injured, and thousands of arrests.  
  Conspicuous for their absence were the leaders of the two CGTs and the 
CTA, even though a general strike had been called for December 20.112 The principal 
labor leaders, Daer and Moyano of the two CGT’s and Víctor de Gennaro of the 
CTA, were later criticized for their hesitant approach to the protests. The joint actions 
between organized labor, the unemployed, and the middle classes would never 
materialize after December 19/20 (making December 13, 2001 the last instance in 
which they were simultaneous protests of all three groups). With the return of the PJ 
to power following de la Rúa’s resignation, the CGT leadership would not reach out 
to the piqueteros as it had before. Later middle class demonstrations would include 
the union leaders in their list of figures who should “leave.”   
Unionized workers certainly joined the crowds on December 20, but they did 
so as private citizens, highlighting the “people vs. power” tenor of the Battle for 
Argentina.113 Many later accounts of that day emphasize the heterogeneous 
composition of the crowds, and many participants remember men in suits marching 
alongside poor women with babes in arms or masked piqueteros. This is unsurprising 
given the chaos of the day, and it lends credence to the idea that Argentina 
experienced a spontaneous “people’s revolt,” but it is not true to a degree. Many 
                                                 
112 See Schuster et al. (2003); Zibechi (2003); Iñigo Carrera and Cotarelo (2003); Lobato and Suriano 
(2003). 
113 An interesting exception is that of the motoqueros, mostly young men working as delivery persons 
in the “informal” economy in motorbikes and organized in an independent union. While the rigid 
decision-making bureaucracy of the CGT and CTA made it impossible to organize labor 
demonstrations, the motoqueros swiftly joined the crowds of December 20. In Plaza de Mayo, they 
lead protesters during the confrontations of that afternoon, helping the columns of people find ways to 
disperse when gas was thrown, or opening breaches among the ranks of security forces. They were 




piquetero groups quickly assembled and marched towards the protests together. 
These last in many cases made a conscious decision not to go to the middle of the 
fray, for fear of attracting the wrath of the security forces. Without minimizing the 
horrific violence of December 19/20, it is reasonable to assume that the middle class 
protests helped decrease the level of repression on the “usual suspects” – the poor and 
the unemployed. Later accounts of the day by labor leaders, piquetero activists, and 
intellectuals agreed that the presence of the middle classes changed everything 
(Colectivo Situaciones 2002, pp. 111-120; see also Camparrós 2002). Nevertheless, 
the following days would show that groups from different social classes and 
affiliations “converged, but did not mix” during the largest protests (Fernández et al. 
2002).  
From the explosion of December 19/20 emerged from the middle class a new 
the member of the “anti-status quo” coalition. Three more cacerolazos took place in a 
more or less spontaneous manner after December 19/20: on December 28 (against 
Rodríguez Saá’s), on January 1 (the day Duhalde took office), and on January 10 
(demanding the resignation of all the members of the Supreme Court). They 
developed as the first, with small columns of protesters banging instruments and 
individuals joining them along the way, and reached the size of the first one – by 
some accounts over 100.000 people in the city of Buenos Aires alone. A significant 
number of these participated in the public assemblies (asambleas barriales), which 
began as attempts to make political debate accessible to “neighbors” across the 
country. By mid-January, the cacerolazos began to be organized either by the 




corralito though uninterested in participating in the public assemblies – known as 
ahorristas (“savers”). The ahorristas quickly distanced themselves from piquetero 
and left-wing groups, and were active until February of 2002, when the banking 
system was systematically reopened.114 This marked a clear split among those in the 
middle classes that had chosen to resort to protest. The cacerolazo of January 10, 
according to media reports, was prompted by “a clear motive: money.”115 
By then there were 200 asambleas across urban Argentina, well over three 
quarters in Gran Buenos Aires. Each one specified a meeting place and time (usually 
once a week), put out bulletins, created a website and a newsletter (many of which 
still exist). The following statement, which appears in the bulletin of the asamblea 
popular of San Cristóbal and Boedo, exemplifies their credo: 
We met banging utensils and turning individual anger into a powerful collective 
being. In the streets we realized that we had passed by each other at the baker’s, at 
the square, but this time we decided to solve our problems together. From the 
neighborhood corners we marched to Plaza de Mayo in defiance of the state of siege: 
that’s how we got rid of de la Rúa and Cavallo […] Our meetings bring together 
neighbors, students, unemployed, pensioners, ruined small businessmen, and workers 
[…] At each assembly, we discuss together what is going on: we said we didn’t 
believe in the rhetoric of Rodríguez Saá, that Duhalde’s plan is more of the same. 
After all, they were appointed by a congress and a Supreme Court that we have 
already rejected.  
 
At the height of their visibility, and in contrast to the piqueteros, the 
asambleas enjoyed the sympathy of the population at large (about 80% according to 
polls in 2002116). This is not surprising, given that many of their members come from 
the educated, more affluent social strata, and their demonstrations were not as 
                                                 
114 One of Duhalde’s major initial problems was how to deal with the banking debacle. His plan to 
return savings in pesos rather than dollars (when devaluation was already under way) predictably met 
with widespread anger.  
115 Rather than “que se vayan todos” reporter Sergio Kiernan notes that the most widely heard cries 
were of “thieves” (“ladrones”) and “this culture of stealing must end” (“esta costumbre de robar se va 
a acabar”) –   “Otro Cacerolazo contra el Corralito” in Página 12, 11 January 2002.  
116 In a study conducted by De Franco et al (2002), support for the cacerolazos was 88% in January 




disruptive as the blocking of roads. Their meetings were planned beforehand only 
insofar as the order of speakers was to be. The venue, the food, and the electricity 
were all donated by local neighbors.117 In many of their meetings, the need to “do 
politics differently” (“hacer política de otra forma”) took center stage.  
The irruption of the middle classes into the scene prompted a new type of 
social mobilization in Argentina. If before December 19/20 popular protest against 
the state was led by the large labor and unemployed organizations, for a few months 
in 2002 it would be by the asambleas, independent piquetero groups like the CTD-
Verón, and human rights groups like Madres and HIJOS. To a large extent the 
“popular protest movement” was markedly different after December 20, when the 
various organizations that refused to rely on hierarchical leadership (and were thus 
less likely to be co-opted) began the type of public activity that many scholars saw as 
the advent of a new type of democratic citizenship (Bielsa et al 2002; Dinerstein 
2003b; Zibechi 2003). Their actions were quite successful at first, prompting the 
resignation of three presidents in one week and tentative attempts at dialogue from 
government. Puerta, Rodríguez Saá, Camaño, and Duhalde all met with 
representatives from the unions, Madres and HIJOS, and business associations, 
though not with the piqueteros. Newly-inaugurated Duhalde would justify the 
middle-classes’ anger while trying to distinguish it from the actions of the 
unemployed:  
[They are] absolutely legitimate. People put money in the bank and now they don’t 
understand why they can’t take it out. They are defending their interests. I do fear 
that cacerolazos get mixed with violent actions (quoted in Schuster et al, p. 61).       
 
                                                 




On January 16, middle class protesters mounted their own roadblocks for the 
first time. Seething over official predictions that the real value of their savings, once 
the ban on withdrawals was removed, would amount to a third of the original amount 
or less, businessmen and white-collar workers came up with the slogan “piquete y 
cacerola, la lucha es una sola”118 to express their anger and their identification with 
the former social outcasts. A national piquetero march on January 28 took an 
unexpected turn when the demonstrators were received in the Buenos Aires 
neighborhood of Liniers by community leaders. The president of the Chamber of 
Commerce stated that “for us, neighbors and businesspeople, it is an honor to be able 
to join the unemployed and the piqueteros with the caceroleros, so that we will march 
together to build a new Argentina” (quoted in Zibechi 2003, p. 187). Though scenes 
such as this were unusual, there was a temporary sense of unity that transcended 
socio-economic class or immediate material needs.  
Amidst cacerolazos and piquetes, the various groups assembled in public 
parks to hold open assemblies, the interbarriales. The first asamblea interbarrial 
took place at the Centenario Park in Buenos Aires on January 13, 2002. Thousands of 
representatives of neighborhood asambleas, “recovered” factories, motoqueros, and 
other activists debated the current situation. They agreed, among other points, to 
protest against extant privatization plans and the corralito with apagones and 
cacerolazos, to join in protests led by labor attorneys to demand the resignation of all 
the members of the Supreme Court, and to recognize that there were two “sides” to 
the struggle and that middle class ahorristas were in the same side as workers, 
unemployed, and all other “victims of the system” (Schuster et al 2002, p. 62). The 
                                                 




interbarriales enjoyed their highest levels of participation between February and May 
2002. A typical interbarrial during the first months of 2002 included the major 
dissident labor groups, piqueteros, over a dozen human rights’ organizations, student 
federations, over fifty progressive non-profit organizations, and of course the 
asambleas. Each assembly produced a list of agreed-upon declarations, on economic, 
political, and social issues. In contrast to the few declarations of the first interbarrial, 
later ones would reflect the difficulty of attaining consensus on more specific issues. 
One encounter on January 17 produced the following list of goals for the future: 
1) To discuss with one’s neighbors the fear generated by the current situation, so as 
to begin confronting it; 2) to organize community-level shopping ventures to 
distribute goods to the needy; 3) to create bulletins to communicate ideas, name 
businesses that charge too much for goods, combat the mainstream media’s 
“distortions;  4) to organize escraches in front of banks; 5) to demand that revenues 
from privatization and taxes on industry go to the unemployed and not the banks; 6) 
to reverse all privatization measures; 7) to nationalize the banking system; 8) to make 
public the names and faces of executives, judges, and policymakers so as to begin “to 
control them;” 9) to demand the creation of a National Constituent Assembly; 10) to 
establish mechanisms through which neighborhood asambleas can give authority to 
their representatives; 11) to expropriate the goods and revenue of businesses that 
“cannot justify their windfalls;” 12) to name each asamblea after a victim of 
December 20; 13) to encourage massive withdrawals of memberships to unions to 
protest the corruption of syndicalist leaders; 14) to demand the government respect 
the “republican ideas of democracy” (de Mello 2002).  
 
Suddenly, some of the expressed resolutions of the interbarriales began to 
steer away from the picture of peaceful democratic understanding that was originally 
intended. This was the case partly because socialist and communist parties played a 
major organizational role, and they sought to set a particular agenda (Brieger, n.d.; 
Petras 2003a and 2003b). This is noteworthy since the first middle class cacerolazos 
had explicitly rejected the presence of political parties, which they would not do after 




interbarriales were co-opted by traditional socialist and communist parties’ 
attempting to create a more radical movement. 
With strong labor unions and “syndicalist-oriented” piquetero organizations 
like the CCC and FTV on the one hand, and an increasingly combative tone to the 
declarations of the interbarriales, left-wing activists and intellectuals proclaimed the 
beginning of a revolutionary period (see esp. Sáenz and Cruz 2002). But this proved 
to be premature. The independent CTD-Verón, MTD-Solano, and MTR, as well as 
the participatory-minded asambleistas soundly rejected attempts to centralize the 
struggle. This caused a major ideological split, which was exacerbated by squabbles 
among left-wing groups competing for leadership, in addition to the usual squabbles 
among labor leaders (Petras 2003a and 2003b).  In his inaugural address, Eduardo 
Duhalde declared an end to Argentina’s alliance with “the financial sector” and a 
newly strengthened one with the “productive sector,” thus renewing his courting of 
the large union organizations. On January 14, 2002, a large contingent of piqueteros 
arrived at the central market of Buenos Aires, demanding food and other goods. 
Porters and market workers blocked their entrance, prompting a violent confrontation 
that symbolized the end of the tenuous labor-piquetero alliance for good.119 
Demobilization (2003-?) 
 As has been pointed out, the piqueteros and asambleistas were highly active 
during the first half of 2002. There were over 2000 roadblocks reported during that 
year, and that number includes only those that were initiated by piqueteros. A violent 
clash with police in Buenos Aires on June 26, leading to the deaths of two young 
                                                 




piqueteros, prompted a massive march of repudiation with the participation of 
asambleas, Madres, HIJOS, the CTA and other union representatives (Moyano, the 
leader of the “dissident” CGT, was booed). It was one of the last large-scale joint 
mobilizations of the cycle of protests, though many groups commemorated together 
the first anniversary of December 19/20 in an act that still retained some hope for 
continued social struggle.  
Ultimately, the cry of “que se vayan todos” was not replaced by a political 
project with which to challenge the status quo. Abandonment by many participants, 
cooptation of several important organizations by political actors, and government 
action directed at addressing a select few issues popular among protesters were all 
contributing factors in the decline of civil society involvement. Debate in several 
public assemblies came to be dominated by the most radical factions, who were both 
better organized and more motivated than the majority of attendees, whom were 
driven off by exhaustion and exasperation.120 Independent piquetero groups and the 
asambleas were unable to maintain their initial momentum, and eventually lost most 
of their active membership. They were often criticized by more centralized groups, 
seemingly rightly, for their naiveté and lack of political savvy. Their grass-roots 
attempts to radically transform democracy were replaced by an unenthusiastic return 
to the ballot box. The decline of the CTD-Verón has been particularly steep; 
following years of continued struggle, the organization has been reduced to a few 
hundred members.  
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Presidential election in 2003 reflected the difficulty of translating collective 
action into a political alternative. Established parties such as FREPASO and the UCR 
all but disappeared. Incredibly, Menem himself led in polls prior to the election (he 
withdrew from the race before the election due to new allegations of improprieties), a 
result of polarization and fragmentation in the opposition (Levitsky and Murillo 2003, 
p. 157). No anti-establishment candidate received significant electoral support. The 
PJ turned to internal power struggles and all-out attempts on the part of the major 
Peronist leaders, Duhalde and the governor of the Pampa province Néstor Kirchner, 
to expand their bases of support. During the Duhalde administration, the PJ 
reorganized itself and set about the task of incorporating the piqueteros into the 
traditional clientelist network of Argentine politics.  
The election of Kirchner to the presidency in 2003 revealed well-defined 
divisions among the unemployed. Behind Duhalde, the so-called “hard” camp 
(“duros”) comprising the CCC, the MIJD, the Polo Obrero, the Coordinator of 
Neighborhood Unity (Coordinadora de Unidad Barrial) and the Combative Workers’ 
Front (Frente de Trabajadores Combativos). Kirchner’s “soft” camp (“blandos”) 
included the FTV and the large Standing Neighborhoods (Barrios de Pie) (Ponce 
2005). Instead of forming a unified protest front, organized labor and the unemployed 
suddenly became competitors for political favors on the part of the PJ. On December 
20, 2003, the second anniversary of de la Rúa’s resignation, three separate piquetero 
groups organized marches on Plaza de Mayo. Almost comically, their enmity was by 
then so clear that they split the day into three separate periods so as not to 




Kirchner successfully gained the support of human rights’ organizations by re-
opening the issue of human right’s abuses during the military period. On August 21, 
2003, the Argentine Congress voted to repeal the amnesty laws enacted during 
Menem’s tenure, to much popular acclaim. Although Madres and HIJOS by no means 
ceased their marches and other forms of collective protest, they are no longer 
spearheading a movement that equates the current political leadership to the military 
juntas of the past. Kirchner’s focus on past crimes serves him in two ways: he is in 
friendlier terms with the influential human rights organizations than his predecessors, 
but he also has made their rhetoric more difficult to defend, as he has been able to 
make a distinction between crimes against the people and the effects of economic 
processes beyond a small group’s control. 
 Seemingly more left-leaning than Duhalde, he has also succeeded in 
maintaining stability while continuing to negotiate with international financial 
institutions. The Argentine economy appears to have rebounded, recording steady 
growth in 2004 and 2005, though poverty and unemployment remain alarmingly high. 
In a widely covered announcement, Kirchner declared his intention to completely pay 
off Argentina’s foreign debt to “gain control of the tools to build its independence.”121 
Beyond the expected rejection of the anti-system core within civil society – who 
believe the debt itself is illegitimate and should not be paid at all – most Argentines 
accepted the announcement as a good sign for the future.122 Hugo Moyano, formerly 
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a “dissident” leader, referred to it as “a historic day. Perón never asked for a cent […] 
and Kirchner is doing the same.”123 Once again, the move by Kirchner represents 
both an attempt to make macroeconomic changes while at the same time presenting 
himself as close to the values held dear by protesters in 2001 and 2002. Besides his 
ties with organized labor and some piquetero organizations, he is a less blatant target 
for other civil society groups still in the opposition.  
The CGT and CTA continue to enjoy the largest number of affiliated members 
of any social organizations in Argentina (around three million members for the first 
and slightly less than one million for the other). They only represent about a quarter 
of Argentine workers, however. Despite Moyano’s warning that support for the 
overall program does not eliminate the “social debt,”124 it remains to be seen whether 
the reunified CGT can put significant pressure on the government. Like the 
population at large, the rest of the workforce, the overwhelming majority of workers, 
rarely if ever participate in organized collective action. As the country has rebounded 
from its economic collapse, protest has returned to the steady activity of “the usual 
suspects.” Even if new actors continue to exist, Argentines have retreated to their 
homes to let their procedural democracy lead the country back to normalcy.    
Conclusions: Civil Society and the State in Argentina 
The preceding account identifies a period (1999-2002) in which Argentine 
civil society united in its opposition to the state. This unity was not the result of the 
creation of a national movement of opposition, as several social movements as well as 
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left-wing intellectuals hoped, but in the adoption of a shared attitude towards political 
figures in leadership positions. The critique of democratic politics in Argentina, what 
Auyero (2004) calls the “moral politics of the crowds,” was first articulated by 
Madres, HIJOS, and other social movements on the one hand, and by the puebladas 
in provincial towns in the early 1990’s. It was inspired by the previous struggles of 
organized labor in its support of Peronism from the 1940’s to the early 1970’s and 
those of human rights movements during the last authoritarian period, and came to 
equate the crimes of the military to the pilfering of national resources by Menem and 
his successors. The major failing of democracy in this view was the willful 
abandonment of political leaders of their responsibilities towards the people and the 
country. It was gradually adopted by “dissident” labor organizations (the CTA and 
the CGT-Moyano), the piqueteros in the late 1990’s, and by the “official” CGT and 
the middle classes during de la Rua’s administration, and culminated in an outright 
repudiation of established elites.   
The return to power of the PJ, and the support it received for the reunified 
CGT as well as several piquetero groups, however, shows that politics in Argentina 
continue to be dominated by political leaders and their ability to establish ties with 
social groups. While it is true that conventional political arrangements make it 
extremely difficult for outsider actors to gain power through elections at the local, 
provincial, and national levels (Levitsky and Murillo 2003), no civil society 
organization or social movement took advantage of the opportunity presented by 
broad popular discontent to become a political alternative (as has happened in several 




popular uprising in Argentina, then, represented a warning for political leaders on the 
possible consequences of taking advantage of the citizenry, but also a deeply-rooted 
belief in the responsibility of leaders to take the people’s needs into account.125 The 
dominant themes of the protests through the 1990’s up to December 19/20 and 
beyond were a rejection of political corruption, of violent repression of citizen 
protest, and of the “selling” of the country to the private sector (particularly 
foreigners). This does not translate into a vision of participatory democracy, though it 
reflects a deep ambivalence towards the path that democratic politics have taken in 
Argentina.  
 The popular mobilizations in Argetina in 2001 and 2002 offer compelling 
evidence in support of the main arguments of this dissertation. It is clear, first and 
foremost, that the “popular upsurges,” particularly on and immediately after 
December 19/20, did in fact represent the formation of a social front emanating from 
a variety of social organizations, social movements, and ultimately individual citizens 
that, in O’Donnel and Schmitter’s terms, “identified itself as the people.” Initially, the 
opposition was composed of the separate struggles of the “dissident” labor unions and 
the human rights’ organizations that represented a link to the military past during 
Menem’s first administration. They subsequently (and independently from each 
other) established ties with the emerging unemployed movement. The primary 
demand of the piqueteros was for recognition of their status as unemployed and as 
victims of the social order. In this sense they found a clear parallel in the experiences 
of Madres de Palza de Mayo, who alsmot immeduiately adopted the issue of 
unemployment as one of its causes. After 1999 the remainder faction of organized 
                                                 




labor adopted the language of the piqueteros as well, highlighting the injustice 
inherent in the loss of a way of life that had been the right and privilege of all.  
Admittedly, the development of the unified popular opposition in Argentina 
was tortuous. Certain actors, particularly the CGT, appeared to join in with the rest 
only when its traditional political partner was out of power, and retreated almost 
immediately following the return to power of PJ leaders. Among the middle classes 
there were those who responded positively to the demands of these groups, but public 
opinion was generally not accepting of the union leadership or of the piqueteros’ 
tactics. Most middle-class Argentines appear to have changed their view (if only 
temporarily) due to the economic situation, the increasing reports of corruption and 
scandalous behavior of leaders, and the struggle of the employees of Aerolíneas 
Argentinas. Finally, the presence of lootings and other criminal acts, while justified 
by many participants in the protests as the unavoidable consequences of government 
policies, puts the capacity of Argentine society to remain “civil” in question. 
Nevertheless, to ignore the extraordinary alliance of the middle classes with the 
usually vilified piqueteros misses the opportunity to examine the ability of social 
movements to create dialogue and find agreements with other sectors of civil society. 
 As is shown in Chapter 3, the apparently spontaneous awakening of the poor 
residents of provincial towns such as Santiago del Estero and Cutral-Co in the early 
and mid 1990’s – the prelude to the piquetero movement – shows striking parallels 
with that of the urban middle classes half a decade later. In both instances, the driving 
force was a sense of betrayal, of a government willfully raking steps to disenfranchise 




protests – piquetes, escraches, cacerolazos – with what is ultimately an attitude 
prevalent among Argentines – the longing for a golden past that meant a dignified 
existence for all – is what drove not only the protests of December 19/20, but the high 
level of collective mobilizations for the better part of 2002.  
 The events in Argentina present an instance of a popular movement explicitly 
supportive of an ideal of democracy that rejects a liberal model as insufficient but 
does not resort to the separation of society form the state (with some exemptions, as 
has been discussed). Participants in protests and demonstrations demanded 
accountability on the part of political leaders, and decried the unnecessary use of 
violence to quell legitimate complaints. Other than from a few isolated, and extremely 
small, revolutionary left-wing groups, there were no calls for the violent removal of 
established political institutions. The dominant understanding of democracy among 
the protests was one that relied on historical precedent: for Costa Rica, the 
“solidarity” state of the Second Republic; for Argentina, the Peronist promise of 
plenty and dignity for all and the fight against authoritarianism and state brutality. In 
contrast to theorists of civil society and social movements, who emphasize “the 
widening of ‘socio-political citizenship’” and “the transformation by the actors of the 
cultural field through their search for a collective identity and the affirmation of their 
difference and specificity” (Escobar and Alvarez 1992b, p. 4), the main goal of these 
protests was to insure that the democratic promise of a state that exists for its people 




dangerous (at worst) attempt to return to the “failed policies of the past,”126 it seems 
nevertheless to be a core element of Argentines’ understanding of democracy. 
The Argentine case also shows that social consensus and solidarity among 
actors within civil society cannot be assumed to exist. Social movements – such as 
Madres and the piqueteros – articulated the language that was adopted by the popular 
movement as a whole, with the possible of excemption of the middle classes, which 
experienced their political awakening in the midst of an immediate crisis. This 
strongly recalls the role played by civil society and social movements elsewhere in 
the world. As has been pointed out in analyses of previous popular uprisings (see 
Chapter 1), collective action is maintained not only through particular goals but also 
through symbols – popular songs, national flags and hymns – and shared values. The 
presence of active social movements and opportunities for communication among 
civil society actors permit the formation of such consensus though, seemingly, only in 
very specific instances and for a short period of time. Solidarity appears to be no 
match for the difficulties of maintaining collective action, or for the entrenched belief 
that (rightly or not) politics is the business of political representatives, and that the 










                                                 


































Chapter 4: Costa Rica’s New Critical Juncture 
The protests in Costa Rica discussed in this chapter differ from the events in 
Argentina, and those in the countries analyzed in Chapter 5, in that they did not 
culminate in the ouster of a democratically-elected president. They are, nevertheless, 
similar to the Argentine case in that they represented a clear instance of short-lived 
social opposition not only to the sitting head of state and his party but to the political 
class in general. As in Argentina, hostility to government economic policy became 




of the nation’s leaders, expressed in terms of longing for a lost and better past. The 
similarities between the two cases provide some clues as to the behavior of Latin 
American civil societies, which are paralleled in many ways in the less “pure” cases 
seen in other countries in the region. 
Despite being the oldest and most stable democratic regime in Latin America, 
Costa Rica has been plagued by social unrest in response to a decades-long program 
of economic reform. In March of 2000, the country erupted in a period of nation-wide 
mobilizations that protested against a government initiative designed to open private 
participation in the electric and telecommunication industries – managed by the Costa 
Rican Electric Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad – ICE) – to market 
competition. The ‘Law for the Betterment of Public Services of Electricity and 
Communication and of State Participation,’127 which came to be know as the “Energy 
Combo,” the “Combo ICE,” or simply “the Combo,”128 was designed to end the fifty-
year old monopoly of the ICE over electricity and telecommunications.  
 Protests against the initiative, led mainly by ICE union members, university 
student leaders, and political activists, had been taking place for months, growing in 
intensity as the date of the first of three required votes in the Legislative Assembly, 
March 20, approached. On March 18, a march of workers and students “expanded 
like foam in the streets of [Costa Rican capital] San José,”129 attracting citizens from 
all social sectors who responded with anger towards the government and its plans. On 
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March 20, in a closed session at close to ten in the evening, the first legislative vote 
approved the initiative after “five years of negotiations, two governments, and four 
days of marathon meetings.”130  Supporters from both major political parties – the 
National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional – PLN) and the Social 
Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana) – PUSC) – and President 
Miguel Angel Rodríguez applauded the result. 
Government officials intended to go ahead with the necessary subsequent 
votes and to enact the law as soon as it was in the books. Instead, they faced an 
escalation of social mobilization, so that by March 21 the streets of San Jose were 
filled by over 100,000 demonstrators, while protests and roadblocks sprang across the 
country. For the next three weeks the protests continued unabated. Marches, 
demonstrations, roadblocks, and, in isolated cases, vandalism of public property were 
reported in over forty points outside the capital. Roads that were forcibly opened to 
traffic by security personnel of the Fuerza Pública were closed again within hours. 
Important highways were blocked almost every day for two weeks. In some cases 
clashes between police and protesters led to arrests, injuries, and some even to 
isolated deaths. Stronger police responses only fueled the popular anger and were 
countered with bigger and more unruly crowds.  
In the end, the government agreed to rescind the initiative in the face of 
popular opposition. It signed a “patriotic agreement” with leaders of groups involved 
in the protests designed to formulate possible reforms to the ICE that would be 
“consistent with the popular will.”131 This resulted in several months of frenetic 
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activity by civil society: open debates, round tables, town-hall meetings, and reports 
prepared by dozens of social groups, including the universities and the Catholic 
Church. A “Special Mixed Commission of the ICE” (Comisión Mixta Especial del 
ICE – CME-ICE) was created to reshape future national debate on the issue. President 
Rodríguez acknowledged that the voice of the protesters had to be heard: “if Costa 
Ricans do not agree with the proposed solution, which I believe is the best, then we 
have to look for another option.”132 This, after long insisting that “the protests do not 
go beyond the same people that have attended many protests during this and other 
administrations.”133 On April 17 the law was finally put to rest when the Sala IV 
(“fourth chamber”) of Costa Rica’s judiciary declared it unconstitutional.  
The magnitude, intensity, and duration of the protests, as well as polling data 
which strongly suggested that they were supported by a majority of the population, 
led to the conclusion that rejection of the Combo initiative represented “the will of the 
people.” In its final report, based on careful analysis of the evidence and discussions 
among its members, the CME-ICE found that the three major causes for the protests 
were the “high esteem” in which the Costa Rican public held the ICE, both because of 
its history and because of its excellent service; the mistrust of the population towards 
politicians exacerbated by the fact that the process of negotiation and ratification of 
the Combo was done in a secretive manner; and a general dissatisfaction with the 
political process in general (CME-ICE 2001). The UNIMER research center similarly 
concluded that “[i]f one adds to the dissatisfaction with the politicians the desire of 
the population to be taken into account, the feeling of being badly represented, and 
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distrust over the changes on a beloved institution, the result may be an ample and 
spontaneous protest capable to shake the country to its core.”134 At the center of the 
debate over the Combo were concerns over possible negative outcomes of the 
initiative itself, but also the “selling of Costa Rica” to foreigners, and the insensitivity 
of policymakers in bringing this about. The protest movement revolved around a 
unified call: “el ICE no se vende” (“the ICE is not for sale”), and was held together by 
universally recognized symbols taken from the country’s past and present.  
Although the intense protest period did not culminate in the resignation of 
president Rodríguez, the events in Costa Rica parallel those in Argentina and 
elsewhere in Latin America in a number of ways. Firstly, and this is the central 
concern of this dissertation, it involved a multiplicity of groups that acted 
simultaneously to stand up to the state. Secondly, the rise in popular discontent and 
eventual mass mobilizations of the citizenry occurred in the midst of a process of 
“neoliberal” economic restructuring that, though appearing to yield positive results, 
was not always welcomed by the population at large. Thirdly, though many of the 
participants in the protests rejected the economic changes outright, the national 
protest movement did not share an explicitly anti-neoliberal agenda, but a series of 
complaints regarding the state’s behavior towards its citizenry and towards a 
historically-important national institution as well as a general sense that Costa Rica 
was no longer a state based on the principles of solidarity. The commonalities among 
the widely different groups were often overstated by anti-status quo individuals and 
groups, who longed for all out revolution. Finally, once the Combo had been removed 
from the legislative agenda, and despite the fact that most of the grievances that 
                                                 




brought Costa Ricans out to the streets in the first place had not been addressed, the 
movement unraveled very soon after.  
Costa Rica differs from most every other Latin American country in that it has 
been a stable democracy for almost six decades. The abolition of the armed forces in 
1949 eliminated the possibility of the type of violent conflicts that prevailed in Latin 
America throughout the twentieth century. After major upheavals in 1948-1949, 
change in Costa Rica has been gradual, with constant attempts on the part of the state 
to find consensus with civil society. Why, then, was there such unexpected anger 
directed at the government in 2000? The following discussion elucidates the parallel 
historical development of the state and civil society in Costa Rica from the transition 
to democracy in 1949 to the present, paying special attention to protest and other 
contentious events. It becomes clear that the process of economic transformation 
begun in the early 1980’s became intertwined in the debate over the nature of 
democracy in Costa Rica, leading to the chasm between the political elites and the 
citizenry that was highlighted during the several weeks of protests in March and April 
of 2000. At the same time, the behavior of those involved in these events negates the 
impression that Costa Rican civil society is united in its rejection of either “liberal” 
democracy or “neoliberal” economics, even if it is keenly aware of their limitations. 
Political Transition: The Costa Rican Second Republic (1948-1978)  
The basic structure of contemporary Costa Rican democracy was put in place in 1949 




juncture” in the country’s history,135 society was clearly stratified along economic 
lines and, despite repeated attempts to institute democratic procedures, politics was 
mainly an elite affair (Lehoucq 1996). It is true that Costa Rica did not have to deal 
with ethnic divisions during the Colonial period, having been an unimportant colony 
devoid of natural riches and fairly unpopulated at the time of its discovery by the 
Spanish (Monge 1966). Moreover, historians have shown that by the beginning of the 
twentieth century the population tended to prefer consensus and peaceful resolution 
of differences to conflict (Fischel 1987). Nevertheless, recent scholarly works have 
rejected the image of Costa Rica as headed inevitably towards democracy (Wilson 
1998; Lehoucq and Molina 2002). In fact, the unique path that the country was to take 
was made possible by the intensification of conflict among political and economic 
elites, and the subsequent elite agreement on the desirability of procedural 
democracy.  
 The catalyst for the initial elite division was Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia. 
Originally the candidate of the conservative National Republican Party (Partido 
Republicano Nacional – PRN), Calderón sought to establish a separate electoral base 
among urban workers and rural campesinos. Calderón’s Presidency (1940-1944) was 
notable for a series of progressive and pro-labor reforms, as well as his alliance with 
important communist figures such as Manuel Mora and progressive Church leaders 
such as Archbishop Víctor Sanabria. Among the governmental reforms were a new 
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Labor Code that offered a number of important protections for workers, as did the 
newly created Social Security Office (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social – CCSS). 
The Calderón administration put special emphasis on improving public education and 
the availability of basic services to the population. 
As elsewhere in the region, industrialization and economic growth in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had promoted the growth of the industrial 
proletariat and its rising importance in both economic and political life. Although 
Costa Rica remained primarily an agricultural country, organized labor became a 
major political force in the 1930’s and 1940’s. The most important labor organization 
was the Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de 
Costa Rica – CTCR), allied with the Costa Rican Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista de Costa Rica – PCCR). The communist led labor movement engaged in 
large-scale strike and protest activity against the largest commercial interests in the 
country, of which the banana-workers’ strike in the province of Limón in 1934 was 
the most significant. Its main rival was the Costa Rican Confederation of Workers 
Rerum Novarum (Confedración Costarricense de Trabajadores Rerum Novarum – 
CCTRN), created by progressive members of the Catholic Church in an attempt to 
develop a non-Marxist labor movement (Wilson 1998, p. 68). The rise to power of 
Calderón heralded the glory days for organized labor, as the CTCR and CCTRN 
jointly supported his administration.  
Yet, Calderón’s tenure was also marred by allegations of corruption, which 




one term in office was over in 1944,136 Calderón was replaced by his chosen 
successor, Teodoro Picado Michalski, amid suspicions of electoral fraud. Picado 
continued to pursue the policies supported by Calderón and his allies, but after the 
end of World War II the United States began to actively support the opposition, 
particularly the leader of the National Liberation Movement (Movimiento Liberacón 
Nacional – MLN), José Figueres Ferrer. As the 1947 presidential elections 
approached, the government faced mass demonstrations of middle- and lower- class 
Costa Ricans that protested government corruption and the PRN’s affiliation with the 
communists. The PRN candidate, Otilio Ulate Blanco, once again emerged victorious 
form an election tainted by allegations of fraud, but this time protests engulfed the 
country. Figueres’ arrival to Costa Rica in March of 1948 marked the beginning of 
the Civil War, from which the MLN emerged victorious. Figueres and Ulate signed a 
pact in May of 1948 that marked the end of hostilities and officially handed power to 
a provisional junta led by Figueres. The Figueres-Ulate pact would symbolize the 
agreement among the major political actors in the country over the need to reform the 
country’s political institutions (Wilson 1998).  
In a puzzling move, and to the chagrin of his most conservative backers, 
Figueres chose to retain most of the social reforms created under Calderón and 
Picado’s administrations, and use them as the base of the Costa Rican Second 
Republic. A 1949 Constitutional Assembly drafted a new constitution which 
substantially changed the institutional arrangements of national politics. These 
institutional reforms, along with the abolition of the armed forces in 1949 
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successfully laid the groundwork for an enduring democratic establishment (Salazar 
1988; Lehoucq 1996; Yashar 1997; Wilson 1998; Lehoucq and Molina 2002). 
Figueres’ clear commitment to democracy was only marred by his staunch anti-
communism, which led to the dismantling of the PCCR as well as the CTCR. Marxist 
activists and intellectuals were forced to go into hiding or exile, and barred from 
participation in politics for two decades.  
As can be seen, the role Calderón played in Costa Rican history provides a 
parallel of sorts for Perón’s in Argentina. Both established bases of support among 
the urban workers and the poor, and both were opposed by an increasingly broad 
alliance of traditional economic elites, conservative sectors of the Church, and many 
in the revolutionary left, whom both men ideologically rejected. The removal by force 
of these crucial Presidents brought about “critical junctures” in their respective 
country’s histories. But while in Argentina the result was four decades of violence 
and military interventions, in Costa Rica the elites opted for peace and cooperation. 
This was partly the result of a tradition of peace and consensus (Monge 1966; Fishel 
1987 and 1992), but also of the choices made by the PLN leadership in the midst of a 
critical juncture. The political institutions established by the 1949 Constitution were 
integral in protecting the subsequent democratic regime (Lehoucq 1996; Yashar 1997; 
Wilson 1998). With the exception of the exclusion of the far left until the 1970’s, 
Costa Rican democracy was founded in 1949 on a widely accepted vision of a 
peaceful and socially conscious republic.  
Along with political reform, Figueres and the MLN, renamed National 




economic development of Costa Rica.  The national banks were given the status of 
Autonomous Institutions, as were those in charge of guaranteeing social welfare, such 
as the CCSS, the National Insurance Agency, the National Learning Institute, the 
ICE, and many others. The goal of the “autonomous regime” was to allow for the 
growth of the administrative and technical power of the state while at the same time 
avoiding such participation to lead to a dangerous increase in the political authority of 
the executive power.137 Through the 1950’s, the role of organized labor as an 
effective actor was further reduced by laws that encouraged the formation of 
“solidarity unions” that did not subscribe to class-based ideology or contentious 
methods of politics. Most unionized private-sector employees joined to solidarity 
rather than traditional unions, a trend that continues today. On the other hand, public-
sector unions were, and still are, more traditionally class-based. The PLN also 
instituted a nationwide collective bargaining mechanism that gave unions little role in 
establishing wages (Wilson 1998, p. 69). The leaders of the CCTRN did not take 
advantage of the opportunity to strengthen the religious-based labor movement and 
chose instead to join the PLN (Regidor n.d.).  
  Over time, the resounding success of the government in achieving industrial 
development, economic growth, and unprecedented social well-being for most of the 
population continued to cement the values that were to become ingrained in the 
nation’s collective psyche. Between 1949 and 1978, Costa Rica enjoyed a largely 
uninterrupted period of economic growth and social progress. The lack of a military 
and the extensive social programs of the “golden age” of the 1960’s and 70’s not only 
                                                 




placed Costa Rica among industrialized nations in terms of human development138 
but also contributed to its political stability and to the consolidation of democracy. 
Political conflict was relatively mild. The PLN held on to power, opposed by a 
variety of opposition groups that agreed only on their opposition to the hegemonic 
party. Only in the late 1970’s were they able to consolidate into a social-Christian 
party, the National Unity Party (Partido Unidad Nacional), which would later 
become the Social Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana – PUSC).  
Social opposition to the government was seen in protests against the 
centralization of water and electric services (which meant rate hikes) in the 1950’s, 
complaints about lack of government-provided housing in the 1960’s, and protests 
regarding public transportation costs in the 1970’s (Booth 1998, pp. 117-118). Rural 
movements that fought for peasant rights also appeared (Edelman 1999). In general, 
though, protests against the government were concentrated on particular issues, and 
there was little sign of unified social blocs that opposed the status quo. This is partly 
due to the aforementioned weakness of the labor movement. Despite the fact that 
social organizations were encouraged by the government (Booth 1998, p. 95), they 
have historically not strived towards autonomy (MacDonald 1997). An important 
exception was the protest movement against a proposed government deal with the 
Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) in 1970. Partly as a matter of national 
pride and partly out of suspicion of side-deals on the part of policymakers involved, 
labor unions, university students,139 left-wing parties, and numerous other groups 
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staged a large wave of protests hitherto unseen in Costa Rica, which successfully 
blocked the deal. The ALCOA victory sparked a short period of unity among diverse 
groups in the opposition – for instance, the three labor confederations that existed at 
the time marched together on Labor Day (May 1), 1971 for the first time (Regidor 
n.d., p. 30).140 Nevertheless, Costa Rica would not experience nationwide social 
protests again until 2000.  
The period between 1949 and1978 was one of relative political stability and 
economic growth. Costa Rica avoided social ills such as extreme poverty and income 
inequality, as well as the political violence that prevailed in the region throughout the 
century, through the primacy of a single political actor. The economic and social 
advances of the 1960’s and 1970’s allowed the PLN to solidify its position by 
creating a national narrative that emphasized peace, social welfare and hard work and 
connected them with the social-democratic system of the Second Republic (see 
below). This effort was so successful that, once the political leadership chose to 
modify its economic policies in the 1980’s, it faced increasing social opposition 
stemming precisely from the values that had served it so well in the previous two 
decades.  
Economic Transition (1979-2000) 
The election of the first non-PLN president, Rodrigo Carazo Odio of the PUN 
in 1978, coincided with the economic crisis that beset it along with the rest of Latin 
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America.141 Costa Rica became the first Latin American country to default on its debt 
obligations in the 1980’s and also one of the first in the region to initiate a World 
Bank-sponsored structural adjustment program (Edelman 1999). At first, executive 
control over state assets, especially the Autonomous Institutions, gradually increased. 
Originally, this was intended to tighten control over state expenditures, though during 
the 1980’s and the 1990’s successive administrations used it to reorient the economy 
away from the state-led model toward a more open and liberal one. The 
entrepreneurial state in Costa Rica was fundamentally reduced and many 
Autonomous Institutions privatized, though the welfare state remained largely intact. 
  Although Carazo took the first tentative steps towards structural reform, the 
economic transition in Costa Rica began in earnest with PLN president Luis Alberto 
Monge (1982-1986), and was continued by the PLN administrations of Oscar Arias 
Sánchez (1986-1990) and José María Figueres Olsen (1994-1998) and PUSC 
presidents Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier (1990-1994) and Miguel Angel Rodríguez 
(1998-2002). Economic reform, then, was undertaken not only by the party that had 
created the social democratic system in the first place but, perhaps more strikingly, by 
the sons of its two main architects – José María Figueres (whose father was Figueres 
Ferrer) and Calderón Fournier (the son of Calderón Guardia). Neither party explicitly 
advocated outright neoliberal reform, but once in power both continued the process of 
structural adjustment.  
 Despite its about-face on economic policy, the PLN continued to enjoy 
electoral success (Wilson 1998; Stokes 2001). It was able to do so by using 
                                                 





“strategies that defrayed the direct costs of the economic and social adjustments for 
voters” and instituting “compensatory policies to protect the lower strata of society” 
(Wilson 1998, p. 114). The process of economic reform was undertaken slowly (as 
opposed to the rapid transition that occurred in Argentina under Menem), and 
governments continually sought input from civil society. The reforms seemed to work 
as well, bringing back economic growth without markedly reducing poverty or 
income inequality in the 1980’s and 1990’s.142 Many reforms met with public 
approval, such as the privatization of the national banking system in the mid 1990’s, 
since Costa Ricans were not happy with the service (Wilson 1998, p. 115). 
Additionally, the government repeatedly established processes of communication 
with civil society, termed “concertación,” to make the process of reform a concerted 
one between the state and the citizenry. The Arias, Calderón Fournier, Figueres 
Olsen, and Rodríguez administrations all organized this sort of meetings with social 
groups to consult on particular reforms (Arias and Jiménez 2005, p. 40).    
 There were some obstacles to the process, to be sure, mostly in the form of 
labor strikes against specific measures.143 In 1983, a proposed freeze on wage 
increases during the Monge administration (designed to alleviate the crisis by 
reducing state expenditures) met with labor strikes that eventually persuaded the 
government to adopt a wage-indexing policy that would rise in accordance to the 
prices of basic goods (Wilson 1998, p. 116).144 Strikes of ICE telephone and electric 
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workers in 1988 derailed a program during the Arias administration to sell 60% of the 
phone company and 40% of the electric company to private corporations. The 
Calderón Fournier administration also faced strikes and labor protests against budget 
cuts and proposed dismissals of public employees in 1991. Finally, the Figueres 
Olsen administration had to deal with a month-long teachers’ strike and opposition 
from ICE employees to an attempt to open the cellular communications market to the 
Millicom company,145 both in 1995. In these early instances of popular protest there 
was a consistent message being expressed: that economic restructuring and the 
reduction of state resources would eventually lead to the dismantling of the welfare 
state created in the 1940’s and 1950’s. The plight of the public-sector workers was 
but an instance of the calamities that would befall the nation as a whole (Regidor, 
n.d.).146 This position, however, would not attract enough support from the citizenry 
until the protests of 2000.  
Overall, and despite some setbacks, the process of economic adjustment 
continued through the 1990’s and beyond. As can be seen, most of the public 
opposition to reforms came from organized labor unions (with the exception of the 
1970 ALCOA protests), and only regarding specific issues. There was not an 
organized anti-neoliberal movement of any significance in Costa Rica by the turn of 
the twenty-first century. Yet, the Combo protests in 2000 were not simply the actions 
of labor unions, but a concerted action on the part of a massive agglomeration of 
unions, civil society groups, student federations, and political parties. Given that 
Costa Ricans tend to eschew public expressions of discontent, that the country’s 
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democratic institutions are strong and stable, and that there was public support for 
many of the reforms enacted in the two decades prior to the protests of 2000 
(purportedly based on processes of national dialogue), it seems relevant to ask what 
sparked the popular fury that sent hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets in 
March and April of that year. A good starting point is the CME-ICE report (2001), 
which points to public dissatisfaction with the political class in general and the 
process of ratification of the Combo in particular, as well as the “public affection” for 
the ICE, as the main causes of the protests. 
The Historical Significance of the ICE 
Figueres and the other framers of the Costa Rican Second Republic were 
aware of the importance of ideological support from the public for the future of their 
political program. The post-civil war political transition was designed to symbolize 
both a new beginning and a return to the “roots” of the nation. It was essential that the 
values underlying the new political arrangement be understood as maintaining the 
core values of the Costa Rican people: peace, hard work, humility, the importance of 
education, and so on. Thus, for example, on December 1st 1949, a formal ceremony 
took place in which the keys of the military barracks were symbolically surrendered 
by the Minister of Public Security to the Minister of Education (Bird 1984). It did not 
hurt that the social guarantees put in place by Calderón and strengthened by 
successive PLN governments were seen as based on “Christian principles” rather than 
on dangerous Communist ideas (Campos Salas 2000).  
The liberacionista camp put heavy emphasis on the importance of education 




1950’s and 60’s, the material construction of the new state was always complemented 
with patriotic rhetoric that connected the national interest with the national 
institutions and the political party that claimed to make it all possible. The very name 
of the PLN – the Party of National Liberation – was deliberately chosen in 1951 to 
keep in the mind of the electorate the memory of the heroic period of 1948 (Gutierrez 
1986). The Autonomous Institutions were given a central place in this process, and 
the ICE soon became a symbol of the progress brought to every corner of the country. 
Figueres peppered his widely read popular writings with praise for the national 
institutions, especially the ICE. Statements such as “the ICE is an admirable 
institution” or “the ICE represents the ideology of the National Liberation 
Movement” (Figueres Ferrer 1979) are common. Not only was the ICE responsible 
for achieving by far the best electric and telephone infrastructure in Central America, 
but it was ICE employees who brought food and medicine to previously isolated areas 
of the country (Amador 2002). 
In expressing their rejection of the Combo, civil society organizations would 
emphasize the historical importance of the ICE. The Civic Union of the Northern 
Zone (Unión Cívica de la Zona Norte), for instance, stated in a press communiqué 
that  
The ICE is part of the national patrimony and has been built and developed with the 
economic resources of all Costa Ricans.[…] Electricity and telecommunications 
constitute fundamental public services to guarantee a high quality of life for the 
whole population, for which they should not and cannot be ruled by the laws of the 
market.147  
 
                                                 




The National Association of Public and Private Employees (Asociación 
Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Privados – ANEP), one of the most active unions 
during the Combo protests asks: 
What happened to the formerly glorious National Liberation Party, architect of a 
middle-class society that gave us peace and honor from all over the world? What will 
they do to show that they will defend the institution that symbolizes the work of Don 
Pepe Figueres?148 
 
Opposition to the initiative came to be expressed in the language of the labor 
unions in the 1990’s. The privatization of the ICE indicated a desire on the part of 
political leaders to eliminate social protections. A public statement from 
representatives of the areas of San Carlos and Huétar Norte objected to the initiative 
on the grounds (among others) that: 
The opening of the telecommunications and electric markets does not favor the Costa 
Rican people. The application of market laws in their pure form will not bring 
economic development for all Costa Ricans. The breaking up of the ICE by this law 
symbolizes the definitive destruction of the solidarity state that all Costa Ricans have 
built, and that in recent years has been dismantled, bringing poverty and unhappiness 
to many Costa Rican families, particularly in the rural areas. We know how to 
recognize very clearly the difference between democratic decisions and those that are 
made to satisfy avarice and inequity.149   
 
Such concordance in language is not coincidental. The ICE unions, in 
conjunction with ANEP and other public-workers’ associations, launched an 
organized campaign to educate the public about the perils of the Combo. They 
organized round-table discussions, lectures in university settings, and in many areas 
were allowed to speak to high school students during class hours (by sympathetic 
teachers and administrators). University and high school students were particularly 
receptive to their message. Students from the night school of Santa Clara warned that 
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“if we sell telecommunications today, tomorrow it will be education and other 
services and benefits that all Costa Ricans enjoy.”150 The Student Federation of the 
University of Costa Rica (FEUCR), a key instigator of protests from the very 
beginning, declared for instance on March 24: 
In essence the “living forces of the nation,” this profuse and complex amalgam of 
sectors, social actors from the civil society, defend one of the public institutions that 
has contributed the most to the betterment of their living conditions, facilitating the 
coverage of electricity and communications services.151 
 
In a telling summary of the public sentiment towards the current leadership, 
Luis Paulino Vargas recognizes the importance of the Golden era in the national 
memory: 
Behind the crisis of legitimacy and credibility in the political system and the 
democratic institutions of Costa Rica, lies perhaps a problem of the absolute inability, 
on the part of the current leadership, to interpret the demands and needs of the Costa 
Rican people and society. There lies the substantive difference between a historical 
leader like [José] Figueres and these current politicians. In the context of Costa Rica 
from the forties to the seventies, Don Pepe [Figueres] knew how to read – even 
intuitively – the soul, still predominantly campesina, of this people (Vargas 2000).       
 
The Decline of Public Trust in Politics 
Throughout the 1990’s a number of irregularities in the management of public funds 
came to light through the mainstream media, as well as public office-holders 
allegedly taking advantage of their positions to benefit their private interests. A major 
scandal in 1994-1995 led to the closing of the Banco Anglo Costarricense (one of the 
largest banks in the country) amid corruption charges involving members of the 
Calderón Fournier and Figueres Olsen administrations. On April 28, 1995, the two 
men held a closed-door meeting from which they drafted a pact between the 
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government, the PLN and the PUSC. The stated goal of the pact was to “clean up” 
Costa Rican politics from corruption, but it was taken by many as evidence that both 
major parties had come to an agreement to “carve up” the country among themselves 
(Rojas 2003, p. 28).152  
It was clear by the late 1990’s that the Costa Rican population was becoming 
disillusioned with their leadership. This was most evident in the growing absenteeism 
of voters in national elections, which had been consistently low from the 1950’s until 
the early 1990’s (about 18%) and had risen considerably so that by 1998 it reached 
30% (Hernández 2002; Seligson 2002; IIS-UCR 2004; Raventós et al 2005). Though 
Costa Ricans’ support for democracy has never been in doubt, numerous polls 
showed a considerable decline in public support for and trust in the major parties and 
political figures. In this political climate, President Rodríguez assumed power 
following an election with the largest level of absenteeism and the lowest percentage 
of actual votes for the victor since the 1960’s. His attempt to reach out to the public 
through a program of Concertación Nacional was a direct result of the perception that 
he lacked a clear electoral mandate.  
 The Shaping of the Combo Initiative 
 
Undeterred by the “Millicom strike” of late 1995, the Figueres Olsen administration 
endeavored to draft projects designed to “open” the electricity and 
telecommunications industries to private competition. Initially, the initiative was 
conceived as three separate proposed bills, which were presented to the Legislative 
Assembly in August of 1996 (Segura 1999). During the next two years, little progress 
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was made in advancing the projects due to major disagreements between members of 
the PLN and the PUSC. In 1998, newly-elected President Rodríguez and his cabinet 
made the “modernization” of the ICE a top priority, and hence one of the primary 
topics of Concertación Nacional (PNUD and CONARE 1999). Yet, although 
Concertación proved successful in attracting support for the reform of the national 
pensions system, the same did not occur with reforms of the ICE (Arias and Jiménez 
2005).  
The government believed that, through Concertación and a campaign to 
educate the public regarding the details of the electric and telecommunication 
initiatives (unified in a single bill, the Combo, in December of 1999), it would avoid 
significant opposition to the initiative. As a result, it persuaded the majority of 
Legislative Assembly members to “fast track” voting on the initiative (Rodríguez 
2000). The first small demonstrations against the Combo took place in the last days of 
December of that year, and continued through January and February of 2000. 
Convinced that the protests were simply the work of ICE unions looking to retain 
their traditional position of power within the institution and of a few “extremists,” the 
legislature kept the initiative on the fast track. This proved to be a major 
miscalculation, as ICE workers and, increasingly, university students began not only 
publicly protesting the Combo but organizing a campaign to “educate the public” 
regarding its dangers. The more agreement there was between PLN and PUSC 
legislators, the more effective with the public were the warnings that the two major 
parties intended to “sell off” the ICE and divide the spoils among themselves. Media 




benefit financial enterprises linked to his family only fueled this sentiment. In a 
typical statement, the Alajuela Pastoral Community demanded: 
Enough lies and tricks, enough false promises. Do not abuse any longer the patience 
of this people, lover of peace. Enough corruption and stealing with impunity. Enough 
under-the-table dealings with the patrimony of all the people of Costa Rica. Costa 
Rica is for its people, not for politicians to divide it like a piñata.153   
 
While the Legislative Assembly debated on the Combo behind closed doors, 
the public opposition maintained that the government intended to leave the ICE at the 
mercy of foreign interests, which would lead to the weakening of the institution and 
eventually to privatization of the electric and telecommunications sectors, as well as 
directly benefit some of the political figures involved in drafting and gathering 
support for the initiative. Célimo Guido, a Legislative Assembly member from the 
left wing Democratic Force Party (Partido Fuerza Democrática – PFD), accused the 
Rodríguez administration of nepotism for giving important posts to powerful 
interests. The relationship of the Combo to economic interests of individual 
politicians was a constant theme during this period. For instance, ICE sources 
supplied Guido with information regarding the links between certain politically-
influential families and the industry. In the report, dated 1994,154 family names such 
as Figueres Olsen, Figueres Boggs, Arias Sánchez, Sánchez Benavides and Sánchez 
Marín, all part of the traditional economic and political elite were conspicuous. Then 
president of the Legislative Assembly, and vocal advocate of the Combo, Carlos 
Vargas Pagán, was linked to at least one project. The Rodríguez administration 
thoroughly failed in providing an alternative explanation, either because it believed 
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there was tacit support for the initiative or because it counted on most of the public 
doing nothing about it one way or the other.155  
The Popular Movement against the Combo 
The first demonstrations against the Combo were composed of ICE 
employees, led by unions such as the Union of ICE Employees (Sindicato de 
Empleados del ICE –ASEDEICE) and the Union of ICE Engineers and Professionals 
(Sindicato de Ingenieros y Profesionales del ICE – SIICE), university students, and 
private citizens from neighborhoods that would be directly affected by changes within 
the institution (such as Sarapiquí and Perez Zeledón). Formal meetings between 
ASDEICE representatives and government officials had yielded no results (to no 
one’s surprise, as their positions were diametrically opposed), so by January of 2000 
protest marches and street demonstrations were reported almost every week.  
As PLN and PUSC officials came ever closer to a final agreement on the 
initiative, other civil society groups began to make their opposition public. 
Environmental organizations also made their voices heard at around this time. 
Members of the Costa Rican Federation for the Conservation of the Environment 
(Federación Costarricense por la Conservación de la Ecología – FECON) and the 
National Front for Forests (Frente Nacional por los Bosques), which represent over 
thirty environmental groups claimed the law would bring a “depredation of the 
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environment” and called for all ecology-minded citizens to join the fight against it.156 
Labor unions not affiliated with the ICE began to express solidarity with the 
institution’s employees. On January 27 of 2000, a National Civic Front (Frente 
Cívico Nacional – FCN) was formed with the express goal of keeping the Combo 
from being passed into law. At its head was former President Carazo (who could 
legitimately claim to be the last head of the executive of the old social democratic 
Costa Rica), joined by the CTCRN, and several other unions and civil society groups 
opposed to the Combo or to privatization of state industries in general. Protests 
actions remained small but constant through the end of February. 
On March 13, the ICE unions called for an indefinite strike, and were joined 
the next day by ANEP, a large and traditionally activist union. This seems to be the 
beginning of a second stage of the protest period, as university student federations 
began to join in the protests. A separate protest of farmers of the National Union of 
Medium and Small Farmers (Unión Nacional de Pequeños y Medianos Productores 
Agropecuarios – UPANACIONAL) and other groups raised roadblocks in the 
Ochomogo area (province of Cartago) on March 16, originally demanding a raise in 
tariffs of potato and onion imports, opted to demand the removal of the Combo 
initiative as well.157 The leadership of UPANACIONAL knowingly put the principal 
interest of the campesinos aside for a while in order to support the fight against the 
Combo: “We are sure that this proposal will only benefit a few, with resources that 
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belong to all of us. […] We wish to tell those who are fighting to count on our 
unconditional support.”158 Whether they did so based on strategic thinking (they 
expected help in future struggles against the government) or out of a sense of 
solidarity, the opposition movement was bolstered all of a sudden by a combative and 
well organized social sector that had its own scores to settle with the government.    
Over the next week, dozens of protest marches would take place, as well as a 
growing number of roadblocks in diverse parts of the country (at least 20 separate 
roads were blocked on March 17, for example). Among the groups that joined the 
actions were taxi and truck drivers’ unions in the province of Alajuela, dock workers 
in the province of Limón, high school and university students, teachers, and 
administrators, feminist movements, and a growing number of unions. Héctor 
Monestel, head of the Union of University Employees (Sindicato de Empleados 
Universitarios – SINDEU) expressed the general sentiment of the protesters: “It is 
time to put a stop to this criminal government and to the country-sellers 
(vendepatrias) in the Assembly.”159  
Despite some instances of petty crime and vandalism related to protests, the 
government did not respond with force, ordering police forces to open blocked 
highways but not to disband peaceful marches. However, the Legislative Assembly 
announced on March 18 that discussions on the Combo would be held behind closed 
doors due to protests in front of the Legislative building, including acts of vandalism. 
With the vote scheduled for March 20, a large march of unions and students headed to 
the Assembly building and was met with police barricades. Several public-sector 
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unions announced strikes beginning on that day and the two of the largest public 
universities – the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica – UCR) and 
the Technical Institute of Costa Rica (Instituto Técnico de Costa Rica – ITCR) 
announced that classes would be cancelled for the coming days. That night, the 
initiative was approved in the first of three required votes, with a comfortable 
majority of forty five votes in favor to ten against. Though the major media outlets 
proclaimed it a victory,160 the public response was immediate and unexpectedly 
strong. 
Marches and demonstrations engulfed the country. Over thirty five roadblocks 
were reported on March 21 alone, and the intensity of the protests only grew in the 
following days. Over the next three weeks, more than two hundred organizations 
expressed their disapproval of the Combo and participated in protests of one form or 
another. High-school teachers and administrators marched along with students, some 
of which set of roadblocks in front of their schools, in busy intersections, or in front 
of government offices. Local media outlets, such as Radio Sinaí and Radio Cultura 
supplied venues for discussing the issues and communicated future meeting points for 
demonstrations. 
It is clear that there was some communication among groups, and that the 
public-sector unions along with the university student federations were instrumental 
in these interactions. A report by the FEUCR communication commission points to 
the importance of contacts with “ICE unions, research committees in the UCR, some 
                                                 
160 The editors of La Nación, for instance, lauded “the effort of the two majority parties to overcome 
the demagogues and push forward a modification of the corporate structure of the ICE.[…] It is a step 
forward. The government and the Congress have shown the way by negotiating in good conscience the 
way to get there. The silent majority in Costa Rica recognizes – and longs for –such leadership.” – “El 




political parties and NGO’s.”161 Albino Vargas, secretary general of ANEP, refused 
to outline for the media the specific organization, but stated that: 
We have developed a structure to guarantee fluid and efficient communications. We 
coordinate with the links of various groups, and each one knows who to address, but 
we respect the autonomy of the popular protests.162 
 
At the same time, most of the demonstrations were the work of individual 
organizations. Even though most of them had the same purpose, in most cases (over 
80%) there was no explicit or “official” connection between groups (Mora 2004, pp, 
5-6). UCR researcher Sindy Mora points out that although alliances in instances of 
collective action tend to be “unregistered,” the best indicator is usually joint 
participation in an action, which was not prevalent either (Mora 2004, p. 5). This 
suggests that beyond a common target and shared symbols, the level of direct 
communication among the various civil society organizations was relatively weak.163  
The police’s use of tear gas to disperse the protests (first reported on March 
21164) only fueled popular anger and, as the days passed, the crowds grew bigger. 
Church organizations and, most prominently, UCR Chancellor Gabriel Macaya 
denounced the forceful official response to the protests. There were several accounts 
of “private citizens” or “neighbors” joining the protests spontaneously. Though there 
is no systematic data on how many “unaffiliated” individuals participated in the 
protests, and though government officials insisted on dismissing the protests as the 
                                                 
161 Distributed by email and photocopies on 15 May 2000.  
162 “Comando Atiende Crisis” in La Nación, 22 March 2000.  
163 Some groups, such as the “alternative front” of the National Front for Struggle (Frente Nacional de 
Lucha) and the University Action Front (Frente de Acción Universitario) attempted to organize a 
“General Meeting of Organizations” so as to “elect a national coordinating body and build a united 
front that will allow for the organization and strengthening of the movement based on a single battle 
plan” (from a flier distributed by the organizations). Such a move towards unified organization never 
took place.  




work of “the usual suspects,” it is clear that public opinion stood overwhelmingly 
against the Combo. A survey made public on March 28 of that year calculated that 
12.4% of respondents had actively taken part in some form of protest action, and 
almost 70% supported them.165 A Cid-Gallup poll likewise found that opponents of 
the initiative outnumbered supporters by three to one,166 and a number of polls taken 
in the following months confirmed these results (PENDHS 2001 and 2002).  
As has been mentioned, the fact that the Rodríguez government eventually 
chose to remove the initiative “pending further national dialogue” was in itself not 
unusual, as previous administrations had done the same in light of more limited 
protests. The central question here is why the proposed privatization of the electric 
and communication industries provoked such a unified response on the part of Costa 
Rican civil society. Other than small entrepreneurial organizations and Chambers of 
Commerce, which supported the initiative as part of their vision of a Costa Rican 
economy integrated to the global market,167 government officials, scholars and 
mainstream media accounts all agreed that the public overwhelmingly rejected the 
Combo. The large set of organizations that made their presence known included many 
that had explicitly opposed neoliberal reform for years prior – political parties such as 
PFD and the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabajadores), labor unions, and civil society groups opposed to privatizations and 
free-trade agreements – but also a large number that had not – environmental, 
                                                 
165 Telephonic survey on “Costa Rican public opinion regarding the Combo ICE,” conducted on March 
24 and 25 by the Institute of Social Research and the Institute of Psychological Research, UCR. 
166 “Piden Posponer Instauración” in La Nación, 13 April 2000 
167 These include the Costa Rican Union of Private Enterprise Chambers and Associations (Unión 
Costarricense de Cámaras y Asociaciones de la Empresa Privada), the Chamber of Costa Rica-North 
America Commerce (Cámara de Comercio Costarricense-Norteamericana) and the Promoter of 




feminist, ecumenical, and advocacy groups, university and high school students, and 
organizations targeting corruption and looking for transparency and accountability.  
Although the focus of the fight was a proposed economic policy, to a large 
extent the language used by protest leaders and organizations emphasized the 
disillusionment of the population, the symbolic importance of the ICE as a “national 
institution,” and the fact that the negotiations involving the Combo “olían a chorizo” 
(smelled like corrupt dealings). Most organizations expressed themselves publicly 
using such language. Though some presented alternative plans to modernize and 
transform the ICE, they did not expect these to have an effect on popular 
mobilizations. The most popular signs and songs seen and heard during the 
demonstrations read: “El ICE es nuestro” (“the ICE is ours”) or “el ICE no se vende” 
(“the ICE is not for sale”), as well as many unprintable popular expressions about the 
politicians involved. The “theme” of the marches reflected more a concern about the 
institution than a sense that there was any chance to change national politics. 
Researchers noted the constant use of patriotic songs and symbols, “pointing to the 
importance that the historically-created institutionalization in the definition of cultural 
entities has on the identities of Costa Rican culture” (Garita 2001, p. 71). The national 
anthem as well as well-known patriotic and popular songs often accompanied the 
marches and gatherings. 
Regarding the spontaneous joining of unaffiliated individuals to the marches, 
some government officials and academics suggest that after the first, smaller wave of 
protests, media reports of police brutality against protesters – and especially their 




the public. One poll reports that almost 75% of Costa Ricans believed the police’s use 
of force as excessive (PIEOP 2000). The media may have also impacted the national 
mood with reports on the occurrence of anti-government protests during the same 
period in other Latin American countries (Ecuador’s in January, for example), which 
could have helped the option of protesting become more legitimate in the eyes of 
Costa Ricans, and of laws similar to the Combo being passed in other Central 
American countries, contributing to the feeling that the ICE would be handed over to 
foreign hands. The growing mistrust in politicians, reflected in declining electoral 
participation and exacerbated by corruption scandals, lead the population to suspect a 
priori any action of politicians, based on their past behavior, to be mainly designed to 
benefit the rich and powerful few.168  
As is clear by the declarations of organized groups as well as the slogans and 
chants of the massive demonstrations, the government “attack on the ICE” was seen 
as a betrayal of the principles that all Costa Rican’s had been taught in school – the 
legacy of an education system created and supported by the founding members of the 
PLN. At the same time, to claim that this was enough to mobilize the population at 
large would be an overstatement. As has been pointed out, government initiatives to 
privatize the banks and the national pensions system did not meet with broad 
opposition, highlighting both the symbolic importance of the ICE and the 
miscalculations of the Rodríguez administration in “selling” the Combo to the public. 
At issue here is not an attempt to establish causal mechanisms for the outbreak of 
                                                 
168 This point was brought up by a number of Costa Rican scholars, such as sociologist José Alberto 
Rodríguez, statistitian Carlos Paniagua, political scientist Rodolfo Cerdas, and economists Ottón Solís, 




protests, but to emphasize the way in which specific government actions were framed 
by organized civil society entities in order to attract popular support.  
 The protection of the ICE in 2000 became the universal demand – the “empty 
signifier,” as Laclau (2005) puts it – that came to encompass all the different groups 
in Costa Rican civil society. This is shown, for instance, by the decision of an 
important feminist organization, Women for Democracy (Mujeres por la 
Democracia), to change its name to Women against the Combo (Mujeres contra el 
Combo). The fight against the initiative was seen as one that concerned “the people” 
as a whole, even those that had more pressing concerns (such as the farmers) or those 
that would not necessarily be adversely affected by privatization. As is seen with the 
addition of the CGT to the protest movement in Argentina after the election of de la 
Rua to the presidency, some groups may have chosen to participate in the protests in 
the hopes that their interests, though not directly at issue, would come to be in the 
future. Nevertheless, even if this strategic mindset was prevalent, the adoption of the 
language and goals of the larger movement allowed for the impact of the national 
popular uprising.       
Demobilization 
Following the removal of the initiative from the public agenda – first, by the 
government’s admission that the public was against it and later by its being declared 
unconstitutional by the judiciary – the government endeavored to open a dialogue 
between the state and civil society. The catalyst for this process was indubitably the 
CME-ICE, composed of members of the PLN, PUSC, and PFD, as well as 




commission organized a number of debates and round tables to acquire feedback from 
civil society and the population at large, and came up with a long list of suggestions 
for reforming the ICE while essentially maintaining its monopoly on electricity and 
communications and its status as a publicly-owned autonomous institution. It is 
notable that Costa Ricans generally supported the creation of the CME-ICE, but had 
no illusions that it would solve the debate, or even that it represented a change in 
attitude on the part of the government.169 
The future of the ICE remains uncertain. During 2002 and 2003, international 
pressures to go ahead with privatization, principally from the United States, in 
relation to the Central American Free-Trade Agreement (CAFTA), forced the issue to 
return to the public agenda. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick warned the 
government that Costa Rica would be left out of CAFTA if it did not open the 
telecommunications industry to private competition.170 In 2005, Costa Rica became a 
signatory of CAFTA, which prompted some protests from the “usual suspects” but 
nothing approaching the intensity or magnitude of 2000.171 Having learned from its 
failed attempts, the administration of President Abel Pacheco (Rodríguez’s 
successor), with the support of the leadership of the PLN and private industry 
organizations, launched an extended campaign promoting CAFTA as beneficial for 
                                                 
169 59% of respondents in the UNIMER poll of June 2000 believed that the creation of the commission 
was mainly “a way to stop the protests” rather than “an appropriate way to attend to the demands of 
protesters” - “‘Combo’ Detonó la Frustración” in La Nación, 25 June 2000. 
170 La Nación, August 1, 2003 
171 The FCN, an umbrella of organizations opposed to the Combo and to privatizations, argued in a 
letter to George W. Bush that “we do not understand why your government attempts to impose on us a 
free trade agreement, which destroys our development model, the basis of our national culture and 
democratic institutions” – “Al Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América, De Las Organizaciones 
Agrupadas En El Movimiento Cívico Nacional y en la Plataforma Sindical Común Centroamericana 
(PSSC-COSTA RICA), sobre el Denominado Tratado de ‘Libre’ Comercio (TLC),” 17 February 2005 




the Costa Rican people. It is quite likely that an altered version of the Combo will 
return to the legislature for debate, and it is not at all clear that the popular response 
will resemble the one discussed here.  
After April 2000 the popular movement was greatly reduced. The 
organizations at the center of the protests continued to organize public actions, some 
quite large, but lacking the impact of the Combo protests. Research has shown that 
communication among civil society organizations is better, and attribute it to the 
strong ties developed during their shared experience in 2000 (Franceschi 2002, p. 16; 
2003, p. 24). Several groups that were active in 2000, after the relatively quiet years 
of 2001 and 2002,172 intensified collective actions with negotiations and the 
impending signing of CAFTA in 2003 and 2004. Among these were public-sector 
workers (ANEP, SINDEU, the ICE unions), agricultural unions (UPANACIONAL 
and others) and neighborhood associations. By contrast, university students, 
environmental organizations, and retired workers, all visible actors in 2000, did not 
(Mora 2004).173 The impending signing of CAFTA once again provoked resistance 
from civil society, but circumstances favorable to a nation-wide movement were 
absent.174 The demands of protests in 2003 and 2004 were a lot move varied and 
overlapped much less than in 2000 (Mora 2004, p. 9). While in the earlier year over 
                                                 
172 In 2002 there was a period of active protests and roadblocks by agrarian workers who owned 
machinery, truck drivers, and certain community organizations against a deal between the government 
and the Spanish company RITEVE regarding inspections of vehicles (Franceschi 2003, p. 9). 
173 Mora (2004) also notes that about 26% of the protests in 2000 were the work of “non-registered or 
“unidentified groups,” and these have not reappeared in later years (p. 4). 
174 A Cid-Gallup poll conducted in July 2000 found that the only measurable impacts of the Combo 
protests were the low approval ratings of President Rodríguez, the Legislative Assembly, and other 
governmental institutions. Respondents had high assessments of other political figures indirectly 
involved, such as former President Arias and PUSC political hopeful Abel Pacheco. Though 45% 
stated that they would consider voting for a “minority” party, only 11% said they were “very 




60% of all protests were directed at the government, the targets of protesters were 
subsequently much more diverse as well (Mora 2004, p. 14). Moreover, many 
organizations fell victim to internal leadership struggles (most notably, the PFD), and 
quickly lost the “political capital” they had accumulated during the 2000 protests.  
Although still very much unresolved, the national dispute over the Combo 
has, by all accounts, deeply affected Costa Rican politics. The political leadership has 
become more careful in its dealings with the public, and calls for national unity and 
dialogue are part and parcel of political rhetoric. For the first time in decades, a strong 
third party, the Citizen Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana – PAC) led by 
former PLN member and Combo-opponent Ottón Solís,175 presented a serious 
challenge to the two dominant powers in the 2002 elections, capturing a respectable 
portion of legislative seats and forcing an unprecedented runoff round in the 
presidential race. The 2002 victor, PUSC candidate Abel Pacheco, a popular former 
television personality, saw his popularity plummet once in power. In October 2004, 
only weeks after former President Rodríguez was voted as head of the Organization 
of American States (OAS), he was forced to resign his post and return to Costa Rica 
to face corruption charges. Former Presidents Calderón Fournier and Figueres Olsen 
were also indicted, the latter choosing to remain outside of Costa Rica (see Lehoucq 
2005). The attorney general, Francisco Dall’Anesse, was praised by political figures 
                                                 
175 The PAC was officially founded in December 2000 with the motto “we, the people, decided to 





and the general public for helping restore the trust of Costa Ricans in their justice 
system.176  
To remind the political class that the “voice of the people” was not completely 
silent, the four major national universities organized a March against Corruption on 
October 11, 2004. They received the support of the FCN, the unions, and the NGO’s, 
and the march was attended by tens of thousands of people. President Pacheco, who 
had benefited in the polls following the Combo protests, attempted to join the 
marching crowds but was booed and heckled until he was forced to leave. “The 
people’s reaction is incredible,” was the only available quote from the President.177 
In the February 2006 elections, former President Oscar Arias (one of the 
architects of the neoliberal turn and the current leader of the PLN) was allowed to run 
for a second term in office after a Constitutional amendment. His victory seemed 
assured, but PAC candidate Solís took advantage of Pacheco’s dismal approval 
ratings at the end of his tenure and of Arias’ support for CAFTA to provoke a virtual 
tie in the Presidential race. Although Arias ultimately emerged victorious, the PUSC 
was badly damaged, making the PAC (a party that grew out of the Combo events) the 
second strongest force in Costa Rican politics.   
Conclusions – Civil Society and the State in Costa Rica 
The historical development of civil society in Costa Rica through the twentieth 
century parallels that of Argentina in some respects. In the early part of the century, 
Calderón Guardia became the center of political conflict, establishing strong ties with 
organized labor and other sectors of society but strongly opposed by established 
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elites. Once Calderón’s party was removed from power, Figueres and the PLN 
retained many aspects of his socio-economic reform program and successfully created 
a new “core national narrative” that attained hegemonic status in Costa Rica. Thus, 
while Argentina continued to sufferer the consequences of the conflict between Perón 
and his enemies, Figueres was able to secure support from organized labor and most 
important civil society actors through co-optation and a proven record of success in 
terms of economic growth and social development. The decision to turn to neoliberal 
economic policies, as in Argentina, meant not the rise of new political elites but the 
continued dominance of the major political forces. In both countries, the direction the 
country was to take on economic policy came to conflict with the core narrative that 
had been present in the country for so long, and this was instrumental in the ability of 
a variety of civil society groups to see themselves as being engaged in essentially the 
same fight. 
The popular movement of resistance against the state in 2000 arose out of the 
multiplicity of groups within civil society finding a common demand – the removal of 
the Combo initiative – and acting in concert for a relatively short period of time. In 
contrast to Argentina, where “que se vayan todos” was more an expression of 
frustration than a specific demand, victory for the Costa Rican mobilizations was 
embodied in a clear objective. Yet, a number of other grievances brought these 
groups together: public anger at the political class, the perception of corrupt dealings 
underlying the Combo negotiations, the government’s ignoring of public opinion, the 
symbolic significance of the ICE as the representative of a welfare state based on 




that held the popular coalition together was not a vision of radical democracy or an 
outright rejection of neoliberal policy – though several of organizations espouse the 
latter and a few the former – but a combination of concerns over an uncertain 
economic future, disillusionment with the political system, and a nostalgic 
recollection of the country’s “golden age.”  
The process of growth of the movement fits the general features seen in the 
Argentina case as well. A core of established organizations, mostly labor unions and 
left-wing parties, engaged in a prolonged struggle against the economic adjustment 
program, decided to concentrate their efforts on opposing the Combo. Joined by 
university student federations, which proved extremely receptive to the message that 
the ICE should be protected, they initiated a cycle of protests against the initiative. 
They were subsequently joined by other active organizations that abandoned their 
primary demands in favor of the immediate goal of defeating the Combo, a large 
number of other civil society groups (additional unions, NGO’s, feminist and 
environmental organizations, and so forth), and eventually by an important portion of 
the public at large. This heterogeneous set of groups from Costa Rican civil society 
never formed an institutionalized social movement, but over the course of several 
weeks acted together in pursuit of a common aim. Once the battle was won, however, 
it was followed by a rapid demobilization on the part of the great majority of 
participants, who either abandoned collective struggle altogether or directed it 






The long-maintained claim of the state workers’ unions – that the wave of 
privatizations and structural transformations of the economy would mean the end of 
the national welfare system – finally found receptive ears among a population 
enraged by political corruption and secrecy, and disenchanted with the political 
system. In a duel of conflicting messages the political leadership was defeated; 
partially due to lack of effort in presenting a case which it assumed tacit consent for, 
but also to the energetic and committed actions of their opponents. By early April, 
hundreds of columns of university and high school students and teachers would join 
large marches of workers and political activists, while across the country roads were 
blocked and commerce paralyzed. Again, the call was for leaders to respect the true 
meaning of democracy, understood as the basis of the “solidary” state, and not as the 
retreat of the state from social and economic affairs. Discussions of the impossibility 
of creating real change in a state-centered society (central to some piqueteros and 
asambleas in Argentina, as well as to a number of theorists) were limited in Costa 
Rica to academic circles, fringe organizations, and internet forums. 
Yet, as in Argentina, the energy required to form a popular front of opposition 
reliant on active participation of the citizenry at large proved to dissipate quickly. 
Some conditions that favored the return to normalcy were the widely praised criminal 
investigations against former presidents involved in corrupt dealings, as well as 
government attempts to clearly communicate its position regarding CAFTA to the 
citizenry and to allow for more open debates on the issue, which suggest an 
understanding of the need for more transparency. The surprisingly strong showing of 




monopoly on political power, which should be taken as a good sign for Costa Rican 
democracy, but which also helps defuse the notion that non-institutional action is 
either urgent or necessary.   
 The strong presence of protest and other forms of collective protest in Costa 
Rica since 2000, however, seems to indicate that while such protest movements are 
hard to maintain, they may arise again in the future. As Albert Hirschman (1988) has 
pointed out, citizens are more likely to participate in collective action if they have 
done so in the past (p. 8). The national governments in both Argentina and Costa Rica 
seem aware that, as surprising as they were, the fact that popular movements of the 
magnitude seen in recent years arose in their countries probably means that they 
could again. The potential for such responses represents an insurance policy of sorts 
in case of serious breaches of legitimacy or accountability, which are so fundamental 
for democratic governance. December 19/20 and the Combo protests, like other 
historical examples of popular rebellion, are in the process of taking their place in the 
continuing narrative of their respective countries. Whether they will be the first of 
many instances of conflict between states and societies in the coming years, as they 









Chapter 5:  Fragile Democracy in the Andes 
 
Hirschman’s (1988) observation that previous participation in collective 
action is an important contributor to mass mobilization is demonstrated clearly in the 
Andean nations of Ecuador and Bolivia, which have experienced a series of popular 
insurrections over the past decade. In contrast to Argentina or Costa Rica, which have 
historically enjoyed the presence of large middle-classes and a lack of ethno-cultural 
conflicts, both of these countries are characterized by the presence of large 
indigenous populations (a majority in Bolivia), intense distrust among different 
geographic regions, and military conflicts with their neighbors. Predictably, the 
common ills of Latin American politics – corruption, an unwillingness of elites to 
open up politics to new actors, lack of legitimacy, and general discontent with the 
political system – are also very much present. 
 Although their historical development, as well as the current social and 
political conditions in Bolivia and Ecuador are so at variance with the Argentine and 
Costa Rican cases, it seems appropriate to include them in this study. Its primary goal 
is not to find direct parallels between the cases or the formation of their respective 
popular movements, but to examine a fundamental aspect of the relationship between 
a mobilized civil society and the state. While some of the main actors in the present 
two cases are concerned with cultural, as well as socio-economic and political, issues, 
they also engaged in processes of framing or articulation of demands and grievances 
that would elicit a response from the population at large. In doing so, they tapped into 




reduced to reactionary attempts to return to a pre-modern existence. What is more, the 
fact that some similarities do exist in the ways in which the general popular 
dissatisfaction with the state and political leaders between Bolivia and Ecuador, on 
the one hand, and Argentina and Costa Rica reveals some important aspects of 
contemporary politics in Latin America as a whole.    
  Even more so than in Argentina, the economic transitions towards neoliberal 
economic models were intimately linked to the advent of democracy in the 1980’s in 
both Andean nations. As a result, socio-economic grievances have not been wholly 
separate from debates about the nature of democracy, particularly following the 
appearance of indigenous and peasant social movements that highlighted the plights 
of those excluded by traditional political and economic arrangements. Military 
governments, in fact, have often seemed more concerned for the broad promotion of 
social welfare than democratic ones in both Ecuador and Bolivia, placing support for 
democracy in these two nations among the lowest in the region (Latinobarómetro 
2005). Comprehensive welfare states such as Costa Rica’s were also never 
assembled, leaving a large portion of the population (particularly Indians) with little 
assistance from the state. There is seemingly less reason to expect the type of 
generalized nostalgia for the past that was evident in protests in Argentina and Costa 
Rica, particularly among peasant and indigenous movements. Yet, as studies of 
indigenous movements have shown, this tendency to look back is evident in them as 
well.    
 The process of formation and growth of the indigenous movement in Ecuador 




the main driving forces behind it were the economic crisis of the 1980’s, the rise of 
indigenous candidates to local positions of power, and the switch of the political 
discourse of popular leaders from class-based Marxism to ethnic-centered calls for 
restitution and inclusion (Beck and Mijeski 2001; Ospina 2000, pp. 132-133; Zamosc 
1994). Deborah Yashar (2005) argues that these movements were mobilized as a 
response to changes in “citizen regimes.” Instead of looking at the changes of the 
early 1980’s as purely economic, she refers to “corporatist citizen regimes” and 
“neoliberal citizen regimes.” While the former allowed for relatively autonomous 
indigenous spaces, the latter denied them and hence provide the motive for 
mobilization. The creation of community networks and the opening of political spaces 
due to the transitions to democracy provided the means and opportunity (see esp. Ch. 
2, pp. 59-60). This argument supports the idea that indigenous groups shared with 
many others during broad civil society mobilizations certain “nostalgia” for the 
corporatist past. 
 Given the success of these movements in extracting concessions from local 
and national governments – considerably more than Madres or the piqueteros in 
Argentina, for example – and the visibility of “Indian faces in media depictions” of 
protests in Bolivia and Ecuador (Postero 2004) it is commonly assumed that the 
repeated confrontations between civil society and the state signal primarily a rift 
among competing ethnic groups. This, as is seen below, is not the case. The popular 
uprisings against a series of presidents in Ecuador and Bolivia have encompassed the 
type of cross-class and cross-groups alliances seen in the previous cases. In 




movements it is possible to identify processes similar to those seen in Argentina and 
Costa Rica. While many groups formed from the grass-roots take leading roles in 
mass mobilizations, their demands for recognition of specific cultural rights take a 
back seat to concerns about national sovereignty and states “selling” important 
resources to foreign interests. The paradoxical goals of encouraging pluralistic civil 
societies and unifying to confront the state are highlighted in these expressions of 
national unity. Despite very different historical contexts and paths of development, 
the protest cycles in Ecuador and Bolivia provide an opportunity to expand the 
inquiry of the relationship between civil societies and states in contemporary Latin 
America.    
Ecuador: Democracy in the ‘Post-Liberal’ Age 
Unlike the authoritarian regimes in countries like Argentina and Chile, the 
military government that ruled Ecuador between 1972 and 1979 designed an 
economic plan of domestic industrialization, land reform, and subsidies for the urban 
poor based on the profits brought by the country’s oil exports. It was also much less 
repressive in its dealings with political opposition than its counterparts in other 
countries and less resistant to democratic change.  Immediately after the transition to 
democratic rule in 1979 (the first “third-wave” transition in South America), the 
country’s leaders attempted to expand this economic program, but were hit hard by 
the end of the oil boom and the debt crisis. In 1982 Ecuador signed its first 
preliminary agreement with the IMF, the beginning of a long process towards 
liberalization that would be slowed by instability in both institutional and non-




parties: Popular Democracy (Democracia Popular – DP), Democratic Left (Izquierda 
Democrática – ID), Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano – PSC) and 
Ecuadorian Rodolcist Party (Partido Roldocista Ecuatoriano – PRE). None of these 
four is strongly institutionalized (Peeler 2004, p. 82), and they reflect historical 
regional animosities in Ecuador, as the first two are supported mostly in the capital of 
Quito and the second in the coastal city of Guayaquil (the country’s largest). As will 
be seen below, the unstable political climate would prove fertile for the growth of 
strong grass-roots social movements.    
As elsewhere in Latin America, economic instability provoked popular anger 
and protests during the 1980’s (Walton 2001). But in 1990 the confrontations 
between society and the state shifted dramatically, with the abrupt entrance to the 
political arena of indigenous social movements. In what came to be known as the Inti 
Raymi uprising, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador 
(Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador – CONAIE) adopted the 
mantel of leadership of many of Ecuador’s indigenous communities178 and led 
marches of thousands of indigenous Ecuadorians to Quito demanding land for their 
communities as well as cultural and citizenship rights that, they felt, had never been 
truly available in a purportedly mestizo country (Lucero 2001, Zibechi 2004; Yashar 
2005). Their demands were explicitly articulated in a list of “16 points” which, as 
Yashar (2005) notes, included ethnic, citizenship, and class (or economic) issues:  
In Ecuador, the “problem of the Indian” is not simply pedagogical, ecclesiastical or 
 administrative, as the dominant sectors would have it: it is fundamentally an 
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economic,  socio-political, and ethno-cultural problem; it is a national problem that can 
only be  solved with the participation of society as a whole.179   
 
A second mobilization was launched to coincide with the 500th anniversary of 
Columbus’ arrival to the Americas, in 1992, and a third took place in June of 1994, 
prompted by government attempts to introduce a new agrarian law. In the latter event, 
CONAIE called for the formation of an Agrarian Front (Coordiandora Agraria) 
along with two other major ethnic organizations, the National Federation of Farmer, 
Indigenous, and Black Organizations (Federación Nacional de Organizaciones 
Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras – FENOCIN) and the Ecuadorian Federation of 
Evangelical Indians (Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos – FEINE). 
The movements proved well-organized, capable of mobilizing large numbers of 
people, and showed a clear political program, and in all three occasions successfully 
pressured the national government to negotiate compromises. Not only were they able 
to force the government to rescind the proposed law in 1994, they were intimately 
involved in the drafting of its alternative (Ospina 2000, p. 136; Yashar 2005, pp. 147-
148).180 
Almost from the start, therefore, indigenous organizations proved capable of 
working together in the pursuit of common goals. In this early period, they already 
opposed economic liberalization, but concentrated on policy issues regarding Indian 
ownership of land, political representation, and respect for traditional cultural 
practices, despite the fact that the movements represented different religious 
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affiliations. Those early successes would place the indigenous front, and most 
especially CONAIE, in a position of influence among other social movements not 
unlike that of Madres in Argentina.  
 Other organizations also made their presence felt in the early 1990’s. Though 
the traditionally-influential United Front of Workers (Frente Unido de Trabajadores 
– FUT) was on the decline (general strikes had proven ineffective in the 1980’s and 
the number of labor protests had diminished considerable – see Zamosc 2004, p. 134), 
some labor unions had success when opposing the government. The National Union 
of Educators (Unión Nacional de Educadores – UNE) developed ties with parents 
and students and called for national strikes, road blockages, and demonstrations 
against proposed cuts in public education and pension plans for educators. They were 
supported by unions and peasant organizations and, despite a strong repressive 
response from the government (particularly in 1993), emerged with significant 
concessions (Miranda 2003, pp. 10-11). In 1994 and 1995 peasants from the National 
Federation of Affiliates to the Farmers Social Security (Federación Unica Nacional 
de Afiliados al Seguro Social Campesino – FEUNASC) organized protests against an 
attempt to eliminate the social security program for farmers, and were bolstered by 
support from CONAIE (Zamosc 2004, p. 135). University and high school students 
began to mobilize as well and took to the streets in large numbers in late 1994 and 
early 1995 to protest budget cuts aimed at public education (Miranda 2003, p. 11).  
 By the middle of the decade there was an identifiable core of movements and 
organizations that opposed structural adjustment that, as in Argentina, consistently 




privatizations and budget-slashing austerity measures. Although its statement of basic 
principles revolves around advocating for the rights of indigenous communities, the 
unification of these communities in a common struggle, and the eventual creation of a 
“plurinational state,”181 CONAIE developed alliances with unions of state industries 
slated for privatization and other groups opposed to economic liberalization. Their 
efforts saw little success in terms of curbing economic change, however, for a number 
of reasons. First, CONAIE and the rest of the indigenous movements still focused on 
their primary agenda. Despite indigenous peoples comprising less than half of the 
total population of Ecuador,182 CONAIE and its allies were able to achieve the 
establishment of a national bilingual education program, and a number of protections 
on indigenous land and cultural rights.183 As long as they received concessions on that 
front, these groups were not ready to antagonize the government completely. A 
second obstacle for the opposition movement was its inability to overcome the 
historical animosities between regions in the country, which often took center stage. 
As the four dominant parties moved closer to each other in terms of their economic 
platforms, it became increasingly difficult to find a conduit to express demands on 
those issues. Finally, the impetus of social mobilizations was reduced by the outbreak 
of military conflict between Ecuador and its neighbor Peru over territorial 
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p. 135) but concede that the total could be much higher.  
183 León Zamosc points out that CONAIE routinely stood behind causes that did not directly apply to 
indigenous claims, but that the organization was very good at taking advantage of the instability 





disagreements and the subsequent government call for patriotic union in the face of 
an external threat (Beck and Mijeski 2001).184 Much like in the cases seen in previous 
chapters, these limiting factors on mobilization were gradually overcome as the 
decade progressed.    
 The structural adjustment program begun timidly in 1982 was at the center of 
President Sixto Durán-Ballén’s presidency (1992-1996), and continued to be for all of 
his successors. CONAIE supported protests against the increasingly inflexible 
neoliberal direction of successive governments, and encouraged the formation of a 
Social Movement Front (Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales – CSM) – though 
CONAIE never officially joined it (Tamayo 1996; Beck and Mijeski 2001). The 
potential influence of the social movements on society at large was not fully 
understood until Durán-Ballén, counting in part on the nationalistic fervor raised by 
the border-war, proposed a number of economic adjustments to be voted by national 
referendum in the form of eleven separate initiatives. The CSM, CONAIE, and the 
unions began a frenetic “popular education” campaign under the slogan “once veces 
NO” (“eleven times NO”), and all of the initiatives were voted down, sending a strong 
message to the political leadership (Miranda 2003, p. 12; Zamosc 2004, p. 136).  
 Still, the success of the opposition showed a marked division among social 
sectors in the country, given that the middle and upper classes for the most part 
supported the economic restructuring. Not coincidentally, Durán-Ballén has the 
distinction of being the last Ecuadorian president, so far, to serve an entire term in 
office. The victory of CONAIE and the CSM over his referendum would mark the 
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beginning of an unprecedented period of social protest and conflict, as well as severe 
political instability, which has yet to end. But rather than showing that the popular 
sectors could, if organized, defeat policy proposals they perceived as harmful, the 
popular opposition against national elected officials in the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s would bring together poor Ecuadorians with their traditional counterparts. 
Durán-Ballén’s successor was Abdalá Bucaram, a former Olympic sprinter 
and mayor of Guayaquil. Knows as “el Loco” (“the madman”), Bucaram combined a 
flamboyant oratory style, a penchant for attention-grabbing stunts, an image as a 
sports magnate,185 and the local support of the coastal areas to eek out a victory in a 
closely contested election.186 He immediately set to weaken the indigenous movement 
by creating a Ministry of Indian Affairs (Zamosc 2004, p. 137), but was unsuccessful 
in this effort given the respect CONAIE already commanded across the spectrum of 
social organizations. He was also unable to secure support in Congress. His clownish 
public style and his image as corrupt were enough to prompt demonstrations against 
him only months after he assumed the presidency. In a risky maneuver, Bucaram 
nevertheless unveiled an economic modernization program less than six months into 
his administration. Protests against corruption quickly turned to a movement against 
the new economic policies, of which Bucaram’s political adversaries took full 
advantage. In a bizarre episode, Congress declared Bucaram unfit to fulfill his 
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responsibilities due to “mental defect,” and replaced him with Speaker of Congress 
Fabián Alarcón, bypassing Vice-President Rosalia Arteaga.187  
The demonstrations against Bucaram would prove mild when compared with 
the massive uprisings that would plague his successors, but they do provide some 
signs of the general shape the conflict between state and civil society in Ecuador 
would adopt. As Pablo Miranda (2003) has noted, the protests were not class-based. 
The Socialist Party was an ally of the Bucaram government, and there were several 
middle-class demonstrations against his policies. The content of the protests was not 
radical in its demands for change, particularly economic change (Zamosc 2004, p. 
144). Under the leadership of CONAIE, protesting groups instead extracted a promise 
from Congress to call for a Constituent Assembly soon after Bucaram was deposed. 
Moreover, the continued success of the social movements to pressure the state this 
time was bolstered by the presence of the Pachakutik Party, created by CONAIE and 
other groups to compete in the 1996 elections. The Plurinational Unity Movement 
Pachakutik – New Country (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo 
País) was the result of a turn in CONAIE’s ideological position. After explicitly 
rejecting representative liberal democratic politics as sufficient for the advancement 
of the indigenous cause, the movement’s leadership decided to actively participate in 
the electoral game.188 In the 1996 elections, Pachakutik placed eight indigenous 
individuals in Congress, 10% of the total seats. Its presidential candidate, Freddy 
Ehlers, received about 17% of the presidential ballots.  
                                                 
187 Arteaga was actually president for two days, between February 9 and February 11, 1997, after 
challenging the constitutionality of Alarcón’s appointment. The Supreme Court eventually rejected her 
appeal and Alarcón took the presidential seat once more.  




The period between the fall of Bucaram and the next presidential election in 
1998 saw the drafting of a new National Constitution that, among other changes, 
aimed to decentralize national politics (including raising the number of seats in 
Congress and the role of regional functionaries). This, in addition to previous 
victories by CONAIE and the social movements, should have translated into political 
gains for Pachakutik, but it did not. In the 1998 elections, Ehlers received only about 
12% of the vote, and the percentage of Pachakutik members of Congress dropped to 
6% (Beck and Mijeski 2001). The temporary support on the part of many indigenous 
voters for a particular wave of protests did not lead to gains for the political groups 
that supposedly embodied them. Then again, the very foundation of Pachakutik might 
have been a strategic mistake in a country with one of the lowest levels of support for 
democratic institutions in the region.189 
Jamil Mahuad’s tenure as President of Ecuador resembles de la Rua’s in 
Argentina in a number of ways. As a candidate of the center-left DP, Mahuad had 
been defeated in previous presidential elections, so in 1998 he formed an alliance 
with the more conservative PSC, and defeated Alvaro Noboa of the PRE in a second 
round vote.190 Mahuad’s campaign promises included signing a peace agreement with 
Peru, the reduction of the federal deficit and tempering of the economic crisis, and an 
ambitious program to reduce poverty. Though he succeeded in doing the first, the 
economy’s precipitous decline eliminated all possibility of a comprehensive welfare 
package.  
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in the Congress. Only 28% of Ecuadorians believe that “democracy can solve their problems” (data 
quoted in Lucero 2001, p. 60). 
190 The results of the 1998 election, including Pachakutik’s disappointing performance, reflect a 




Like de la Rua, Mahuad was encouraged by economic advisors and by the 
IMF to design an economic austerity plan, which he unveiled initially on September 
1998 and was immediately decried in massive protests by the unions, the indigenous 
organization (including CONAIE), and their usual allies on the left. In an increasingly 
unstable environment Mahuad’s second proposed package of reforms coincided with 
a precipitous devaluation of the Sucre (the national currency) against the dollar in 
March of 1999, leading to a temporary closing of banks so as to prevent the massive 
withdrawal of dollar accounts. The usual coalition of movements in protest was 
joined by angry small and mid-sized businessmen and other middle-class groups 
(Zamosc 2004, p. 139). In July of that year, supporters and leaders of the right-wing 
PSC marched alongside CONAIE and their allies to protest sharp increases in fuel 
prices; they also demanded the government reduce its subsidies for healthcare. PSC 
leaders León Febres Cordero and Jaime Nebot proclaimed that “the resignation, 
impeachment, removal, or revocation of [the President’s] mandate are the means to 
bolster democracy and respect the Constitution.”191 Mahuad (again, like de la Rua) 
elected to appoint an economy minister with “emergency powers,” Guillermo Lasso, 
to restructure the national economy. The subsequent Mahuad-Lasso plan, based on 
the dollarization of the Sucre (inspired by the Menem-Cavallo convertibility plan) 
provided the spark that ignited the next wave of protests. 
CONAIE and a large net of social movements proved the strength of their 
camp by creating a Parliament of Peoples (Parlamento de los Pueblos), to re-create 
democratic decision-making from below. This “parliamentary” body called for 
                                                 




continued civil disobedience against Mahuad’s policies (Lucero 2001, p. 63). In a 
press release, CONAIE declared that: 
The National Parliament of the Peoples of Ecuador, democratically constituted by 
twenty one provincial parliaments, innumerable community, cantonal, and 
neighborhood parliaments has assumed the direct exercise of national sovereignty to 
save the Republic of Ecuador from national dissolution brough about by Jamil 
Mahuad’s decision to renounce monetary sovereignty by substituting the sucre, our 
historic monetary symbol, with the dollar.192 
 
That the “historic monetary symbol” was part of the historic regime that 
excluded indigenous populations that CONAIE was created to oppose points to the 
ability of this movement to adopt a situation-specific language. Opposition to the 
Mahuad plan and the attempt to join other organizations seemingly superseded the 
need for a consistent message on CONAIE’s part. The strategy proved successful: the 
coalition against Mahuad came to included many traditional opponents of CONAIE, 
and brought the country to a standstill.  
Between January 13 and 21, 2000, the type of festive/combative climate of 
social protest that would occur in Costa Rica in March of that year and in Argentina 
in late 2001 took over the streets of all the major cities in Ecuador. Hundreds of 
mobilizations, roadblocks, and middle- and upper- class demonstrations were 
reported, though this insurrection would have a different conclusion. A segment of 
the armed forces, led by Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, had been rumored to be plotting to 
remove Mahuad from power. In a maneuver that would later earn it criticism from 
several allies,193 CONAIE joined Gutiérrez’s forces and on January 21 executed a 
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bloodless coup d’etat. A Junta of National Salvation, composed of Gutiérrez, 
CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, and former Supreme Court Chief Justice Carlos 
Solórzano assumed power, though Gutiérrez ceded his seat to General Carlos 
Mendoza, once the brass of the Armed Forces officially withdrew its support for 
Mahuad. Hours later, facing strong international pressure, Mendoza allowed Gustavo 
Noboa, Mahuad’s Vice-President, to assume power.     
Although CONAIE proclaims the events of January 21 as a victory for the 
popular movement,194 the leaders of some left-leaning organizations charged that they 
had been deliberately excluded as part of an agreement between CONAIE and the 
military (Lucero 2001, pp. 67-68). The broader response from the population was one 
of relief at the return to institutional democratic norms (Zamosc 2004). Despite the 
fact that CONAIE attained the most visibility, it would be a mistake to interpret the 
protests of January 2000 as an “indigenous uprising.” As can be seen, they signaled 
the temporary convergence of indigenous groups, poor-people’s organizations, the 
middle-classes, and the conservative elites against Mahuad’s dollarization plan and 
the fuel price-hike specifically, and against Mahuad personally more generally. In 
fact, almost exactly a year later, CONAIE and the rest of the “popular front” 
organized yet another uprising against Noboa’s economic package. This time, 
however, Noboa had the support of DP (his own party), of the PSC, and of the 
business community (Lucero 2001, p. 68). Furthermore, polls showed the general 
public to be more receptive to the idea of dollarization.195 Without middle- and upper-
class participation, it was easier for the government to paint the protests as the acts of 
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criminals and dangerous groups, to apply more violent forms of control (several 
deaths were reported in late January and early February of 2001), and to achieve a 
more favorable deal for the government from negotiations with protesting groups. On 
the other hand, Noboa, like Bucaram, was the target of increasing allegations of 
corruption. But it appears that the angry masses did not go as far in the January 2001 
protest wave as they had a year earlier because of the presence of a viable electoral 
alternative for the 2002 elections: none other than former Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez 
and his newly formed Patriotic Society January 21 Party (Sociedad Patriótica 21 de 
Enero).  
Behind the support of CONAIE, Pachakutik, and other social movements, as 
well as those parts of the citizenry impressed with his willingness to give up power 
peacefully in 2000, Gutiérrez won the presidency convincingly, with over 55% of the 
total vote. Gutiérrez had also supported prosecuting former presidents Buacaram and 
Noboa, both of whom were in exile, for corruption during his campaign. Given his 
military background and the support he received from the social movements, he was 
compared to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. Unlike Chávez, however, Gutiérrez 
backed a plan to move ahead with austerity measures and privatizations; popular 
opposition was soon to follow. There was a consistent opposition front led by 
CONAIE and the CMS, despite the presence of Pachakutik representatives in high 
post in the national government. Yet, data shows that the number and intensity of 
protests in Ecuador actually went down between 2003 and 2004, at the same time as 
the opposition movement restarted its offensive “though with little receptivity from 




Once again, the opposition came to be joined by various sectors of civil 
society when particular events galvanized public displeasure. The tide began to turn 
in earnest against Gutiérrez after municipal elections in October of 2004 (Unda 
2005). Disappointing results for his party led to the formation of a coalition between 
Gutiérrez’s party and the conservative faction of Abdalá Bucaram’s PRE. In 
exchange for PRE’s support, Gutiérrez substituted most 27 out of 31 members of the 
Supreme Court in December.  
It was this political move, rather than the economic proposals, that provoked 
the rapid increase in popular protests and the gradual unification of various protesting 
groups during the first months of 2005. The realignment of the Supreme Court was 
decried as a dictatorial move by the PSC, ID, and Pachakutik, as the indigenous party 
was welcomed by the opposition and an inter-class alliance was created. The chant of 
“fuera Lucio” (“out with Lucio”) became predominant, along with “que se vayan 
todos,” a deliberate nod to the Argentine uprising of 2001. On March 31, the 
president of the Supreme Court announced that corruption charges against three ex-
presidents – Bucaram, Gustavo Noboa, and Alberto Dahik – were to be dropped. The 
Gutiérrez government was condemned not only as dictatorial, but as complicit with 
systemic corruption and hypocritical to boot, given his anti-corruption rhetoric during 
the presidential campaign. Bucaram’s return to the country days letter prompted an 
explosion of protests, which paralyzed the country.196 On April 20, Congress voted to 
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remove Gutiérrez from the Presidency for willfully violating the separation of 
powers. Like in 2003, the police had forcefully confronted protestors, particularly in 
the week of April 13-20. On the 20 the chief of police resigned and the Chief of Staff 
of the armed forces announced that they no longer supported the President. Bucaram, 
Noboa, and Dahik, now joined by Gutiérrez, fled into exile as Alfredo Palacios 
assumed the Presidency with a new promise of constitutional reform. 
Demobilization has never truly occurred in Ecuador, as many of the 
participants in the previous waves of protest continue to be active in pursuit of 
politica and socio-economic goals. Rather, while CONAIE and others have attempted 
to continue forcing the state’s hand by paralyzing the country through further 
“invasions” of the capital city (as in March 2006), they have not received the type of 
support necessary for a shakeup at the highest reaches of government. In part, this is 
due to a wait-and-see attitude among Ecuadorians, in expectations of new Presidential 
elections in late 2006. As interim President, Palacios has publicly considered the 
possibility of nationalizig parts of Ecuador’s energy resources, a key demand of a 
large number of actors in the protests. With the outcome of elections uncertain, it is a 
distinc possibility that Ecuador has not seen the last of its current struggles with 
political instability.   
The three cases of “interrupted presidencies” caused by nation-wide protests 
in Ecuador in recent years are similar to those discussed in more detailed in the 
previous two chapters, though with certain crucial differences. Even though social 
protest in Ecuador is, as a rule, dominated by CONAIE and its allies, the events that 




of concerted action by very dissimilar actors within civil society. Each group 
certainly had its own agenda, but the choice to demonstrate jointly among normally 
antagonistic groups points to some commonalities across class, ethnic, and regional 
differences. Crucially, the three interrupted presidencies strongly suggest that the 
presence of a significant core group of anti-neoliberal organizations and movements 
was not enough to constitute a popular uprising. Instead, Bucaram’s corrupt practices 
and his bizarre governing style allowed opponents in Congress and the Supreme 
Court to act against him. Mahuad was perceived as acting undemocratically given his 
rapid enactment of stringent austerity measures and a corralito-like limit on bank 
accounts, which directly affected businesses and the middle classes. The deep 
financial crisis and opposition by important sectors of the military precipitated his 
demise. Mahuad’s expulsion through a military-led coup provoked worries in the 
international community, and breaks the pattern of respect for institutional rules seen 
in the previous cases, but the military brass’ decision to return to democratic rule 
almost immediately reflects broad support for democratic rules. The insurrection 
against Gutiérrez, after all, was prompted by his dismissal of the courts rather than his 
economic policies alone.   
The ability of CONAIE and the CSM to galvanize public opposition to these 
presidents through their ability to mobilize large numbers of people and through their 
experience in recognizing and stating their grievances clearly was fundamental for the 
development of public opposition. At the same time, it appears that in agreeing to join 
with congressional opponents of the successive presidents the social movements were 




nature of the Ecuadorian electoral environment, social opposition against a particular 
candidate served the purposes of other established parties. This pattern changed with 
the rise in popularity of Gutiérrez, who was believed to continue the trend of left-
wing presidents initiated by the election of Chávez in Venezuela. Instead, Gutiérrez 
alienated the social movements, suggesting that the rise in massive popular opposition 
is just as likely to occur against formerly popular figures.  
The case of Ecuador shows that changes in the political environment also 
affect the mobilizing capacity of social movements. Before 2002, the poorer sectors 
(Indians, peasants, and blue-collar urban workers) found themselves in a position 
similar to their counterparts in Argentina and Costa Rica: faced with economic 
policies that seemed to exacerbate their material troubles, they had no electoral 
alternative and were forced to choose among competing elites (Pachakutik, the 
indigenous party, was never a viable alternative, since its platform attracted mostly 
activists Indians intent on changing the Constitution). This explains, in part, the 
massive participation in collective action against Bucaram and Mahuad. The lack of a 
similar response to Noboa’s equally drastic economic measures was due partly to the 
absence of a particular event to spark public anger, but also of the presence of an 
electoral alternative in Gutiérrez, the ally of the people. The fears of elites within and 
outside of Ecuador that Gutiérrez would turn Ecuador into a copy of Chávez’s 
Venezuela were allayed by the rapid turn of the established social movements against 
their former partner. That this last popular insurrection revolved around the protection 




assumption that Latin American social movements wish to engage in an all-out attack 
on liberal democracy.   
Bolivia’s Popular Wars 
Perhaps in no other country in the region were the transitions to democracy and to 
neoliberal economic policies as intimately linked as in Bolivia. Hernán Siles Zuazo 
was democratically elected as President in 1982, but inherited a deep economic crisis 
(met with widespread protests, of course) and a military that still was dubious about 
its desire to completely relinquish power. It was the “governability pact” of 1985 
between the traditional political parties – the centre-right Nationalist Revolutionary 
Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario – MNR), the right wing 
National Democratic Action (Acción Democrática Nacional - ADN), led by former 
dictator Hugo Bánzer, and the center left (despite its name) Revolutionary Left 
Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria – MIR) headed by Jaime Paz 
Zamora – that established the rules of the democratic game for the following two 
decades (Domingo 2005, pp. 1730-1731). The leaders of all the major political blocs 
supported the New Economic Policy Law, or Decree 21060, which was passed in 
1985 and quickly put an end to hyperinflation.    
Between 1985 and 2003 the governability pact worked well enough, with 
Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989) of the MNR, Paz Zamora (1989-1993) of the 
MIR, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997) of the MNR, and Bánzer (1997-2002) 
able to complete their constitutionally-allowed tenures.197 As can be expected, this 
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did not preclude social and political conflicts. While the elite-led parties competed for 
power, labor unions led by the Bolivian Workers’ Central (Central Obrera Boliviana 
– COB) consistently mobilized to protest the successive administrations’ economic 
policies, joined by left-wing parties and groups.198 New populist parties, supported by 
the urban poor and informal-sector workers, attempted to enter the electoral fray, 
though with little success.199 As in Ecuador, indigenous organizations flourished in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, putting aside historical animosities to form a coalition 
designed to protect tribal lands and indigenous rights (about 60% of the Bolivian 
population is considered to be Indian, the highest proportion in Latin America – see 
Yashar 2005, p. 21). The Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Orient of 
Bolivia (Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente de Bolivia – CIDOB) was formed in 
1982, with land protection as its primary goal. It organized a March for Territory in 
1990 and protests in 1992, which led Paz Zamora to establish seven exclusive 
indigenous territories by presidential decree (Postero 2004, pp. 195-196).200 In 
addition, the late 1990’s saw an increase in protests by coca farmers (cocaleros), 
many though not all of them Indians, for economic rights and against Plan Colombia 
– the American initiative to eradicate the sources of cocaine in Colombia and Bolivia.  
Sánchez de Lozada, known in Bolivia as “Goni,” came to power in 1993 with 
support from elites and indigenous groups alike. Along with his Aymara Indian Vice-
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President, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, Goni pursued a strategy that combined increasing 
indigenous rights with a stronger push towards economic liberalization. During his 
administration Bolivia amended its Constitution to declare itself a “multi-ethnic” and 
“pluri-cultural” society, instituted bilingual education programs nationally, ceded 
more lands to indigenous tribes, and developed a Law of Popular Participation (Ley 
de Participación Popular) designed to decentralize the management of resources 
towards municipal and regional governments (Postero 2004, p. 189; Domingo 2005, 
p. 1733). Not surprisingly, he found less popular pressure in restructuring the 
economy, though his policies would not lead to significant changes in the overall 
levels of poverty in the country, for which he would later be blamed. Bánzer, his 
successor, concentrated more on economic reform than on continuing to advance the 
indigenous cause. It was during his tenure that Bolivia would see its first major 
popular uprising. 
In September 1999, the government awarded a 40-year exclusive concession 
to provide water services to the city of Cochabamba and surrounding areas to the 
company Aguas del Tunari (AdT). During the preceding negotiations, a large 
coalition of civil society organizations had formed the Front for Water and Life 
(Coordinadora del Agua y la Vida – CAV), which strongly opposed the concession. 
The CAV’s demands were immediately dismissed by the government, but the 
organization began a thorough popular education campaign and gained broad 
legitimacy amongst the public (Nickson and Vargas 2002, p. 114). It was often joined 
in demonstrations by cocaleros led by Aymara leader Evo Morales, and later by small 




raise in water fees, combined with an apparent possibility of extra charges for small 
farmers, as well as the exclusive nature of the contract fueled a massive wave of 
protests that lasted until April 2000, when the contract was annulled. The so-called 
“water war” (“guerra del agua”) was widely celebrated by popular groups and left-
wing intellectuals as a defeat of neoliberalism (Assies 2003; Tapia 2005), but Andrew 
Nickson and Claudia Vargas (2002) persuasively show that the price hike was the 
detonator of protests by many groups not opposed to this type of economic reforms 
outright. 
The national government attempted to appease discontented sectors of civil 
society by promising political reform. Bánzer, tired of the “repression-concession 
dynamic,” proposed a constitutional reform that would give more voice to popular 
sectors.201 Future events would prove this initiative to be unsuccessful, though he had 
correctly predicted the appearance of new actors to the institutional political arena. 
After cocaleros set a new round of protests against fumigation of coca plots in 2001, 
and riding on his popularity from the Cochabamba events, Evo Morales founded the 
Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo – MAS), an alliance of 
“cocaleros, the old Left, an influential leftist lawyers’ group, current leaders of 
campesino and workers’ unions, members of the new Bolivian MST, and some 
lowland indigenous leaders, presenting a varied popular front” (Postero 2004, p. 205). 
Another indigenous leader, Felipe Quispe, founded the Pachakutik Indigenous 
Movement (Movimiento Indígena Pachakutik – MIP), patterned after the Ecuadorian 
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party, and with many of the same expressed goals. However, Quispe has alienated 
many of his potential supporters through his aggressive speaking style, his perceived 
sexism, and his radical politics – even when compared to Morales (Postero 2004, p. 
206; Alenda 2004). Besides representing peasants and Indians, MAS and MIP 
presented themselves from the start as an alternative to the corruption of the 
“oligarchic” traditional parties. At the same time, the indigenous movement was 
weakened by internal leadership struggles (not least between Morales and Quispe), 
financial difficulties, and cooptation of certain sectors (Alenda 2004).  
In the 2002 presidential elections, Morales lost to Sánchez de Lozada by a 
margin of about 1.5% of the total vote. The unexpected showing of MAS signaled a 
diminished net of support for Goni, emboldening other opposition groups and 
political parties to stand against him as well (even though he enjoyed the backing of a 
parliamentary coalition). In February of 2003, the government announced a 
significant hike in income taxes, which provoked protests among the middle classes, 
unions, and popular organizations. In this particular instance, the violence escalated 
when protesting police officers demanding wage and pension concessions clashed 
with the military, leaving thirty-one dead and hundreds of injured (Domigo 2005, p. 
1739; Postero 2005, p. 74). Though the government reneged on the proposed 
measures, the general mood was tense, in the expectation of a new packet of austerity 
measures that was seen as sure to come. 
Protests and labor strikes were common throughout 2003. But it was the 
announcement of the construction of a natural gas pipeline through Chile, in order to 




unexpected explosion of outrage. In the city of El Alto, Aymara organizations such as 
the MIP vocally protested against the measure.202 Starting on September 17, the COB 
declared a national strike. University students took to the streets soon after in La Paz, 
and the CAV in Cochabamba organized massive demonstration under the call “el gas 
es nuestro” (“the gas is ours”). Groups opposed to Goni’s economic policies were 
joined by citizens angered by the selling of the country’s resources to foreigners and 
through Chile, Bolivia’s historical enemy, no less (Seoane and Taddei 2003; Postero 
2004 and 2005; Shifter 2004). Thus, nationalist sentiments took center stage in the 
“gas war,” and were crucial in eroding Goni’s political support.203 The fact that there 
had been talk since the previous government of not allowing such measures to be 
taken without public consultation also contributed to the general sense of indignation. 
Facing more violence and an unraveling political coalition, Sánchez de Lozada 
resigned on October 17, to be replaced by his Vice-President Carlos Mesa. 
Mesa’s short-lived administration seemed doomed from the start. Not only did 
it have to face an almost constant environment of social unrest revolving around the 
nationalization of hydrocarbons and natural gas (including important waves of protest 
in Cochabamba, El Alto, and La Paz in April of 2004), but it lacked the congressional 
support that Goni had relied on initially during his presidency. Sure enough, after a 
new upsurge of protests encompassing all of the groups discussed above in May and 
June of 2005, Mesa resigned his presidency. Yet, the dynamics of this latest conflict 
demonstrate the complex relationship between civil society and the political class, as 
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well as conflicts based on regional interests. Through the end of 2003 and most of 
2004, the conflict around the future of the hydrocarbons and natural gas industries 
remained at the forefront, following a referendum in April of 2004 that was taken to 
mean that hydrocarbons would be nationalized. Simultaneously attempts from Mesa’s 
economic team to increase the price of fuel sparked additional protests around the 
country.  
In the gas-rich province of Santa Cruz, hunger strikes and protests against the 
fuel-rate increase gave way to an attempt by the Civic Committee Pro Santa Cruz 
(Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz – CCPSC), a business-led organization, to establish a 
regional referendum designed to award autonomy to the region. On January 28, 2005, 
around 200,000 santacruceños participated in a rally to demand regional autonomy. 
During the following days, MAS, Aymara organizations, the COB and several other 
unions declared themselves against Santa Cruz’s separation from the rest of the 
country. On March 6, President Mesa announced his resignation, citing political and 
social pressures surrounding the hydrocarbons legislation as well as roadblocks 
organized by the CCPSC in Santa Cruz. In an extraordinary gesture, thousands of 
citizens and organizations, including MAS, marched in support of Mesa. On March 8, 
Congress voted against accepting the President’s resignation. With this support, Mesa 
launches a public denunciation of protest groups, calling roadblocks an “attack on 
democracy” (OSAL 2005b, p. 158). On May 5, a new hydrocarbons law that fell far 
short of nationalization was passed by Congress, sparking a renewed outburst of 
protests that led to Mesa’s resignation on June 6. Behind the support of MAS, MIP, 




promise of calling for national elections as rapidly as possible. In the December 2005 
elections, Evo Morales was elected President with almost 54% of the total vote, an 
unexpectedly-strong result.      
 The Bolivian “wars” against the state between 2000 and 2005 – against the 
privatization of water in Cochabamba, against the building of the natural gas pipeline 
in Chile, and for the nationalization of hydrocarbons – show that the economic debate 
over the failure of neoliberal reforms to reduce poverty and economic inequalities 
was at the forefront of social demands, relegating indigenous “cultural” issues to the 
background. The national and international media referred to these uprisings as 
“indigenous revolutions” – which is understandable given that many of the 
participants were Aymara, and many of the protests used “ethnic tropes and 
metaphors to make their arguments, referring to the strength of the Andean warrior 
people, etc.” (Postero 2004, p. 207) – but they were not. The size and intensity of the 
protest cycles were made possible, as Nancy Postero (2004 and 2005) correctly notes, 
because indigenous groups eschewed purely ethnic and territorial demands in order to 
find common ground with other organizations. More than in any of the other 
countries discussed previously, the debate revolved around national economic policy 
almost always conflated with notions of nationalist pride. Civil society organizations, 
as has been seen, were able to mobilize against attempts to split the country (on the 
part of the opportunistic CCPSC) or to allow some segments of the political elites to 
take advantage of the crisis created by the protests themselves.       
It would appear that the electoral victory of Morales signals a triumph of the 




of an outsider candidate, and one of Aymara descent at that, has been widely 
celebrated by supporters of the fight against neoliberal capitalism around the world. It 
is not at all clear, however, that Morales’ election means a radical turn for Bolivian 
politics. Despite Morales’ much-publicized ties with Hugo Chávez, he has never 
espoused a particularly anti-capitalist stance. Although he has denounced 
neoliberalism as “the culprit responsible for so many deeds, and also responsible for 
the uprising of the Bolivian people” (quoted in Postero 204, p. 208), Morales has 
shown a willingness to negotiate with other political actors, supporting Sánchez de 
Lozada and Mesa at different points.204 It remains unclear whether he will attempt to 
govern through broad alliances of different classes or if, like Chávez, his presidency 
will exacerbate the class polarization that has dominated politics in Bolivia for over 
two decades.  
Conclusions – Civil Society and the State in Ecuador and Bolivia 
Political conflicts between social actors and the state in these two Andean 
nations usually revolve around either material issues or demands for recognition of 
indigenous cultural traditions and their right to their original lands. Given the 
complexities of party competition in these countries, on top of regional and ethnic 
conflicts, it is perhaps even more surprising that their civil societies have been able to 
unify repeatedly in pursuit of common goals. They have been able to do so by 
temporarily abandoning group-level demands and appealing to, of all things, national 
unity and pride. This has sometimes benefited established elites, which can for a time 
stop worrying about the anti-systemic stance of social movements like CONAIE or 
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political parties like the MIR and join social protests against individual political 
figures. It has also brought benefits to individual movements, as their capacity to 
mobilize masses of citizens functions as leverage for governments to attend to their 
demands.  
Although, as has been pointed out, the particular shapes that the popular 
uprisings in these countries have taken lend little support to the idea that they 
represent a growing anti-capitalist (or at least anti-neoliberal) movement, they 
nevertheless appear to have been most successful in mounting a counter-hegemonic 
challenge within their societies. By this I mean their indisputable success in bringing 
issues of indigenous recognition and participation in politics to the front, forcing 
change in the legal frameworks of their countries to accommodate their demands, and 
finally placing indigenous candidates at the highest levels of national government, 
culminating in the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia. That this was achieved through 
the parallel use of mythical “originarian” indigenous traditions and the participation 
in broader alliances of movements and organizations that pursued nationalistic aims 
only serves to underscore the paradoxes inherent in their civil societies. It becomes 
clear, for instance, that the values and ideas that come to encapsulate a particular 
struggle of “the people” – what Laclau (2004 and 2005) calls the “empty signifier” – 
may leave out some important concerns for many participants, and in fact even 
contradict them.      
 It is a mistake to confuse the preeminence of indigenous symbols and rhetoric 
with the cultural wars some left-wing activists claim to be witnessing in the Andean 




civil society expressed quite clearly as their principal concern the reform of 
governmental institutions so as to insure the well being of the countries’ populations. 
Debates on autonomy for native tribes or local-level decision-making were of 
minimal importance in the most explosive periods of popular protest. Should the 
future Presidential administration in Ecuador, like that of Morales in Bolivia, 
continue to take steps towards the strengthening of state control over natural 
resources, the problematic of supporting such a turn while advocating for autonomy 
within civil society is likely to come to the fore.  
 It seems reasonable to expect, in contrast to Argentina and Costa Rica, future 
periods of social instability in the Andean cases. Both Ecuador and Bolivia contain a 
larger core of active social movements than Costa Rica or Argentina, particularly 
since in both of the latter the middle classes were late additions to the opposition, and 
promptly returned to inactivity. In Bolivia and Ecuador smaller and weaker middle 
classes were not as crucial elements of the mass movements, and much of the original 
population could be more easily pushed to action once again. The process of framing 
the collective grievances and demands of large segments of the populations in these 
countries, which came to be adopted by the larger movements, took place over a 
longer period of time: among the indigenous organizations of both nations, for 
instance, or among the tin miners and cocaleros in Bolivia. The continuity of popular 
protest in Bolivia and Ecuador attests to the effect such framing had on the formation 
of strong, active civil societies that spearheaded national debates on the meaning of 
democracy, and arrived at conclusions not in vogue among theorists in the most 




the health of democracy in these nations will contribute to an evaluation of the 






Chapter 6:  General Conclusions 
 
The popular protest mobilizations that have taken place in Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, and Bolivia since 2000 exemplify the need for students of civil society 
to reevaluate the impact a mobilized citizenry can have on the promotion of 
democracy. Scholarly critiques of a “tame” or “limited” conception of the relationship 
between civil society and democracy (in Habermas 1991; Touraine 1981, 1982, 1987, 
and 1989; Melucci 1989 and 1992; but especially Keane 1988a and 1988b; Cohen 
and Arato 1992; Baker 2002) – which focuses solely on the role of civil society in the 
consolidation of liberal democratic institutions – are warranted, since such a view 
excludes the potential for alternative forms of democratic governance. However, such 
critiques usually commit the same mistake as their targets. They replace a rigid and 
reified view of this relationship with another one, which, in turn, limits the possible 
goals of civil society to the establishment of radical or participatory “self-limiting 
utopias” based primarily on the struggle against state colonization of the public 
sphere.  
Throughout, I have used the term “civil society” broadly, referring to 
collective actors voluntarily formed by individuals that actively pursue particular 
goals. I have backed away from definitional matters as much as possible, choosing 
instead to adopt the usage of the term common to the literature reviewed in Chapters 
1 and 2. The mass mobilizations examined here fit nicely with O’Donnell and 
Schmitter’s characterization of “popular upsurges” in the 1970’s and 1980’s, for 




religious groups, intellectuals, artists, clergymen, defenders of human rights, and 
professional associations.” The protests in Costa Rica in March and April of 2000, in 
Argentina in December 2001 and early 2002, in Ecuador in 2000 and 2005, and in 
Bolivia in 2003 and 2005 all included a broad range of social organizations and 
movements, unions, student and ecclesiastical organizations, and a multitude of 
others. They were all, moreover, initiated by these groups, though often they were 
joined by political leaders and parties with agendas of their own. Even in cases where 
elite actors had a hand in prompting social unrest – as with Peronist punteros 
encouraging lootings in Argentina or opposition parties seeking to remove sitting 
presidents in accordance to the wishes of social movements, such as Carlos Mesa in 
Bolivia and Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador – the organized social groups at the heads of 
the protests were never led or directed by elite actors. They are as clear examples of 
the expression of “people power” as their more celebrated counterparts across the 
globe. 
A number of scholarly analysts of the renewed impetus of social protest in 
Latin America (Mattini 2000 and 2003; Vargas 2000; Colectivo Situaciones 2001 and 
2002; Houtart 2001; Sader 2001; Negri and Cocco 2002; Assies 2003; Dinerstein 
2003a and 2003b; Ferrara 2003; Mamani 2003; Miranda 2003; Seoane and Taddei 
2003; Zibechi 2003 and 2004; Barbetta and Bidaseca 2004; Hardt and Negri 2004; 
Tapia 2005; Unda 2005) have mistakenly taken the appearance of social movements 
espousing new identities and intent on radically transforming their societies as signs 
that such a goal was the driving force behind the protests, missing the proverbial 




address the issue of the framing and articulation of goals, ideals, and values, which is 
crucial to the formation of mass movements in civil societies composed of large and 
heterogeneous multiplicities of collective associations and movements.  
The importance of framing has been widely discussed in the recent literature 
on social movements (Klandermans 1988; Snow and Benford 1988; Tarrow 1994; 
Benford and Snow 2000), in theoretical critiques of orthodox Marxism (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2004 and 2005), and in in-depth analyses of the democratic 
revolutions led by civil society in Eastern Europe (Kubik 1994). Even if the existence 
in the public sphere of common values rooted in tradition or “political culture” is 
granted, the connection between values and particular conditions and events is almost 
never obvious and is therefore articulated in competing political discourses. As 
Gramsci recognized, the struggle for hegemony – that is, the dominant cultural 
discourse – is constantly at work between the state and civil society, but that is partly 
because civil society itself is rife with disagreement and conflict among its members. 
In order to turn civil society into a social movement, such disagreement must be 
overcome by the framing of competing claims and goals into a commonality of 
purpose. The usefulness of the notion of hegemony is that it recognizes that the 
framing and articulation of values and ideas is contingent, though not necessarily 
arbitrary. Thus, in order to understand a particular case of political conflict, it is 
important to identify the way in which that conflict is understood by its protagonists.       
 Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation outline three theoretical difficulties with 
the extant theoretical accounts of mobilized civil societies derived from the 




1970’s and 1980’s. First, I argue that the goal of these dissident organizations in the 
past was to free themselves from state domination, as the theorists of civil society 
claim, but that this was the result of particular political and social conditions (as well 
as of the choice, both on the part of dissident intellectuals and of their analysts, to 
minimize the importance of economic factors in their accounts). The claim that the 
goal of civil society in contemporary politics is necessarily such a separation between 
the public sphere and the political arena does not necessarily hold under a different 
set of conditions. Second, the aforementioned claim is further complicated by the 
need to explain how the different collective entities within civil society come to 
accept the same goals and values. In democratic polities the obstacles to free 
association and expression are presumably absent, yet the very freedoms that 
democracy provides, as well as the ability of individuals and organizations to engage 
in direct negotiations with political officials without fear of violent reprisal, make it 
less likely that competing social groups will reach common ground. Hence the 
fundamental importance of the notion of framing. Finally, I question whether the 
commonalities of values and purpose that are sometimes seen in civil society are 
necessarily the product of horizontal communication in the public sphere, or whether 
they might come from above; that is, from political elites in the past or present. In the 
cases I discuss in this work, I suggest that accepted norms of what constitutes 
democracy, social justice, and political legitimacy might have been inherited from 
elite notions adopted by society as a “core narrative of identity” in the respective 




In the case-study chapters, I show that in each of the Latin American nations 
examined the major conflicts between civil society and the state were framed in terms 
of the limitations of liberal democracy, though not with the goal of securing the 
freedom of society from the state. The economic projects of economic liberalization, 
which presumably reduced state intervention in society, left civil society open to the 
unpredictable whims of the global economy and the behavior of corrupt public figures 
trying to gain from the processes of structural adjustment. The public reactions 
against them reflected a rejection of both, not in terms of a preferred radical political 
program, but instead rooted in a shared sense of national pride and identity. Thus, the 
distinction between civil, political, and economic societies, originally delineated by 
Gramsci and adopted by Keane, Baker, Cohen and Arato, and others, proves useful in 
analyzing the Latin American cases. However, while these theorists concentrate on 
the relations between political and civil societies, they fail to realize that the 
protection of society from the effects of economic change may require more rather 
than less state intervention.  
 The case studies demonstrate that large popular movements growing out of 
the fusion of the struggles of a variety of collective entities in civil society may take 
alternative forms. While in all four cases mobilized civil societies stood in opposition 
to state policies and political leaders, they did so not in order to pressure for the 
radical transformation of governmental institutions, but instead to demand more state 
intervention in order to insure standards of social justice deemed fundamental to 
democratic life. As is clearly seen in previous chapters, some participants – perhaps 




radical change, but the processes through which the popular opposition took shape 
tended to favor the goals and demands of the moderate majority of citizens, who do 
not usually participate in contestatory collective action. What social movements 
accomplished in the cases examined was the framing of political scandals and 
unpopular economic policies into a betrayal of an idealized past rather than the 
promise of a utopian future. This is extremely important since it shows Latin 
American societies to be supportive of elite-centered politics, and state intervention in 
society, as long as it delivers the goods, even in cases in which no major elite group 
joins the popular mobilizations in word or deed.  
This work is based on an empirically-based analysis of the behavior of civil 
society grounded in a detailed look at the beliefs espoused and the language used by 
social movements and other social actors but also a historical analysis of the core 
narratives on which such language and beliefs are based. The influence of elites in the 
hegemonic core narrative of a nation is instrumental in shaping the views and values 
of civil society, and it is far from coincidental that such past figures as Jose Figueres 
in Costa Rica or Juan Perón in Argentina were constantly referred to by critics of 
these governments. The belief, or at least the hope, that social movements may be in 
the process of overcoming these narratives and replacing them with something new is 
widespread among Latin American left-wing intellectuals, but the articulation of 
common social demands in each of these countries leads away from that conclusion. 
 This is most clearly seen in Costa Rica, where the various social organizations 
involved in the protests unfavorably compared the leadership in 2000 to the architects 




notion of social welfare hand in hand with a healthy democracy. That the “golden 
age” of Costa Rican progress coincided with the virtual monopoly on power of a 
single political faction, the persecution of certain political groups, and the deliberate 
decimation of organized labor movements seemed not to worry the general public in 
the face of the destruction of that legacy. More than in any other country in the 
region, there seems to be a consensus across the social spectrum over the need to 
maintain the principles of solidarity and social welfare inherent in the discourse of 
Figueres and the PLN, the core narrative of national identity that dominated Costa 
Rica for three decades, and evidently still has a stronghold on the national psyche. 
That this did not make itself apparent in the nearly two-decade long process of 
structural adjustment already under way is a function of several factors: the lack of an 
organized social opposition rooted in civil society, including a strong labor 
movement; the deftly managed process of reform, undertaken slowly, with popular 
input, and using mechanisms of spreading the costs across various social classes; the 
overall health of the national economy; and the continuity of established political 
parties. Chapter 4 shows how some effects of the reforms had begun to become 
unpalatable to the population by the late 1990’s, but it was mostly the combination of 
a precipitous decline of public trust in their leaders and what was perceived as an 
attack on a beloved national institution that provided the opportunity for critics to 
frame the issue such that they received massive support.  
 The events in Argentina, though precipitated by the prospect and then the 
reality of economic collapse, showed a similar pattern. The first instances of social 




particularly the human rights organizations – and then by the hardest hit social 
sectors, first in town-level puebladas and later in the shape of the unemployed 
movement. It took the established labor organizations some time to incorporate 
themselves to the social opposition, given their historical ties to the PJ, as seen by the 
internal splits of the CGT into rival factions and their unification following the 
ascension to power of Fernando de la Rúa. It is notable that the rapid process of 
structural adjustment did not at first lead to the unification of civil society, but to its 
splintering. The labor movement experienced an unprecedented internal shakeup, and 
the piqueteros grew out of separate factions divided by ideological values and 
strategic goals. As in Costa Rica, the opposition began to gain traction by responding 
to the experiences of most Argentines, not only the unemployed but also the 
impoverished middle classes, and framing them as the result of a deliberate campaign 
of the political class and foreign investors to dispossess the country of its rightful 
patrimony. De la Rúa’s imprudent choice to declare a state of siege to respond to 
lootings and early protests also tapped into the national narrative in a negative way, 
providing evidence for the opposition’s claim that neoliberal democratic government 
was essentially as dangerous and immoral the defunct military dictatorship. The 
subsequent popularity of Néstor Kirchner reflects the willingness of Argentines to 
allow for strong political leadership and an interventionist state, as long as these are 
considered legitimate. 
 In Bolivia and Ecuador, ethnic conflicts and class disparities were put aside in 
order to give birth to mass popular movements that decried corruption of politicians 




national problems require national solutions led by the state was evident in protests 
against the campaign by groups in the Bolivian province of Santa Cruz pursuing 
autonomy for the region. It was also clear in CONAIE’s appeals against the 
dollarization of the sucre, and in its willingness to abjure power shortly after 
successfully deposing President Jamil Mahuad. Despite the prominent role played by 
indigenous organizations in both countries, and of the ubiquitous use of “indigenist” 
symbols and rhetoric, the main engine of the largest instances of popular protest was 
not what Yahar has called an effort to overcome the “post-liberal challenge,” but a 
demand for insuring that the riches of these countries be used by the state to benefit 
its citizens. The recent moves towards increased state control of natural gas and oil, to 
the supposed detriment of transnational corporations, is a direct reflection of this 
drive.    
The triggers of the protests were not dysfunctional political systems or corrupt 
leaders, at least not directly, but specific economic initiatives – the freezing of bank 
accounts in Argentina in order to stop investment flight, the privatization of the ICE 
in Costa Rica, dollarization and austerity measures in Ecuador, the natural gas 
pipeline in Bolivia.205 Demands for political reform lost some of their priority when 
other, more urgent matters were at stake, precisely as social protest ceased to be the 
purview of a few active social movements and became “the people’s cause.” This 
points to a major limitation in many contemporary theories of civil society and new 
social movements (e.g., Cohen and Arato 1992; Escobar and Alvarez 1992a; Baker 
2002; Yashar 2003), which focus solely on political and cultural conflicts at the 
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expense of socio-economic ones. In contemporary Latin America, the debate on the 
meaning of democracy is intimately linked to how states respond to the material 
needs of the citizenry, to their behavior towards natural resources, and to their 
willingness to engage in politics based on the “moral politics” of the population at 
large. In essence, the relationship between civil and economic societies affects that 
between civil and political societies. In the Latin American case, the citizenry came to 
see the economic transformations underway as a retreat of the state from its previous 
paternalistic role, leaving large segments of society (and by no means only the poor, 
the peasantry, or the indigenous communities) unprotected in the face of amoral 
market processes and immoral practices on the part of political leaders. 
The content of the values that motivate the actions of civil society groups is 
contingent on a number of factors. The case studies in this dissertation have attempted 
to illustrate how material and historical conditions contribute to what amounts to the 
“construction” of a common identity across a multiplicity of heterogeneous groups. 
This articulation, however, is almost invariably reactive, in that it responds to 
political or economic crisis or to the actions of ruling elites. The articulation of 
demands shared by heterogeneous actors refers to specific issues and, given the 
difficulty to maintain collective action, does not usually endure beyond the 
“resolution” of those issues. This would appear to be the case in recent protest 
movements in Ukraine, Lebanon, and elsewhere, and the evidence collected here 
strongly supports this view. 
General opposition, the “voice of the people,” was only heard when the 




attention of the population as a whole. That the catalyst for mobilization in all four 
countries was an issue of national sovereignty and/or national pride is, it seems to me, 
extraordinarily important. When it came to act together with others, social 
movements held on to the symbols and language prevalent in a core national narrative 
that would be accepted by the population at large. Collective action may come from 
“below,” but symbols more often than not come from “above,” from elites 
establishing hegemonic visions of national pride that have effectively captured the 
imagination of the popular classes. How indigenous movements, which purport to 
represent the “originarian” (“originarias”) identities of American aboriginal cultures, 
deal with the pull of national identity as opposed to more “traditional” nationalities is 
a question that cannot yet be answered. So far, however, indigenous confederations 
such as CONAIE and political figures such as Evo Morales have had no qualms in 
adopting nationalistic stances to further their aims. 
 Not only were the national anthem and flag very prominent among protesters 
in all four countries (mixed with indigenous symbols in Ecuador and Bolivia, to be 
sure), but the main goals of the protests themselves referred to national rather than 
regional or ethnic interests. “The gas is ours!,” cried the Bolivian protesters, just like 
the demonstrations in Costa Rica declared that “the ICE is ours.” The abandonment of 
the national currency was seen as a further betrayal of the trust of the people of 
Ecuador on its leaders, but so was Lucio Gutiérrez “about-face” on his electoral 
promises. Like Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina, Gutiérrez quickly went from a self-




of the same policies. Not coincidentally, the response of Ecuadorians was the same as 
that of Argentines in 2001; “out with Lucio,” but also “they should all go.” 
 The processes of formation and gradual growth of the opposition movements, 
as well as their rapid fragmentation following the end of the crises, illustrate the 
relevance of the second critique elaborated in Chapter 2. In Costa Rica, the struggle 
against the Combo initiative was undertaken for years prior to 2000 by a stable, 
though relatively small, core of organizations, led by public-sector unions, university 
student federations, and left-wing political parties. As the date for the first legislative 
vote approached (more rapidly than anticipated, due to the “fast-tracking” of the 
initiative) the opposition block was joined in rapid succession by farmers, several 
labor organizations, non-profits, high school students and teachers, all of whom put 
aside their priorities in order to combat a government policy that was by then 
understood to signify a betrayal of the principles that had held the nation together thus 
far. This was the product both of a far-reaching information campaign on the part of 
the opposition and by the unwillingness of state officials to present their position 
clearly to the public. The latter proved to be a costly political miscalculation that may 
have seriously affected the subsequent course of events. The growth of the coalition 
was achieved primarily by the ability of the original core of movements’ ability to tap 
into the significance of the “solidarity state” of which the ICE was indubitably a 
symbol, though strategic considerations on the part of some participants (in order to 
secure support for later battles) cannot be discounted.  
Once the initiative had been rescinded, and the victorious opposition had 




public support. In the presidential elections immediately following the protests voter 
turnout was ominously low (a sign that direct collective action does not necessarily 
translate into political commitment) and the winning candidate belonged to the 
PUSC, the same party as President Rodríguez. The government seemed to learn its 
lesson as well, beginning a well-funded campaign to sway public opinion in favor of 
CAFTA, which could eventually result in a renewed drive to privatize electricity and 
telecommunications. Ottón Solís’ surprising showing in the 2006 election can be 
attributed to the general disillusionment expressed in the 2000 protests, but also on 
the disastrous performance of Abel Pacheco, Rodríguez’s successor.  
In Argentina, the development of social opposition to the economic reforms 
and political corruption that culminated in the economic collapse of 2001 was 
seriously hindered by the debilitated civil society that emerged form the military 
period and to the initial popularity of Carlos Menem and his packet of economic 
reforms. Even as, in the late 1990’s, it became clear that there were serious social 
consequences to the structural adjustment program, the diverse segments of the 
opposition failed to unite. The labor movement was engaged in deep internal 
struggles, as were the unemployed piqueteros, whose main instrument of struggle 
gained them animosity from the middle and upper classes. The unification of civil 
society was the product of the deepening economic crisis, public outrage at a series of 
political scandals, and the election of the UCR candidate de la Rúa, which eliminated 
the problematic allegiance between the CGT and the PJ. Yet, even as the opposition 
gained force, the more articulate discourses of opposition –particularly coming from 




piquetero organizations – never quite grabbed hold of the population with the same 
strength as it did in Costa Rica. The more diffuse common ground centered on the 
conviction that political leaders had stolen the country’s wealth and deliberately 
deprived its people of the social guarantees that (supposedly) all enjoyed in the past. 
Thus the ambiguous and open-ended “que se vayan todos.”  
As is related in chapter 3, the period of unity between the unions, the 
piqueteros, and the middle classes was short, if indubitably intense, and the new 
forms of sociability so lauded by observers did not last. The middle classes diverged 
into asambleistas and ahorristas, the labor movement returned to its own squabbles, 
the piqueteros were largely  co-opted by PJ leaders and likewise continued to 
concentrate in their differences rather than their similarities, the neighborhood 
assemblies and interbarriales were hijacked by far-left political parties with no real 
popular support, and the human rights organizations were placated by government 
action on behalf of their original goals of justice and punishment for military violators 
(particularly after Kirchner’s election in 2003).  
Bolivia and Ecuador’s opposition movements have shown more of an ability 
to repeatedly engage in large-scale popular mobilization. This is surprising, given the 
existence of ethnic, cultural, and geographic divisions as well of a lack of large 
middle classes, which often are the standard bearers for “national identity.” It bears 
repeating that the nationwide protests seen in these countries were not purely the 
work of indigenous, peasant, or poor-people’s movements but wide alliances 
encompassing the middle classes, white collar unions, NGOs, and moderate political 




cocalero movements in Ecuador provide stable leadership within civil society, such 
that when these organizations choose to mobilize, they can often count on a certain 
amount of support. At the same time, the unsuccessful protests led by CONAIE in 
March of 2006 show that the emergence of coalitions across civil society is not 
automatic and cannot be taken for granted. It is clear that the continuous ability to 
mobilize multitudes of citizens is partly the result of the successful organization of 
indigenous communities in both countries (Zamosc 2004; Yashar 2005) and of 
peasants and miners in Bolivia. Nevertheless, in both nations the major demands of 
the protest movements have been towards increasing the abilities of states to control 
national resources and distribute wealth more equally, not towards dispersing political 
power among competing worldviews, and certainly not towards radically changing 
the structure of liberal democratic institutions.    
 The attempts on the part of several social movements in Latin America to 
create new types of politics, to demand recognition for cultural or ethnic traditions 
long ignored by national elites and state institutions, and to form new identities based 
on shared life experiences at the local level are indubitably important. Since many in 
Latin America remain impoverished, ignored and often actively discriminated against 
by national and local governments, the development of communal forms of 
organization can be crucial for the provision of vital necessities to people across the 
region. Social movements such as Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the 
Zapatistas in Mexico, and the Landless Peasant Movement in Brazil have synthesized 
daily communal interactions with political action. This has prompted some theorists 




through these communal identities (e.g., Mattini 2000 and 2003; Colectivo 
Situaciones 2001 and 2002, Zibechi 2003). Some maintain a structuralist 
understanding of society and emphasize that change most common from “the civil 
society from below” (Houtart 2001, p. 66), but this is coupled, as Gideon Baker 
(1998a) has noted with a renewed hope in “voluntarism” – the ability of collectives to 
understand their inferior social position and act in order to change it.   
These authors neglect to notice the incompatibility, in Hudson Meadwell’s 
(1995) terms, of pre-modern forms of organization with the trappings of modernity: 
national states, globalized communications, and so forth. In an attempt to combat 
what they see the no-exit nature of modernity, they offer a “post-modern” revolution 
grounded on pre-modern communal ties that is as theoretically problematic as it is 
divorced from actual political practice. This somewhat eclectic mix is evident in Luis 
Mattini’s (2003) contention that: 
Today nobody can claim “scientifically” that we are headed towards a new and real 
emancipation or we continue our long march to highly technological barbarism. We 
do perceive that we are experiencing a formidable civilizational rupture and […] we 
assume that liberty is not a state, but an act, independent of final results. This 
“expression of desires,” this ontological exigency, is a part of concrete social 
practices (p. 229). 
 
Ana Dinerstein (2003b) approaches this challenge through the lens of civil 
society: 
Whereas the concept of civil society produces identification with the state through 
the notion of separation and independence, the negative concept allows a critique of 
the state since it overcomes the political abstraction and the violence of the 
homogenization implicit in the general category of citizen. It implies a struggle to 
transform civil society into a subject (p. 195). 
 
 The problem which Meadwell identifies in theories such as Cohen and Arato’s 




exacerbated by these theorists’ rejection of homogeneity, making it the actual 
unification of different groups and different identities almost self-contradictory. It 
seems more useful to acknowledge, as Bert Klandermans (1994) puts it, that the 
construction of identities within social movements involve “a plurality of ideas and 
significations that followers attribute to their movement and the problems that 
motivate it” (p. 175). In fact, as is clearly seen in the Latin American protests, social 
movements have no intention of abandoning those elements of modernity on which 
theorists such as Mattini, Dinerstein, Zibechi, or the members of Colectivo 
Situaciones place the blame for current social ills due to their “totalizing” efforts. As 
with works on civil society and social movements that emphasize the need to avoid 
the colonization of the social on the part of the state and emphasize “cultural politics” 
– i.e., “when sets of social actors shaped by, and embodying, different cultural 
meanings and practices come into conflict with each other” (Alvarez, Dagnino, and 
Escobar 1998, p. 7) – this perspective fails to acknowledge that for a large part of 
Latin Americans the theoretically obsolete notions of nationality and the welfare state 
remain very much legitimate. They are too concerned about poverty, hunger, disease, 
corruption, and all the other matters that directly affect their daily lives. For better or 
for worse, the disillusionment felt in many countries over the failure of democracy 
and neoliberal reforms to solve these problems has precipitated at least an attempt to 
find a different alternative, but one that embraces national pride and demands more 
state involvement in society rather than less.  
 A national-level shared identity is, according to liberal thinkers such as Ernest 




civil society. Yet, the Latin American cases show that, as constructivist scholars have 
argued, this identity is mutable and particularly vulnerable during “critical junctures” 
in national history (Collier and Collier 1993; Golob 2003). The adoption of neoliberal 
economic programs, and the necessary structural transformations that they imply, 
represented critical junctures in the countries under discussion, particularly when they 
occurred hand-in-hand with political transitions. The appearance of mass protest 
movements reflected not only difficult economic outcomes but also the unwillingness 
or inability of sitting elites to create a new national narrative to legitimize national 
policy. This is plainest in the case of Costa Rica, where the dominant PLN and PUSC 
continue to insist (quite incongruously, at times) that freer markets are the best way to 
continue the social-democratic legacy of the country, but also can be seen in the 
mixture of populism and neoliberalism of the PJ under Menem, as well as of 
purportedly “center-left” leaders such as Abdala Bucaram and later Gutiérrez in 
Ecuador, and Jaime Paz Zamora in Bolivia.  
It is not possible to conclude from the case studies that the ideas and goals 
identified here are the dominant ones in each of the four countries. The claim here is 
that they were the preeminent ones expressed in nationwide mobilizations of civil 
society. Whether such mobilizations necessarily have longer-term repercussions in 
national politics is an issue for further study, but their impact is apparent in the cases 
discussed here. In all four countries, national elections immediately following the 
mobilizations showed healthy national dialogues on issues of economic development, 
social welfare, and the need to reform political institutions to reduce improper 




military officer and supported of the protests against Mahuad, was elected President 
with strong backing from CONAIE and activist social organizations. Evo Morales 
similarly gained the presidency in Bolivia, his program of social reform reinforced by 
his indigenous roots and lower-class background. Argentina’s Kirchner, though a 
leading figure of the long-ruling PJ, was widely seen as more left-leaning than his 
rivals, and one of his first acts in office was directed at insuring the prosecution of 
human rights’ abusers before 1983, an issue of significant appeal to social 
movements. In Costa Rica, Ottón Solís almost defeated the supposedly invincible 
Oscar Arias, in an election that revolved around the looming Central American Free-
Trade Agreement.  
It may be the case that the demands of protesters across the Latin American 
region – as I understand them, for the return to state policies based on welfare-state 
principles and for respect of national sovereignty – are unrealistic, or that they will 
hinder future economic growth. For many critics, the increased activity of social 
movements in Latin America during the 1990’s and the explosion of protests in the 
current decade represent an unwillingness to understand the undesirability of 
returning to – to use a ubiquitous phrase – “the failed policies of the past.” This is an 
empirical question, perhaps the most divisive one in Latin America today, since it is 
clear that the economic programs instituted to replace the “failed policies” have fallen 
far short of their original promise. In this work, I have attempted to demystify the 
presence of “the voice of the people” in the uprisings in Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia, in order to place them in the context of dominant elite conflicts 




Nevertheless, the popular mobilizations discussed in this work expressed explicit 
demands on the part of immense popular actors. To ignore them altogether, in favor 
of abstract economic models and established orthodoxy among experts, seems an 
abandonment of one of the fundamental tenets of the democracy that everyone claims 
to values so greatly.     
 As indicated previously, it would seem that the lack of enthusiasm for this 
new wave of mass protest in Latin America stems from concerns over its deleterious 
effects on the region’s democracy. Yet, every one of these movements expressed 
itself in democratic terms. Not only in the sense that democracy (understood as the 
will of the majority) and social movements are conceptually connected – as Charles 
Tilly (2003) aptly puts it, the message inherent in social mobilization is: “We are 
here, we support this cause, there are lots of us, we know how to act together, and we 
could cause trouble if we wanted to” (p. 24) – but they explicitly saw their demands 
as part of a broader conception of democracy. In addition, all of the cases discussed 
show a significant amount of restraint on the part of the opposition movement, which 
had opportunities to reject established political practices but chose not to do so. This 
can be gleaned from the immediate abdication of power by the impromptu junta that 
took over in Ecuador in January of 2000, but also by demonstrations in Bolivia 
initially supporting President Mesa and by the willingness of social movements to 
meet in negotiations with Fernando de la Rúa’s successors in Argentina. The popular 
opposition always demanded the establishment of improved channels of 
communication between society and the state rather than replacing political 




 It should be noted, however, that unbridled enthusiasm for the type of mass 
mobilizations seen here potentially ignores some troubling issues. To begin with, as 
has been noted by several analysts (e.g., Naím 2004; Peeler 2004; Valenzuela 2004), 
such overwhelming popular reactions cause severe instability – social, political, and 
economic. Particularly in still-fragile democracies such as Bolivia and Ecuador, the 
risk of an outright return to authoritarianism may be small, but it is not to be 
discounted altogether. Attempts on the part of national governments to control the 
protests often led to fierce clashes between demonstrators and security forces, and 
although some blame must fall on political leaders for resorting to violence to quell 
dissent, every one of the cases saw radical opposition groups or angry mobs attacking 
individuals and destroying public and private property. The images of individuals in 
lower-middle-class and working-class neighborhoods in Argentina wielding firearms 
in order to protects their homes and families from mobs, of small-business owners 
crying over the loss of their livelihoods, are reminders of the dark side of popular 
action, which can all too easily turn to wanton vandalism. 
 Perhaps most importantly, given the importance of framing and articulation in 
the creation and maintenance of popular movements, is the very real danger of 
populist and semi-authoritarian leaders taking advantage of the energy of the mass 
mobilizations in order to solidify their power at the expense of democracy, even if 
they do so in the name of democracy. The most prominent warning sign is the career 
of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who did not come to power following civil 
society mobilizations, but has been shown to enjoy the support of large sections of his 




behind legitimate criticisms of Venezuela’s democratic regime and widespread 
discontent with established political elites, and despite drafting and effecting a 
National Constitution that opens up governance to citizen input, Chávez has solidified 
political power around himself and his close political allies and created a cult of 
personality reminiscent of far darker times (see McCoy and Meyers 2004). Some 
critics have argued that Kirchner and Evo Morales have abused their newfound 
popularity to the detriment of democratic institutions in similar ways (see, e.g., 
Castañeda 2006), but regardless of the veracity of these charges the potential for such 
regression is very real precisely by virtue of the characteristics of civil society at the 
core of this study. 
 Unified and mobilized civil societies, I have argued here, are products of 
necessary simplifications of a vast array of problems, conflicts, demands, and goals 
into articulated narratives. Given that the citizens of Latin America are all too often 
faced with such dire challenges that they have little or no time to worry about abstract 
issues such as democratic consolidation, and given that the cases discussed above and 
the history of the region in general show a propensity for strong leaders supported 
from the grassroots to arise, the danger of charismatic figures establishing themselves 
as national saviors is all too real. The specter of populism has made appearances in 
the recent past, with Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru, for 
example, and the disappointments of democratic governance in the last two decades 
may lead the hardest hit Latin Americans, who polls continuously show to be 




rewards. As Mafalda, a beloved Latin American cartoon character puts it, “what is 
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